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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the burgeoning neo-republican literature by proposing a 
novel solution to the problem of transnational domination. In doing so, the thesis will offer a 
coherent and defensible account of transnational domination, one which claims that the problem 
of transnational domination can arise in two distinct forms. The first form of transnational 
domination occurs when external agents interfere or threaten to interfere in the affairs of states, 
since any interference with states will correlatively interfere with the lives of the individuals living 
within that state. The second form, what I will term individualised transnational domination, 
occurs when transnational control bypasses the state and interferes in the lives of individuals. 
Addressing the two forms of transnational domination and securing an internationally just 
political framework requires that we look to create a multi-level system of cosmopolitan 
democratic governance in which: states’ capacity to secure social and political justice is protected; 
transnational agents, including multinational corporations, are subject to constitutional 
constraints; and individuals are able to influence and direct the governance that they’re subject 
to, thereby rendering the framework democratically legitimate.  
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Introduction 
 
The Problem of Transnational Domination  
 
Over the last two decades, neo-republicanism has emerged as a contender to liberalism’s 
preeminent status within political theorising. Theorists working within this broad tradition are 
united in the way in which they understand freedom as a status-concept. For neo-republicans, to 
be free is to enjoy independence from arbitrary control or domination,1 and individuals are 
deemed to be free when they are protected from the capacity of others to exert arbitrary control 
over their lives and their choices.  
While many theorists have offered novel accounts of how we might achieve individual 
freedom from domination, less attention has been paid to the problem of transnational domination, 
or how we might secure an internationally just world in which individuals are free from 
interference or the threat of interference. The problem, here, is that while it might be possible to 
design ideal republics in which citizens enjoy protections against domination, the transnational 
framework within which these republics are embedded may be such that internal non-domination 
is undermined by external agents. The central issue that this thesis therefore addresses is how we 
might develop a political solution to the problem of transnational domination, and thereby secure 
international justice, while simultaneously ensuring that individuals enjoy social and political 
justice.  
Since Philip Pettit has offered the fullest account of neo-republican freedom, and has 
considered the problem of transnational domination at length, this thesis will primarily engage 
with his work. Indeed, he outlines one component of the problem of transnational domination 
succinctly when he argues that, ‘If such a state were dominated by an outside agency, then its 
citizens would also be dominated by that agency, since any restrictions at the level of the state 
would inevitably involve restrictions on their democratic lives. And so we see that the ideal of the 
free person or citizen requires that the state that protects people against private domination ought 
to be, not only internally undominating, but externally undominated as well.’2  
Pettit goes on to argue that socially and politically just states can be subject to external 
domination by a variety of international and transnational agents, including other states, 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, governance institutions 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that in recent years there has been a gradual shift in neo-republican 
terminology, which is in part a result of the difficulties associated with defining arbitrary/non-
arbitrary control. Pettit now prefers to use the term uncontrolled interference rather that arbitrary 
interference as the term ‘arbitrary’ may be misleading owing to modern connotations. See: 
Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 58. 
2 Philip Pettit, Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, Inc, 2014), p. 151. 
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such as the European Union, and multinational corporations. In order to address this issue, Pettit 
has offered us two accounts of how the problem of transnational domination might be addressed.  
In A Republican Law of Peoples (2010) he argues that it would be necessary to develop 
a set of global regulatory norms or rules, which would discipline international agents and 
constrain their actions, and that weaker states would need to coalesce into blocs to counterbalance 
the power of stronger states. As will be evidenced in the first and third chapters, however, this is 
a strategy that Pettit rejected in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997). 
Indeed, he argued in this earlier work that such an approach is an implausible means for securing 
non-domination between individuals because it would inevitably lead to a war of all against all 
and a correlative reduction in freedom for all agents. It is therefore unusual that Pettit applies this 
strategy to the international level.   
In his most recent work, Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (2014), 
Pettit has amended his suggestions and outlined an account of international justice which would 
require that states agree to a series of multilateral arrangements which would create a global 
framework within which each state can exercise their sovereign liberties. The aim of this approach 
would be to create the global infrastructure in which states’ capacity to secure social and political 
justice would be protected from external interference and would seem to suggest a more highly 
institutionalised international political system than that advanced in A Republican Law of Peoples.  
While he offers us a plausible theory of international justice to supplement his accounts 
of social and political justice, I will argue that Pettit’s most recent suggestions would similarly 
fail to secure non-domination. This is because his approach relies on states themselves being the 
primary enactors and guarantors for the overarching global infrastructure, and Pettit, in his earlier 
work, offers us an account of exactly why this is insufficient for securing non-domination. Indeed, 
at the domestic level he has convincingly argued that the problem of domination cannot be 
addressed by potential dominators vowing to forgo exerting domination because the option to do 
so remains within their purview. That is, he posed the question, ‘Can I alienate my power of 
interference, and suspend the domination I practice, by persuading myself that it is wrong to 
interfere in your choice? Will the moral constraints that I thereby recognise act as checks on my 
will and serve to liberate you, whether wholly or in part?’3 Importantly, he resoundingly answered 
in the negative because, ‘Even if I form the view that it is wrong to interfere with you, it remains 
the case that I may prefer to practice interference, whether out of weakness of will, out of malice, 
or out of a will for evil; the option continues to lie within my capacity.’4  
He concluded that, ‘My power of interference in your choice, and my domination over 
you, can only be contained by external checks that remove or replace the interference option or 
                                                          
3 Pettit, On the People’s Terms, p. 63. 
4 Ibid., p. 63. 
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put it cognitively off the menu.’ 5 This conclusion led him to defend the strategy of constitutional 
provision as the most appropriate means for addressing domination at the domestic level: this 
strategy requires that an external authority, in this case the state, is empowered to remove the 
option of interference from all individuals’ choice-sets. I think that a similar approach is necessary 
at a transnational level because even if states vow to uphold the global order, the option to renege 
on this promise remains within their reach. 
Even more problematically, Pettit does not consider the possibility that control need not 
necessarily be exercised solely between transnational agents (i.e. between states, international 
organisations, transnational private institutions, and multinational corporations), but can bypass 
the state and be exercised by transnational agents over individuals. This phenomenon, what I will 
call individualised transnational domination, is a process in which control cuts across national 
borders, exerting a significant degree of coercion over spatially dispersed individuals in states 
which might enjoy external protections against domination. For example, if a state were to decide 
to close its borders against all Muslims or all blue-eyed individuals, this policy would not directly 
coerce a specific state but would control many spatially dispersed individuals. As such, it seems 
possible to claim that the control which is exercised will bypass the state and interfere with the 
lives of individuals. 
It is important to be clear that while attempting to distinguish between transnational and 
individualised transnational domination, I am not suggesting that Pettit is unconcerned with the 
ways in which individuals’ lives are affected by transnational control. Indeed, his 
acknowledgement that, ‘any restrictions at the level of the state would inevitably involve 
restrictions on their democratic lives,’ evidences his concern for the effects of transnational 
domination upon individuals’ lives. Nonetheless, the distinction that this thesis will attempt to 
highlight is that Pettit understands transnational domination to occur when transnational agents 
interfere, or threaten to interfere, with the state, and this process correlatively interferes with 
individuals’ lives. Individualised transnational domination, however, is a process whereby the 
state is not interfered with, but individuals are. The concept of individualised transnational 
domination is therefore an attempt to supplement Pettit’s account of transnational domination, 
enabling us to distinguish between those forms of transnational control which interfere with the 
state (and correlatively interfering in the lives of the individuals who live within that state), and 
those forms of control which bypass the state and interfere in the lives of individuals.  
Indeed, James Bohman, who has considered this problem at length, argues that the 
solution to what I will refer to as individualised transnational domination, is to redesign the 
international political system as an interactive deliberative polyarchy. This would require the 
creation of a federated system of global governance in which power is dispersed horizontally 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 63. 
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across demoi in which citizens are able to initiate deliberation and redesign the world around 
them. Although a plausible solution to this problem, Bohman’s account fails to ensure that polities 
are capable of securing internal social and political justice and, as such, offers us an account in 
which one form of transnational domination might be addressed, but which permits other forms 
of domination to arise. 
Pettit and Bohman’s accounts therefore show that there are two forms of transnational 
domination which neo-republicans must aim to address simultaneously. Firstly, it is necessary to 
ensure that states’ capacity to secure internal social and political justice is protected against 
external threats; and, secondly, it is necessary to address the ways in which transnational agents 
might bypass states and interfere with individuals. The aim of this thesis, as noted above, is to 
attempt to offer a solution to these twin forms of transnational domination through developing an 
account of neo-republican international justice.  
Centrally, I will argue that attempting to resolve this problem should lead us to re-
examine Pettit’s earlier work on transnational domination in Republicanism: A Theory of 
Freedom and Government, and aim to replicate the strategy of constitutional provision beyond 
the state. Doing so, I will argue, requires the development of an independent, overarching 
authority capable of disciplining transnational agents, necessitating the creation of a multi-level 
cosmopolitan democratic framework. Within such a framework, states’ capacity to secure social 
and political justice would be protected against external threats, and individuals would be able to 
influence and direct the political control that they’re subject to at all levels of governance. 
Importantly, these transnational and global levels of governance would be able to properly 
regulate transnational agents, including states, international organisations, and multinational 
corporations. In addition, the fundamental basic liberties and welfare rights that Pettit believes 
would be necessary for securing personal independence and freedom would be granted the status 
of human rights and would enjoy global entrenchment and enforcement. In this way, it will be 
possible to address the two forms of transnational domination and thereby secure neo-republican 
international justice, while simultaneously ensuring that individuals enjoy social and political 
justice within states. 
 
Specifying the Methods, Scope, and Impact of the Thesis 
 
Before detailing exactly how my argument will develop, it is necessary to briefly digress and note 
the underlying methods, scope, and intended impact of my thesis. Indeed, in developing a solution 
to the problem of transnational domination, I will primarily use the philosophical methods of 
conceptual analysis, consistency of argumentation, and logical progression, with the quality of 
my theorising being judged by its consistency, deductive closure, axiomatisability, and 
parsimony. This thesis should therefore be judged to be weak or strong according to the degree 
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to which it meets these criteria. It is useful to briefly consider each of these methods and criteria 
in turn. 
Starting with the methods, conceptual analysis is a means to analyse and assess competing 
interpretations of political ideas, considering the advantages and disadvantages of these 
competing interpretations.6 In the context of this thesis, conceptual analysis will be employed to 
primarily consider the concepts of domination, arbitrary and non-arbitrary control, the principle 
of affectedness, democracy, and rights. Building upon an analysis of these concepts, I will employ 
the tools of logical progression/inductive reasoning and consistency of argumentation to develop 
my theory of non-domination. Though subject to a number of critiques, including, most 
problematically, the fact that it relies on questionable premises and the biases inherent in the 
philosopher’s understanding of the issue being analysed, inductive reasoning is necessary for my 
theory to be able to move from an analysis of concepts to more general suggestions about how 
domination might be addressed. This is because the premises (the ways in which I define and 
conceptualise key concepts) are all subject to uncertainty and challenge. It is therefore not possible 
to deduce from my initial premises any certain conclusions about how to achieve non-domination; 
instead, since the key concepts are subject to a great deal of debate and disagreement, the best 
that can be hoped for is that the conclusions reached are probable based upon the earlier 
assumptions. Though this means that the validity of my conclusions can only be judged as strong 
or weak (rather than valid or invalid), by ensuring that the arguments being made are consistent I 
hope that the inductive conclusions reached are as probable as possible.7 
Importantly, this means that the criteria for assessing the quality of this thesis are going 
to be ones which assess the internal coherence of the theory, and whether the arguments offered 
are strong or weak. These criteria, outlined by Christian List and Laura Valentini, require that a 
theory have the following features: it must be logically consistent, with the statements and 
principles which comprise that theory being capable of being simultaneously true; it must be 
deductively closed, with all statements which are logically entailed by that theory belonging to 
that theory (and therefore are logically consistent with all other statements and principles as 
outlined in the previous criterion); it ought to be axiomisable, which requires that the theory is 
capable of being stipulated as a set of principles from which the entire theory derives; and it ought 
to be parsimonious, avoiding unnecessary complexity, and stated as simply as possible.8  
It is also important to emphasise that this thesis will primarily focus on explicating the 
ideal requirements for securing non-domination, and developing context-independent principles 
                                                          
6 Christian List and Laura Valentini, ‘The Methodology of Political Theory’, in Herman 
Cappelen, Tamar Szabo Gendler, and John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophical Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 525-553 (pp. 526-
535). 
7 Ibid., pp. 538-544. 
8 Ibid., 539-540. 
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for addressing the problem of domination. The reason for considering how non-domination might 
be realised in the ideal world, rather than in existing non-ideal conditions is that, as discussed by 
Adam Swift, ‘we need fundamental, context-independent, normative philosophical claims to 
guide political action even in nonideal circumstances’.9 Indeed, before looking at how to address 
domination in the real world, it is necessary to first understand what domination is, how it can be 
identified, how it arises, and the trade-offs which may need to made in order to address 
domination. Importantly, without a conceptual and analytical approach to values, it will be 
difficult to make, ‘substantive or evaluative judgments about the relative importance or value of 
the different values at stake,’10 and we may, inadvertently, create further problems in our attempts 
to address domination. 
Ideal theory, Swift argues, therefore supplements and supports the work of social 
scientists and those working in non-ideal theory. That is, while social scientists are tasked with 
telling us what states of the world can be realised, and how they might be realised in the here and 
now, those working in ideal theorising are tasked with advising us on which states of the world, 
and the means by which we might realise them, are better or worse.11 This thesis will therefore 
largely focus on considering the concept of domination in an ideal context, with the aim of 
providing guidance to others who might be concerned with analysing how we might move 
towards a world in which domination is prevented or largely mitigated against.  
With these comments in mind, it is necessary to define the scope and intended impact of 
this thesis. To that end, I will primarily contribute to the neo-republican literature in two ways: 
firstly, by offering a revised account of transnational domination, one which combines the insights 
of Pettit and Bohman; and secondly, by offering a novel account of how we can address the 
problem of transnational domination and secure international justice. Indeed, I will aim to show 
that transnational domination can occur in two distinct ways. Firstly, as argued by Pettit, 
transnational domination can occur when external agents interfere, or threaten to interfere, with 
socially and politically just states. Secondly, individualised transnational domination can occur 
when control bypasses states and interferes in the lives of individuals. As noted above, I believe 
that the solution to this problem is to develop a multi-level system of cosmopolitan democratic 
governance in which states’ capacity to secure social and political justice is protected, and in 
which individuals are able to influence and direct all of the political control that they’re subject 
to. In developing this theory, I will engage with the literature from other research areas, including 
theories of global governance, political science, education, e-democracy, and the history of 
                                                          
9 Adam Swift, ‘The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances’, Social Theory and 
Practice 34 (2008), pp. 363-387 (p. 363). 
10 Ibid., p. 369. 
11 Ibid., pp. 368-371. 
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political thought. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that in engaging with these areas, I will only 
do so to the extent that they are relevant to developing my own theory.  
This thesis will also aim to contribute meaningfully and originally to the literature in five 
further ways. Firstly, I hope to demonstrate that the problem of adaptive preferences (a 
phenomenon whereby changes in individuals’ preferences are related to individuals’ beliefs about 
the unavailability of certain options rather than the intrinsic qualities of the available options) 
needs to be taken seriously by neo-republicans as such preferences can mitigate against 
individuals’ capacity to enjoy personal freedom. Indeed, as will be shown in the first chapter, 
adaptive preferences can undermine individual agency and vitiate against freedom of opportunity 
and can therefore act as a constraint on individuals’ capacity to lead lives of their own choosing. 
Secondly, I aim to show that Pettit’s account of freedom can accommodate this insight, and it can 
be addressed within the context of his theorising through the creation of a formal deliberative 
institution. Thirdly, I aim to show that not only is neo-republicanism compatible with 
cosmopolitan democracy, but that securing non-domination requires that republics are embedded 
within an overarching framework of democratically shaped constitutionalism: securing social, 
political, and international justice requires the creation of a multi-level system of governance in 
which individuals would be members of a series of hierarchical demoi, each of which must remain 
democratically legitimate and subject to individuals’ influence and direction. Fourthly, I will 
argue that it is necessary to redraw democratic boundaries in accordance with the principle of ‘all 
possibly affected interests’, and that this principle would need to be supplemented by a principle 
of subsidiarity in order to avoid excessive overinclusion when political decisions are made. I also 
aim to show that the creation of a series of boundary courts would be able to resolve jurisdictional 
disputes which may arise between different demoi. And finally, I aim to show that such a 
framework for governance could be realisable, and that this thesis is therefore not solely 
concerned with idealised abstract theorising but could offer us a novel means for securing 
international justice. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
To that end, this thesis will be developed across six chapters. In what follows, I will briefly outline 
the primary objective of each chapter, the general structure of each chapter, and highlight how 
this contributes to the overall thesis. It is also important to note, here, that I have not included a 
chapter dedicated to a literature review, as might be found in other theses. The reason for this is 
that I will engage extensively with the literature which is relevant to the specific aims of each 
chapter as the thesis develops; this will ensure that all of the relevant arguments are considered, 
critiqued, or improved in the right context, rather than being noted and then discarded at the outset.     
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The first chapter, Domination and Republican Social Justice, will provide a thorough 
analysis of the concept of domination in order to provide the foundation for my own later 
arguments. To that end, I will start by outlining the historic roots of the concept of non-
domination, and discuss its later eclipse by the non-interference conception of liberty. I will then 
analyse the distinction between positive and negative concepts of liberty, and explore Thomas 
Hobbes’ conception of freedom as non-frustration, and Berlin’s account of freedom as non-
interference, arguing that neither account offers an adequate conception of freedom. I will then 
analyse Philip Pettit’s account of freedom as non-domination, and argue that underlying his 
account of political liberty is an ideal of personal liberty; this ideal sees individuals as capable of 
engaging in self-rule and seems to provide the prism through which Pettit views the evils of 
domination. I will then explore Pettit’s theory of republican social justice, with a particular focus 
on the claim that that dominating agents must be subject to external constraints in order to be 
rendered non-dominating. After doing so, I will explore the ‘critical’ challenge to Pettit’s 
republicanism, outlining Sharon Krause’s arguments for expanding the concept of domination to 
include cases of systemic or structural domination. After outlining Krause’s arguments, I aim to 
show, following Pettit and Frank Lovett, that domination is a phenomenon that occurs between 
agents, not agents and background structures, and that Pettit’s account can therefore accommodate 
Krause’s concerns. Importantly, I will also acknowledge the possibility that background 
structures may give rise to adaptive preferences which can undermine freedom of opportunity. I 
will then outline the problem of corporate agency, arguing that while it would be possible for 
states to develop legislation to constrain the actions of some corporate agents, such measures will 
be unable to address the dominating potential of multinational corporate agents since these agents 
may be able to easily evade national governments’ attempts to constrain them. Indeed, given their 
capacity to move their operations elsewhere, multinationals have two distinct powers which they 
can use to dominate otherwise socially and politically just states: they can extract concessions 
from governments by threating to leave; or they can leave in order to evade their responsibilities 
and seek more favourable terms elsewhere. Governments who are financially dependent upon 
multinationals, or countries in which significant numbers of citizens are employed by 
multinationals, will be acutely aware of a need to placate these agents and will seek to please them 
of their own volition. As such, this chapter will conclude that social justice cannot be fully realised 
while multinational agents can act with impunity.  
The second chapter, Securing Democratically Legitimate Governance, will thoroughly 
examine Pettit’s account of democratic legitimacy in order to show that it is possible to secure 
political control without giving rise to domination, while also arguing that securing social and 
political justice is insufficient for securing non-domination. This is because transnational agents, 
including multinational corporations, other states, and international institutions have the capacity 
to undermine social and political justice within states and, as I will show in the following chapter, 
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can interfere with individuals without necessarily interfering with just states. This chapter is 
therefore integral to the overarching aims of this thesis, and will be particularly important to the 
development of my own account of international justice, which seeks to combine Pettit’s account 
of democratic legitimacy with an account of multi-level cosmopolitan democratic governance. To 
that end, this chapter will begin by outlining Pettit’s account of democratic legitimacy, showing 
that guarding against imperium requires that individuals exert influence and direction over the 
ways in which they’re governed. I will then outline and respond to two counterarguments to 
Pettit’s account of non-arbitrary governance, as well analysing how direction over governance 
might be secured. In doing so, I will engage extensively with Jon Elster’s arguments in favour of 
determining the common good deliberatively. I will then outline Pettit’s account of the common 
good which requires that we derive a set of public, shared interests which cohere with the 
requirements of free and reasoned debate between equals, and which would arise spontaneously 
from dispersed deliberative interactions between citizens at a range of political and civil sites. 
Importantly, it will be argued that Pettit’s account of the state and democratic legitimacy should 
be supplemented by a formal institution tasked with enabling citizens to deliberatively transform 
their raw preferences into informed preferences, and I will outline a digital deliberative assembly 
as an example of such an institution. After explaining how such an institution would support 
Pettit’s theory and mitigate against the problem of adaptive preferences, this chapter will finally 
argue that a state’s capacity to secure the basic liberties and enjoy democratic legitimacy is 
dependent upon the ongoing goodwill of external agents such as multinational corporations, other 
nations, and supranational institutions.  
 The third chapter, The Problem of Transnational Domination, will examine the twin 
problems of transnational domination and individualised transnational domination. The former 
conception of transnational domination, which Pettit himself theorises, acknowledges that states’ 
capacity to secure social and political justice can be undermined by interference, or the threat of 
interference, from external agents. Individualised transnational domination, however, is a process 
whereby control bypasses the state and interferes in the lives of spatially dispersed individuals. 
Analysing these problems is central to the aims of this thesis as doing so will evidence that Pettit’s 
account of transnational domination ought to be enlarged to accommodate the problem of 
individualised transnational domination, and that his account of international justice requires 
amendment in order to address both forms of transnational domination. To that end, this chapter 
will begin by outlining Pettit’s conception of transnational domination and his accounts of 
international justice as presented in A Republican Law of Peoples and Just Freedom, arguing that 
both of his suggestions are problematic as they fall foul of powerful arguments that Pettit made 
in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Indeed, the primary concern is that 
neither of his strategies ensures that there are effective external constraints on transnational 
agents, and therefore the option of exerting domination is not effectively removed from these 
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agents’ choice-sets. This chapter will also outline Bohman’s account of transnational domination 
and argue that while he account takes the problem of individualised transnational domination 
seriously, his proposed solution of creating a global deliberative polyarchy would fail to secure 
global non-domination. This is because individuals would never be able to exert influence and 
direction over governance since demoi would be in a state of continuous flux, have an undefined 
jurisdiction (since democratic decision-making is decoupled from national communities and 
deterritorialised), and there would seemingly be no overarching authority capable of adjudicating 
on the appropriate competencies and powers of the competing demoi. Finally, the third chapter 
will argue that the analysis of Pettit and Bohman’s accounts suggest that it will be necessary to 
address both forms of transnational domination simultaneously, and aim to replicate the strategy 
of constitutional provision at a global level.  
 The fourth chapter, A Framework for Transnational Republican Governance, will build 
upon the arguments of the preceding chapters in order to outline a transnational political system 
capable of providing the framework within which individuals can enjoy social, political, and 
international justice. This chapter will therefore provide my central contribution to the literature. 
It will do so by outlining a multi-level framework for neo-republican governance in which 
individuals would be members of a series of demoi, ranging from the local to the global, each of 
which would be subject to members’ influence and direction, and in which the strategy of 
constitutional provision would be secured by democratically legitimate institutions at a global 
level. To that end, this chapter will begin by arguing that addressing the problem of individualised 
transnational domination requires that demoi must be constituted on the basis of who can be 
deemed to be possibly affected by a given issue in order to ensure that individuals who are 
interfered with are not excluded from influencing and directing the making of political decisions. 
Nonetheless, it will be argued that this principle must be qualified by a principle of subsidiarity 
in order to ensure that we do not adopt an approach which is excessively overinclusive, since 
doing so would enable many unaffected individuals to influence and direct decisions which could 
never plausibly affect them. After considering two accounts of transnational governance as 
possible means for pursuing the aims of neo-republican governance, it will be argued that David 
Held’s cosmopolitan democracy, with suitable elaboration and refinement, could provide a 
framework in which non-domination could be secured. I will then briefly discuss the role of 
human rights within such a framework, arguing that Pettit’s fundamental basic liberties and 
welfare rights which guard against dependence should be seen to be a set of human rights which 
must be globally entrenched and enforced, the contravention of which would justify intervention 
by the transnational and global community. Centrally, I will also outline Held’s suggestion of 
creating ‘boundary courts’ as a means for resolving jurisdictional disputes between demoi and 
ensure that decisions are taken at the most appropriate location in accordance with the principles 
of affectedness and subsidiarity. This chapter will conclude by briefly explicating such a model, 
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arguing that it is important to ensure that the principles of affectedness and subsidiarity are upheld 
within states as well as at a transnational level.  
 The fifth chapter, Securing the Conditions for Transnational Republicanism, will outline 
and offer responses to a series of possible objections to cosmopolitan democracy and the 
framework for transnational governance outlined in the preceding chapter. Offering such a 
defence is integral to this thesis as each of the objections, if not surmounted, would seem to 
evidence that my account of international justice would be infeasible or undesirable. To that end, 
I will outline Robert Goodin’s concern that such a transnational framework is unnecessary as 
states already fulfil the required function of discharging general moral duties; David Miller’s 
argument that mutual trust and a shared identity are integral to the creation and maintenance of 
democratic communities, and these conditions are absent beyond the state; and Will Kymlicka’s 
argument that linguistic barriers will mitigate against the possibility of realising transnational 
democracy. In response to these objections, this chapter will argue that we should aim to: promote 
a transnational nationalism as a supplement to existing nationalisms, emphasising a shared history 
and identity with a view to securing mutual trust and shared understanding within transnational 
demoi; propagate a civic education which would be designed to create virtuous citizens capable 
of discharging the basic duties of republican citizenship; and open up national public spheres to 
one another, with the aim of creating an interactive transnational public sphere. I will also consider 
the objection that ‘crafting’ citizens through a civic education may be experienced as form of 
cultural imperialism. After outlining why this need not be a significant concern, I will 
acknowledge that this conflict is indicative of a larger problem: this problem is that the rights 
outlined in the preceding chapter may come into conflict with many ethical or cultural traditions. 
In response, it will be argued that such conflicts need not be insurmountable since many human 
rights can be endorsed by non-western doctrines and traditions and, even if this is not always the 
case, these rights can legitimately trump such doctrines because they secure the necessary 
preconditions for individuals to lead lives of their own choosing.  
The final chapter will then briefly and concisely summarise my arguments, and outline 
some of the limitations of this thesis. It will also highlight some implications of this research for 
neo-republicanism and political theory more generally, and note some avenues for future research. 
I will also succinctly outline my answer to the problem of how we might develop a political 
solution to the twin forms of transnational domination, and thereby secure social, political and 
international justice. To that end, I will conclude that transnational domination can be addressed 
through the creation of a multi-level system of governance in which states’ capacity to secure 
social and political justice is protected; the capacity of external agents to dominate states is 
neutralised by transnational governmental institutions; individuals are members of a series of 
overlapping demoi such that they can exert influence and direction over the ways in which they’re 
controlled; and that this system of governance could be realised in the future through the 
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promotion of transnational nationalisms, a civic education, and the opening up of national public 
spheres to one another. 
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Chapter One – Domination and Republican Social Justice 
 
Introduction 
 
My aim in this chapter is to analyse the concept of domination which lies at the heart of neo-
republican political theory, with a particular focus on Pettit’s paradigmatic work. In doing so, I 
will provide the foundations for the later discussion of the problem of transnational domination, 
emphasising the difficulties posed by multinational corporations and the necessity of replicating 
Pettit’s strategy of constitutional provision at a transnational level. In addition, I will also aim to 
show, contrary to the claims of critical and radical republicans, that Pettit’s account of domination 
does not need to be expanded to account for what they term ‘structural’ domination, as his theory 
already has the resources required to address the concerns of these theorists.  
 To that end, my argument will develop across eight sections. The first section will outline 
the historical roots of the concept of non-domination, and note its eclipse by the non-interference 
view of freedom. The second section will build upon this discussion by exploring the concepts of 
positive and negative liberty, arguing that it is possible to embrace positive liberty without 
advocating an intrusive or authoritarian state. The third section will then outline the neo-
republican critique of the non-interference conception of liberty, and argue that individual liberty 
requires that individuals are free from frustration, interference, and domination when making their 
choices. The fourth section will then outline that Pettit’s account incorporates a notion of self-
mastery (specifically orthonomy) akin to conceptions of positive liberty, and it is this conception 
of orthonomy which seems to provide the prism through which Pettit views the evils of 
domination: that is, frustration, interference, and domination all undermine an individual’s 
capacity to choose freely between options. I will also outline that securing individual liberty 
requires that individuals are protected from invasion, vitiation, invigilation, and intimidation, and 
that it is possible to have domination without interference, and interference without domination. 
The fifth section will then outline Pettit’s suggestions for securing freedom from dominium, with 
a particular focus on the arguments in favour of pursuing the strategy of constitutional provision 
and his account of the basic liberties, and also indicating why he considers this to be a theory of 
republican social justice. The sixth section will then introduce a ‘critical’ republican objection to 
Pettit’s theory, and outline how Pettit’s theory can accommodate these concerns without being 
fundamentally altered. The seventh section will then explore the problem of domination by 
corporate agents, arguing that republican social justice cannot be secured while multinational 
corporations have the capacity to exert domination and evade proper constraint, suggesting a need 
to replicate the strategy of constitutional provision at a transnational level. The final section will 
conclude.   
 
18 
 
Republicanism: From Greece to the Early Modern Era 
 
It is useful to begin by outlining the historic roots of neo-republicanism and explore its recent 
revival. In simplified terms there are two strands of classical republicanism which inform 
contemporary political theory, one associated with the Greek city states, and one associated with 
the Roman Republic. The former emphasises the realisation of the good life and liberty through 
active membership in self-governing communities; while the latter, which we will be our primary 
focus, emphasises individual independence, the rule of law, and the mixed constitution as 
mechanisms which secure individuals’ capacity to lead their own lives. 
The neo-Athenian, or civic humanist, tradition builds on the Aristotelean belief that the 
good life is realised through active participation in the polis and the active cultivation of civic 
virtue. Theorists associated with this tradition emphasise the importance of these virtues as 
intrinsically valuable components of the good life and claim that political liberty can only be 
realised through active individual participation in self-governing communities.12 On this view, 
citizens are required to immerse themselves in the life of the community – only then is political 
liberty truly achieved. This older republicanism still enjoys a degree of prominence within the 
communitarianism of Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor.13 
Neo-republicanism, on the other hand, represents an attempt to modernise Roman 
republicanism, and its recent revival is particularly associated with Quentin Skinner and Philip 
Pettit. Skinner argues that Roman republicanism’s conception of political liberty was largely 
derived from Roman moral philosophy, and is particularly associated with the work of Livy, 
Sallust and Cicero. For Skinner, the distinctive evil identified by Roman republicanism is the 
recognition that individuals can be rendered less free when subject to arbitrary power, rather than 
being rendered less free only when this power manifests as direct interference.14 He argues that, 
‘the hated figure of the dominus in the republican tradition is someone who hopes to be able to 
exercise his or her invigilating powers successfully without ever having to stoop to actual 
                                                          
12 For those interested in the civic humanist variant of republicanism, see: Hannah Arendt, The 
Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958); Athanasios Moulakis, ‘Civic 
Humanism’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 
Edition), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/humanism-civic/; J.G.A. 
Pocock, ‘Civic Humanism and its Role in Anglo-American Thought’, in Politics, Language, and 
Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1989) pp. 80-103; Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: 1998). 
13 See: Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Michael J. Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered 
Self,’ Political Theory 12 (1984), pp. 81-96; Charles Taylor, ‘Cross Purposes: The Liberal-
Communitarian Debate’, in Charles Taylor (ed.), Philosophical Arguments, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 181-203. 
14 Quentin Skinner, ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, in Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), The 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values Volume VII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), pp. 225-250 (p. 238). 
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interference.’15 Importantly, this power of invigilation can be seen when, ‘the dominated 
correspondingly find their choices limited by what they believe their dominus or master may be 
willing to tolerate, and are forced to adjust their behaviour in the hope of staving off any 
interventions detrimental to their interests.’16 The important point is that while the dominus may 
choose not to interfere in the dominated individual’s life-choices, they nonetheless have the 
capacity to do so and this capacity is detrimental to individual liberty. Skinner further claims that 
one of the evils of domination is that it undermines individuals’ capacity to make choices in a 
reason-sensitive way (this link between individual reason and choice is central to Pettit’s account, 
as we will see below), because another’s will enjoys an invigilating status within the dominated 
individual’s deliberations over how to act in a given situation, exerting a subtle and sinister degree 
of control.17 
Skinner argues that this Roman conception of liberty was later revived in the Renaissance, 
as a way of defending the liberties of the city against the tyranny of the signori and the powers of 
the Church, and is particularly in evidence throughout Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. The 
tradition further developed through the English commonwealthmen, particularly Harrington and 
Milton, and their struggle against the despotism of the Stuarts. Machiavelli also influenced 
Montesquieu and the opponents of French absolutism in the eighteenth century.18 Skinner goes 
on to argue that what preoccupied early modern theorists was not a theory of freedom of action, 
but what it meant to be a free person as part of a community. On Skinner’s interpretation, these 
theorists claimed that, ‘what it means to be a free person is not to be dependent– in the manner 
definitive of servitude – upon the will, and hence upon the mere goodwill, of anyone else.’19 
Following these insights, Skinner argues that: 
 
It is possible to act freely, [the early modern theorists] maintain, if and only if you are a 
freeman. If instead you live as a slave, you can never act as a free agent under any 
circumstances. This is not necessarily because your choices and actions will be impeded, 
but rather because they will never be the product of your own autonomous will. They will 
inevitably be a product both of what you will and desire and of what your dominus may 
be willing to permit.20  
 
While Pettit has also discussed neo-republicanism’s historic roots in a variety of places,21 
it is useful to focus on his discussion in Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World 
                                                          
15 Quentin Skinner, ‘On the Slogans of Republican Political Theory’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 9 (2010), pp. 95-102 (pp. 96).  
16 Ibid., p. 96. 
17 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
18 Ibid., pp. 95-97. 
19 Ibid., p. 97. 
20 Ibid., p. 98. 
21 See, for example: Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of 
Agency (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 144-149; Pettit, On the People’s Terms, pp. 6-10. 
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as here we learn of the rise of republican thought and its gradual eclipse by the Hobbesian concept 
of freedom. To that end, Pettit argues that the Romans believed, ‘that to live in potestate domini, 
in the power of a master, was enough in itself to make you unfree. Having a gentle master might 
be a boon in other ways, but it did not give you liberty.’22 Indeed, he claims that to be a freeman 
or liber was to live a life distinct from that of a slave; those who enjoyed the status of a liber were 
protected against a master’s power in a range of basic choices. Importantly, it was through, 
‘having the status of a citizen who is guarded by a law that is itself controlled by the citizenry,’23 
which secured an individual’s status as a freeman, thereby equating being free with being a citizen 
or civitas.24 He goes on to emphasise that the Roman Republic sought to protect people, 
specifically propertied, male citizens, in their horizontal relationships with one another through 
the provision of an equal legal status which guards against dominium, and in their vertical 
relationships with the Republic through ensuring equality in exercising control over the law, 
thereby avoiding imperium. This conception of freedom, on Pettit’s view, required that the polity 
be organised around the principles of, ‘equality before and equality over the law.’25  
Such equality was ensured through a mixed constitution which put power in the hands of, 
‘mutually checking, popularly representative bodies and officials…the arrangement was 
constitutional insofar as public, impartial law governed it; and it was mixed insofar as it gave 
power to all sectors of society.’26 Without going into detail on the institutional processes which 
supported the mixed constitution, it is important to note that a series of checks and balances, such 
as the election of senators for short terms, the oversight of elected officials, and the veto powers 
of the tribunes, all contributed, at least in theory if not in practice, to the maintenance of a society 
of free citizens who enjoyed equality before and over the law.27 
With the downfall of the Roman Republic and the emergence of the Empire, republican 
thought declined in influence, only to enjoy a resurgence in the high Middle Ages. Pettit notes 
that the Italian city states, those who repudiated being subject to the Pope or local princes, came 
to organise their public life in a manner akin to the Republic. Venice, Florence, Pisa and Perugia 
all embraced republicanism to some degree, and Machiavelli, in his Discourses on Livy, 
developed republican ideas for contemporary use. To that end, he followed Polybius in hailing 
the virtues of the mixed constitution and civic freedom (freedom from others’ dominating 
influence), and emphasised the importance of a contestatory political system which would enable 
citizens to challenge political decisions. Pettit goes on to argue that after Machiavelli it became 
clear that republicanism makes three broad claims. Firstly, it emphasises the ideal of freedom as 
                                                          
22 Pettit, Just Freedom, p. 4. 
23 Ibid., p. 4. 
24 Ibid., p. 4. 
25 Ibid., p. 4. 
26 Ibid., p. 6. 
27 Ibid., p. 6-7. 
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non-domination in social and political life. Secondly, promoting this ideal requires a mixed 
constitution. Thirdly, protecting the mixed constitution, and thereby securing the ideal of non-
domination, requires a citizenry who are empowered and motivated to contest public power and 
exercise eternal vigilance over the polity’s political system.28 
Pettit argues that this republicanism later underpinned the political systems of the 
northern European countries who resisted or overthrew absolute monarchs, including the Polish 
and Dutch republics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the English republic in the 
interregnum. While this political philosophy enjoyed the support of reformers and revolutionaries 
across Europe, Pettit claims that it was despised by absolutists who argued that peace required a 
single sovereign with absolute power. Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, two prominent 
absolutists, each worried that neo-Roman republicanism would facilitate dissension and rebellion 
and thus made it the target of their criticisms.29  
Indeed, the absolutists may have been right as, in the eighteenth century, republican ideals 
were embraced by American colonists and their British supporters, including Richard Price and 
Joseph Priestly, and used to criticise the British Parliament’s control over the colonies. Following 
the imposition and repeal of the Stamp Act, Parliament announced a Declaratory Act which stated 
Parliament’s right to make laws and statutes which were binding over those living in America. It 
was claimed that since the American’s lacked electoral representation in the British Parliament, 
and the British members of Parliament were not subject to the laws which they passed in relation 
to the colonies, the colonists were entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the British Parliament. 
Indeed, this lack of control over the laws which governed them, and lack of control of the taxation 
to which they were subject, were instrumental in the colonists’ rebellion against the British 
government.30  
Similarly, republicanism’s revolutionary potential found expression in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s The Social Contract, published in 1762. Pettit argues that despite embracing the ideal 
of non-domination, Rousseau followed Hobbes and Bodin in rejecting the idea of a mixed 
constitution, and the separation of power which this ideal affirms, and instead embraced the 
absolutists’ claim that authority and sovereignty must be concentrated in one agent. Unlike, Bodin 
and Hobbes, however, Rousseau did not believe that this sovereign needed to be a single 
individual or elite group, but instead should take the form of a, ‘sovereign assembly of the 
people.’31 Rousseau believed that subjection to a lord or master (or monarch) would result in a 
lack of freedom but, in submitting to the dictates of the General Will, individuals retained their 
freedom through subjection to their own collective will. Rousseauian republicanism therefore 
                                                          
28 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
29 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
30 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
31 Ibid., p. 12. 
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represents a break with Roman republicanism, since its focus is on the freedom of the collective 
rather than the individuals that comprise that collective, and should be seen as a progenitor of the 
communitarian tradition which emphasises that freedom is achieved through collective self-
determination and civic participation.  
Nonetheless, it was not Rousseau’s innovations which eclipsed Roman republicanism, 
but the rising tide of liberal contractarian thought which emerged from Hobbes’ Leviathan. 
Indeed, Skinner argues that Hobbes sought to show that it was only actual interference which 
rendered us less free rather than another’s capacity to interfere and, as all governments interfere 
with their citizens, Hobbes believed that we have no reason to prefer a democratic government to 
an undemocratic one as each interferes with individuals in the same way.32 This ‘constitutional 
indifferentisim’ provided one of the central premises for Leviathan and was taken up by later 
thinkers.33 
Indeed, one of these later thinkers was Jeremy Bentham who utilised the concept of 
freedom as non-interference as the cornerstone of his utilitarian philosophy. Pettit goes on to argue 
that as a social reformer, Bentham aimed to ensure that government was concerned with the 
freedom of all of its citizens rather than just an elite subset of propertied males. As a result, Pettit 
believes that Bentham consciously rejected the ideal of non-domination as too demanding a 
concept; that is, if Bentham had called for the expansion of freedom of non-domination for all 
citizens, women and children included, then a greater swath of reforms would have been 
necessary (such as a transformation of family law under which men enjoyed power over their 
wives, and employment law under which employers had power over their employees). As 
universal freedom as non-domination would have required radical and unwelcome changes, Pettit 
believes that Bentham opted for the weaker ideal of freedom as non-interference.34 
 While non-domination was challenged, and largely displaced by, the less demanding 
concept of freedom as non-interference, it faced a further challenge over its account of exactly 
what range of choices ought to be protected in order to secure individuals’ status as freemen. 
Indeed, Pettit goes on to argue that seventeenth-century republicanism was concerned with 
guaranteeing the ‘basic liberties’; these were a set of choices which were co-enjoyable by all 
citizens and were co-exercisable (that is, everyone could enjoy these liberties at the same time). 
These liberties included, for example, being able to say or think whatever an individual wanted 
to, religious freedom, and the capacity to choose which profession to engage in. But, with the rise 
                                                          
32 Skinner, ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, p. 238. 
33 For Skinner and Pettit’s arguments, see: Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Philip Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on 
Language, Mind, and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). For a critique 
of these arguments see: Ian Shapiro, ‘Reflections on Skinner and Pettit’, Hobbes Studies 22 
(2009), pp. 185-191. 
34 Pettit, Just Freedom, pp. 13-16.  
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of the non-interference account of freedom and the view that freedom consisted simply in an 
absence of impediments to pursuing whatever one wants, the ideal of protecting the same range 
of choices for everyone was also supplanted. This is because what any two individuals want to do 
will be different, and therefore freedom from interference does not require a co-enjoyable and co-
exercisable range of liberties; instead, it requires that individuals be able to determine exactly 
what constraints they are happy to operate under.  
 This change coincided with industrialisation and the emergence of contractualist thinking 
and classical liberalism. Classical liberals advanced the idea that individuals are free when they 
are able to contract into whatever arrangements they want (regardless of any background 
conditions which may entail unequal bargaining power), and that if an individual is willing to 
accept the terms, then they are free. Importantly, these thinkers also challenged the regulation of 
contracts, deeming regulatory interference to be inimical to individuals’ actual freedom to be able 
to contract into whatever arrangements they chose (this is because non-interference requires that 
individuals be able to pursue their preferred option from a choice-set, including entering into 
disadvantageous contracts).35  
Pettit argues that these two claims, that it is only actual interference and only interference 
in an individuals’ preferred option which undermine freedom, led to the eclipse of Roman 
republicanism and its richer account of freedom as non-domination. Indeed, as we will see in the 
next section, these historic developments have led, in Skinner’s view, to the neglect of a promising 
republican contribution to political theory.36  
 
Positive Liberty, Negative Liberty, and the Occlusion of a Third Way 
 
Since Berlin’s lecture on the ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,’37 theories of political liberty have tended 
to be characterised as positive or negative accounts of freedom. Positive liberty, which varies in 
its prescriptions depending on the specific theory, concerns the possibility of acting so as to 
control one’s own life, realise one’s fundamental purposes, or realise self-mastery – the focus, 
here, is on the internal constraints on action. Negative liberty focuses on the absence of barriers 
or obstacles to acting. An individual is free in this sense to the extent that they are free from 
external constraints.38  
In Berlin’s view, the positive conception of liberty lends itself to a certain 
authoritarianism. Indeed, he argues that this view of freedom makes a distinction between what 
                                                          
35 Ibid., pp. 13-27.  
36 Skinner, ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, p. 238. 
37 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Isaiah Berlin (ed.), Four Essays on Liberty 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118-172. 
38 Ibid., pp. 118-172. 
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we might deem to be individuals’ ‘higher’ or rational selves, and their ‘lower’ base self. The 
higher self is identified with reason and autonomy, and with an individual’s capacity to identify 
their own good and take steps to realise that good. The lower self, however, is a morass of 
impulses, urges, and desires which intervene against the higher self’s attempts to realise the 
individual’s good. As an example, we can imagine an individual who, knowing the dangers of 
smoking, decides to quit. Their reasoned, autonomous self sets itself the goal of escaping this 
habit but the lower self mitigates against this goal by desiring to smoke. On this view, achieving 
individual liberty requires that an individual strives to gain control or mastery over their lower, 
partial self, entailing that an individual is positively free when the higher self masters the lower 
self.  
The negative conception of liberty, however, is understood by Berlin to involve an 
absence of interference, where interference more or less consists of intentional obstruction or 
frustration of an individual’s activities. This may involve direct physical interference, as when 
someone imprisons another individual or forcibly prevents them from doing what they want, or 
when someone’s activities are curtailed by a credible coercive threat. Berlin, here, seems to follow 
Hobbes who argued that, ‘A Free-Man is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit 
he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to,’39 and who also seemingly 
acknowledged that threats can similarly interfere in individuals’ lives when they are, ‘made to 
hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.’40 On this conception of liberty, 
‘I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my 
activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed 
by others.’41    
With these comments in mind, it is important to note that Berlin overstates the potential 
for positive liberty to collapse into authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Indeed, Berlin argues that 
the division between individuals’ higher and lower selves opens the door to the coercion of 
individuals, ‘for their own sake;’42 it enables other individuals or collectives to coerce individuals 
in the name of their ‘true’ self. In the smoking example above, it may enable another to intervene 
on the smoker’s behalf, locking them in a room until their desire to smoke has abated. Berlin 
argues that, in such a situation, the intervening individual can then claim that while they have 
coerced the smoker, they have done so by reference to their higher self and their ‘real’ rational 
interests, thereby liberating them from their base desires and forcing them to be free.43 More 
problematic, Berlin argues, is the possibility that proponents of positive liberty may go one step 
                                                          
39 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (ed.) C. B. MacPherson (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 262. 
40 Ibid., p. 264. 
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further and equate the individuals’ good with the good of a social group, such as a tribe, a race, 
or a state. Once an individuals’ higher interests are equated with the interests of this wider group, 
and the defender of positive liberty remains convinced that coercing individuals in accordance 
with the higher self is merely supporting them in achieving freedom from their heteronomous 
self, they are, ‘in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, 
torture in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is 
the true goal of man ... must be identical with his freedom.’44  
An example of an account which seems to raise the spectre of an over-intrusive state is 
Joseph Raz’s conception of liberal perfectionism and ‘valuable autonomous agency.’ On Raz’s 
view, it is not autonomy which is valuable in and of itself, since individuals may autonomously 
choose to do stupid or irrational things, but rather autonomy is valuable only when it enables 
individuals to realise the good life. Indeed, as argued by Raz, ‘Since our concern for autonomy is 
a concern to enable people to have a good life it furnishes us with reason to secure that autonomy 
which could be valuable. Providing, preserving or protecting bad options does not enable one to 
enjoy valuable autonomy.’45 On Raz’s approach, securing valuable autonomous agency would 
permit governments to close off options which are not conducive to the good life, or make those 
options more costly to realise.  
Similarly, we find a ‘radical republican’, Michael J. Thompson, arguing that individuals 
can only realise their true ends in societies in which hierarchical relations of domination and 
extraction are prevented. Living a free life, on Thompson’s view, would require that, ‘social 
formations characterised by hierarchical relations organised for the benefit of those more elite 
within the structure’ be prevented; that individuals’ efforts are aimed at the community’s interests 
rather than their own private interests; and that the community’s resources are used for the benefit 
of everyone, rather than being extracted by elites. It would therefore be necessary for politics to 
fulfil a ‘positive’ function in creating the institutional and social conditions in which people can 
develop as free community-oriented individuals, in which everyone is prevented from subverting 
common resources to private ends. This would require at least three things: that the state takes 
control of all economic, cultural, material, moral, and educational resources; that it ensures that 
this common fund of resources is used to enhance the lives of the community as a whole; and that 
it prevents capitalist enterprises from emerging, and instead encourages the creation of 
cooperative, self-governing firms, which the state is to steer towards the enhancement of the 
common good.46  
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 In each of these accounts, we can see that it is possible that governance could start to 
evolve into authoritarianism, seemingly evidencing the veracity of Berlin’s arguments against 
positive liberty. Indeed, Raz and Thompson both stipulate what freedom entails and then perform 
the sleight of hand which Berlin’s critique is aimed at. That is, in each theory, the state is, ‘in a 
position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture in the name, and 
on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man ... 
must be identical with his freedom.’ While these accounts clearly do not countenance bullying, 
oppression, or torture, they do licence politics to coerce and control individuals in the name of 
their ‘real’ selves, regardless of whether or not individuals themselves actually want to engage in 
valuable autonomous agency or lead the communal lives that Thompson equates with their 
leading free lives. 
While some theories of positive liberty therefore seem to raise the spectre of an over-
intrusive state, such intrusiveness or authoritarianism does not characterise all theories which 
place value on individual autonomy or self-mastery. Indeed, it is perfectly feasible to attach 
central importance to these values, as those working in the Kantian tradition do, without this 
necessarily leading to authoritarianism. We find, for example, that T.H. Green attaches great value 
to individuals’ capacity to act in accordance with the ‘Good Will’ or doing something worth doing 
or enjoying.47 This view clearly represents an account of positive liberty, since it posits that 
freedom consists in acting in accordance with the Good Will rather than acting as one pleases, 
and yet does not necessitate the creation of a coercive or authoritarian government. Indeed, 
Green’s approach is to argue that rather than promoting the Good Will, the aim of governance 
should be to create laws and rights (which ought to be justified on ethical rather than legal 
grounds, and in coherence with Kant’s categorical imperative), which would secure individuals’ 
capacity to lead purposeful lives in which they’re able to realise the Good Will. This requires that 
rather than promoting each individual’s positive liberty, the state is required to create the 
conditions in which individuals can realise the Good Will in their own way. In embracing Kant’s 
categorical imperative, and thereby advocating a fundamental equality between agents, Green is 
able to privilege a concept of positive liberty and avoid the authoritarianism that Berlin associates 
with such an approach.  
It might be similarly argued that John Rawls attaches a central importance to autonomy 
without defending an authoritarian state as a means to realising such autonomy. Indeed, the 
‘original position’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ might be viewed as devices which are deployed to 
enable individuals’ autonomous, ‘higher’ selves to legislate over their ‘lower’ heteronomous 
selves; in placing individuals behind a veil of ignorance, wherein they are denied knowledge of 
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their lower passions and desires, Rawls ensures that the principles of justice which are selected 
are the product of rational, reasoned decision-making. As a result, individuals’ autonomous wills 
determine the principles which structure their societies, but in a non-perfectionist manner. That 
is, the principles derived from the original position only prescribe the two principles of justice 
(the equal basic liberties principle, and the difference principle), which then ensure that 
individuals can lead meaningful, free lives within a just society.48 
We can now see how Raz and Thompson’s theories are subject to Berlin’s critique of 
positive liberty but that Green and Rawls’ accounts avoid Berlin’s charges, and that it is possible 
to advocate a positive conception of liberty without defending an authoritarian regime as a means 
to realising such an end. While it is therefore true that some accounts of positive liberty may lead 
to authoritarianism, this brief discussion has shown that this is not necessarily true of all accounts 
which place value on autonomy or self-mastery. Problematically, however, the result of Berlin’s 
overly simplistic characterisation of the two concepts of liberty and arguments against freedom 
as self-mastery or autonomy, is that it, ‘forecloses a more or less salient third possibility.’49  
Indeed, this third possibility, freedom as non-domination, combines elements of both the 
positive and negative accounts of liberty and, ‘is negative to the extent that it requires the absence 
of domination by others, not necessarily the presence of self-mastery, whatever that is thought to 
involve. The conception is positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs something 
more than the absence of interference: it requires security against interference, in particular 
against interference on an arbitrary basis.’50 It is also, as we will see below, positive in a more 
foundational way since the problem of domination is that it undermines individuals’ capacity to 
lead lives of their own choosing, in accordance with the principles and reasons that they avow. 
With this in mind, we can now turn to the neo-republican critique of freedom as non-interference 
and the case for construing freedom as non-domination.   
 
Freedom as Non-Domination: A Challenge to Freedom as Non-Interference 
 
The non-interference view of freedom claims that an individual is free when they’re not subject 
to obstructive interference, and might be construed in one of two ways. The first, a Hobbesian 
version of non-interference, would perhaps be better defined as ‘freedom as non-frustration’. The 
second, which Pettit associates with Berlin, is what we might call ‘freedom as non-frustration, 
actual or counter-factual,’ and is closer to what we might consider to be freedom as non-
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interference proper.51 It is useful to consider each of these accounts of negative liberty in turn as 
they serve to highlight freedom as non-domination’s distinct appeal.  
Starting with the former of these two versions of non-interference, Pettit notes that 
Hobbes’ view of freedom was such that your freedom of choice is only reduced when you’re 
hindered in pursuing your actually preferred option; a hindrance which obstructed you from 
pursuing an option which you do not prefer would not reduce individual freedom since, as it 
happens, you do not actually want to pursue this option and therefore you will not be frustrated 
in your aims.52 Nonetheless, Pettit goes on to argue that Berlin has shown that this view, that 
you’re free if you are able to satisfy your preferred choice from a given set of options, is counter-
intuitive. This is because you can satisfy your preferred option in a given choice-set in one of two 
ways. Firstly, you may act to remove any obstructions which stand in the way of satisfying your 
preferred option. Alternatively, you may ‘retreat to the inner citadel’; that is, if someone cannot 
get what they want, they can learn to want only what they can get. But, as Pettit goes on to argue, 
this view is absurd as an individual cannot make themselves free simply by accommodating 
themselves to whatever options are actually available to them. As an example, Pettit suggests that 
we put ourselves in the shoes of a prisoner who, being incarcerated, lacks a choice between living 
in a prison and living in the outside world. The problem, here, is that if Hobbes’ view of freedom, 
that individuals are free if their preferred option is not frustrated, is correct, then all the prisoner 
needs to do is to change his preference to living in prison. Doing so would apparently render him 
free. This counter-intuitive result, Pettit argues, provides us with a good reason to reject the 
Hobbesian view of freedom since adaptation to constraints cannot count as a means to liberate 
oneself from that constraint.53   
Importantly, Pettit goes on to claim that, by parallel argument, we can see why Berlin’s 
account of freedom as non-interference is also fundamentally flawed.54 For Berlin, it is not enough 
to be free from frustration in your pursuit of your actually preferred option, freedom also requires 
that you’re not interfered with in your pursuit of any of the available options. We can see why 
this conception of negative liberty also fails if we consider the example of a slave and his well-
meaning master. Imagine that a master has an institutionally guaranteed right to treat his slave as 
he pleases, but he largely abstains from doing so, preferring to allow the slave to lead his life as 
he pleases. This would seemingly entail that, as long as the slave’s options are not obstructed, and 
we can assume they largely won’t be given the master’s goodwill, the slave is free since none of 
his options are going to be obstructed. Nonetheless, this seems entirely counter-intuitive because 
the slave remains subject to his master’s capacity to interfere in his life. That is, the master’s right 
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to interfere in the slave’s life, should the slave behave in unacceptable ways, renders the slave 
unfree. 
Pettit offers an analogy to see why freedom as non-interference may not actually entail 
freedom in any meaningful sense. He argues that a slave who lives under the yoke of a benevolent 
master is in the position of a horse whose rider gives him free rein to travel where it will. The 
horse is seemingly free but it nonetheless remains subject to the control of the rider in its saddle: 
should the horse do something that the rider does not want, he will correct it. The horse and the 
slave are in equivalent positions: they are free to pursue whatever options they prefer but are 
nonetheless subject to the invigilation and virtual or reserve control of the rider or master should 
they pursue an option that is deemed unwanted.55 
Where Berlin argued that it would be wrong to believe that an individual can free 
themselves by adapting their preferences to an option that will not be frustrated, Pettit argues that 
it would be absurd to conclude that an individual can make themselves free through always 
selecting an option that others are willing to permit them to pursue. Indeed, this would be similar 
to the retreat to the inner citadel – individuals would be able to guarantee themselves freedom 
through ingratiation, toadying and kowtowing which ensured that others with the power to 
intervene are kept at bay.56 Where Berlin criticised the view that an individual can render 
themselves free through adapting their preferences to those that won’t be frustrated, Pettit 
criticises the view that freedom can be achieved through adapting oneself to what others will 
permit.57 
Pettit concludes that, ‘Let the anti-adaptation assumption be granted [that a retreat to the 
inner citadel does not render someone free] and the non-frustration theory must fail; let the anti-
ingratiation assumption be granted [that accommodating oneself to pursuing options which others 
will permit cannot secure freedom] and the non-interference theory must fail.’58 Fundamentally, 
Pettit’s claim is that, ‘neither adaptation nor ingratiation counts intuitively as a means of liberation 
in a given choice and any theory that entails that it can serve such a liberating role has to be 
inadequate.’59 Instead, he argues that freedom of choice requires that every option be open to 
pursuit, not just an individual’s preferred option. Furthermore, he claims that an individual’s 
capacity to pursue each option must be independent of the preferences of others as to how they 
should choose.60 It is not enough to just be free from interference, as the perceptive slave is. 
Instead, individuals require systematic protection from others’ capacity to invigilate their choices 
or interfere with them.  
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Indeed, such protection is required even if those with the capacity to intervene are of a 
generally benevolent disposition, or generally inclined to not intervene in the lives of others. Pettit 
illustrates the problem of relying on the goodwill of others in a number of places, but it is useful 
to outline one example to show why we ought to be concerned with security against the possibility 
of others interfering in our lives. In Henry Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House, Torvald, a successful 
nineteenth century banker, enjoys an enormous degree of power over his wife Nora. As a matter 
of luck, Torvald dotes on his wife and does not utilise his powers to coerce or control her. On the 
non-interference view of freedom, Nora must be deemed free since her husband does not interfere 
in her choices. The problem with this case, for those who endorse non-domination as a value, is 
that Nora’s freedom is dependent upon Torvald’s beneficence but, should the circumstances of 
their relationship change and Torvald withdraw his goodwill, Nora will find herself in a very 
different position. Indeed, ‘If Torvald took against her and withdrew his goodwill, then she would 
no longer enjoy non-interference at his hands.’61 The problem for Pettit is that even though Nora 
might enjoy non-interference, she does not enjoy non-domination. This is because she is subject 
to her husband’s will, she lives under Torvald’s dominium, and it is only a matter of brute luck 
that he continues to dote on her and deny her nothing. Lacking security in how she will be treated, 
Nora may be forced to ingratiate herself with her husband, toadying and kowtowing to his every 
whim in order to secure her husband’s ongoing generosity.62  
We can see, then, that the neo-republican account of freedom, which requires that 
individuals not only be able to pursue whichever option they want but be able to do so without 
accommodating other’s preferences, is more demanding than the non-interference view of 
freedom: not only must an individual be free from interference, they must also be free from others’ 
capacity to interfere arbitrarily. Before we proceed to a more detailed analysis of this account of 
liberty, it is important to consider an objection to the ideal of freedom as non-domination. 
Although advanced by different theorists in different ways, the objection is that the non-
interference conception of freedom can accommodate the insight that there can be a loss of 
freedom without interference.63  
As a representative example of this objection, Matthew Kramer claims that the extent of 
negative freedom that we enjoy at any time is conditioned by the probability that we will be 
interfered with in the future.64 Kramer argues that people who are subject to arbitrary power, as 
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Nora is, while not interfered with at a specific time, are more likely to be interfered with at some 
point in the future than those who are not subject to such power. Those who are subject to an 
increased probability of future interference are less negatively free than those with a lower 
probability of being interfered with. For Kramer, exposure to arbitrary power should be seen to 
adversely affect an agent’s overall negative freedom, although it may not affect any specific 
negative freedom. Simply, he claims that we should understand freedom to have overall and 
specific components. An individual has an overall quantity of freedom which can be negatively 
impacted upon in relation to the probability of interference at some point in time; they can be 
uninterfered with at a specific time, but nonetheless be subject to an overall loss of negative 
freedom if the probability of being interfered with later is high.65   
As an example of how Kramer’s approach seemingly accommodates the neo-republican 
claim that individuals are unfree even when not subject to a specific instance of control, imagine 
that a slave has a choice between cleaning for his master and relaxing while his master is out. He 
is negatively free to relax, since his master isn’t there to prevent him from doing so, but relaxing 
will likely result in some kind of punishment or sanction from his master when he returns. So, his 
specific negative freedom to relax remains uninterfered with but, in being able to impose a 
punishment for having chosen to relax, the master has made the slave’s range of conjunctively 
exercisable negative freedoms smaller, reducing his overall quantity of negative freedom. The 
more sanctions and punishments that the master can impose on his slave, the smaller the range of 
conjunctively exercisable negative freedoms, the more there will be an overall loss of negative 
liberty.66 In this way, negative liberty is claimed to encompass neo-republican freedom; exposure 
to arbitrary power, whether or not it is exercised, has an adverse effect on negative freedom 
through the probability of it being exercised.  
So, Kramer sees negative freedom as only being affected by arbitrary power in proportion 
to the probability that it will actually manifest as interference. Nevertheless, the probabilistic 
approach fails on two fronts. Firstly, it must maintain that if there is an extremely low probability 
of interference, an individual is largely free. Secondly, it ignores the fact that individuals can be 
implicated in a relationship of domination and subjection, a relationship that is common 
knowledge between the parties, and which will ensure that the subjected party acts as required in 
order to stave off actual interference. It is useful to consider each of these responses in turn. 
 If Kramer is correct, we’re forced to conclude that Nora is largely free. Indeed, doted on 
by a husband who has never interfered in her life before and who has denied her nothing, we seem 
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forced to accept that the probability of Torvald interfering in Nora’s life is so low as to be 
negligible. But, we have good reason to suppose that past performance is not necessarily a good 
guide to how Torvald is likely to act in the future, and is therefore a poor means for determining 
the extent of freedom enjoyed by Nora. This is because new circumstances may arise which 
Torvald may not have encountered before. Perhaps, for example, his wife might decide to join a 
woman’s liberation group, or refuse to play the part of the doting wife. In such circumstances, 
Torvald may feel forced to grab the reins, to check his wife’s errant behaviour, and would 
(because of the norms and laws which permeated society in the nineteenth century) be able to do 
so. The problem with the probabilistic approach advocated by Kramer is that it fails to address 
the issue identified by Pettit. That is, individuals can be unfree regardless of whether or not 
another is likely to interfere in their life, and they are unfree as long as another has the unchecked 
capacity to interfere.  
The second problem for the probabilistic account of non-interference is that, as discussed 
above, those who are subject to domination, and who know that they’re subject to another’s 
capacity to exert arbitrary control over their lives, may ingratiate themselves with their dominator, 
or may act in ways which they know are going to be permissible. Indeed, we may find that Nora 
plays the doting wife simply to secure her husband’s goodwill and forbearance on other matters, 
or that she always pursues options that she knows Torvald is likely to approve of. The fact that 
Nora has to act in this way to secure a lower probability of interference must surely evidence that 
she is subject to Torvald’s will. It therefore seems that on the probabilistic view, ingratiation and 
individuals censoring their own actions are means by which an individual can reduce the 
probability of interference in their lives, and therefore function as a means for securing a greater 
degree of freedom.  
We must therefore conclude that the non-interference conception of freedom and the 
revised probabilistic account fail to address the problem highlighted by Pettit whereby individuals 
are rendered unfree when others stand ready to take up the reins and exert arbitrary, unchecked 
control over their lives. Freedom should therefore not be understood to consist of non-frustration, 
since doing so entails that freedom can be increased through the unfree adapting their preferences 
to wanting only what they can get. Likewise, freedom should not be understood to consist solely 
of non-interference, since doing so entails that freedom can be increased through the unfree 
kowtowing, toadying, and ingratiating themselves with those who dominate them in order to 
secure a greater area of non-interference.67 Instead, we should follow Pettit in understanding 
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freedom to require that, ‘You must be able to get what you want regardless of what it is that you 
want. And you must be able to get what you want regardless of what others want you to get.’68  
 
The Liber 
 
Being a free person or liber, Pettit argues, requires that: 
 
1. you have the room and the resources to enact the option you prefer, 
2. whatever your own preference over those options, and 
3. whatever the preference of any other as to how you should choose.69 
 
The first of these requirements has two distinct components. The first component broadly 
states that individuals ought to have the capacity to pursue their favoured option from a given set 
without being prevented from doing so. This maps onto the non-frustration view which was 
defended by Hobbes and simply requires that a free individual is not frustrated in their pursuit of 
their actually preferred option in a choice-set.70 The second component of this requirement 
stipulates that individuals must have the personal, natural, and social resources necessary to 
pursue their favoured option. We will return to exactly which choices qualify for non-frustration, 
and the importance of guarding against the invasion and vitiation of these choices, below.71 
 The second requirement maps onto Berlin’s critique of Hobbes’ account of non-
frustration and requires that non-frustration is secured across whichever option an individual 
actually decides to pursue. To use Berlin’s analogy, we can think of the options in a choice-set as 
representing a series of doors. Non-frustration requires that whatever door an individual actually 
pushes on is unlocked and therefore accessible to them. But, as discussed previously, if this were 
enough for freedom, then the individual could simply adapt their preferences and decide to push 
on whichever door is open, regardless of whether or not this was their actual preference. Instead, 
and what the second requirement entails is that each door must be unlocked so that, regardless of 
an individual’s preference, they are not frustrated in their attempt to open a door. This requirement 
therefore stipulates that freedom requires that individuals are not only free from frustration in the 
pursuit of their preferred option, but that they’re not interfered with in the pursuit of any option 
in a given choice-set.72   
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 The third requirement is that not only must each door be open to an individual regardless 
of which they actually choose to open, but their capacity to open a door, ‘must remain in place 
not only if you change your mind about what to choose, but also if others change their minds as 
to what you should choose.’73 This requirement therefore links to the example of Torvald and 
Nora, since it requires that Nora’s choices (perhaps to cease to be a doting wife and to instead 
join a woman’s liberation group) be independent of Torvald’s preferences. If she is truly to be 
free, Nora must be able to pursue whichever option she wants without having to consult her 
husband or account for his preferences; ‘freedom involves the ability to enact any of the options 
in a choice, regardless not only of what you prefer to choose, but also of what others prefer that 
you choose.’74 The free person, then, enjoys a resilience in their capacity to choose how to lead 
their own life: they are able to look at a set of options and know that they can choose as they will 
free from interference, and enjoy secure knowledge that others need not be placated in order to 
secure their acquiescence.  
At this point it is necessary to briefly pause and turn to the issue of positive liberty again. 
This is necessary as underlying Pettit’s account of non-domination is a foundational conception 
of individuals as, at least, autonomous agents and, ideally, as agents who engage in orthonomous 
decision-making. Since this account of individual self-rule seemingly motivates Pettit’s concern 
with domination, it is necessary to be clear about exactly how Pettit understands the relationship 
between the political and personal ideals of freedom. 
 Leading an orthonomous life requires that individuals form and act on their desires in 
accordance with the right sort of principles. Indeed, Pettit and Michael Smith argue, in 
Backgrounding Desire, that orthonomy requires, ‘that the properties which the agent 
countenances as valuable - the properties which he desires - figure consistently in the 
determination of which options he comes to desire.’75 Orthonomy requires that not only must 
individuals govern themselves and make choices in an autonomous way, but that they must make 
their choices in accordance with the requirements of rationality and in accordance with the 
principles that they endorse: ‘It means being sensitive to the properties that count for you as values 
and not being disrupted by pathologies of desire.’76 This view can be contrasted with heteronomy, 
which Pettit and Smith define as the antonym of orthonomy, wherein individuals are ruled by 
capricious whims and desires. To be orthonomous, then, is to form desires and make choices in 
accordance with the values that an individual endorses, ensuring coherence between principles 
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and actions, and is more demanding than autonomy which simply requires that individuals choose 
as they will. 
Importantly, orthonomy does not require that individuals actively ensure that they form 
their choices in accordance with their principles in all situations. Instead, and as is more likely in 
the real world, many of the actions that we perform, and choices that we make, are not the result 
of any explicit reflection. Instead, Pettit argues that we largely act out of habit, with our principles 
and reasons guiding our actions in a virtual way: we only engage in explicit reflection in situations 
which are out of the ordinary. In these situations, we engage in a process of internal discursive 
reflection, selecting how to choose or act on the basis of the principles and reasons that we 
endorse.77 Fundamentally, orthonomy requires that individuals, ‘form and act on desires that 
answer to [their] evaluations, in particular to evaluations that reflect whatever count as the 
relevant facts.’78 
It is important to be clear that Pettit does not stipulate that individuals do, or have to, lead 
orthonomous lives. Instead, he simply acknowledges that freedom of choice is going to require 
some form of autonomy or orthonomy. This is because freedom of choice presupposes that 
individuals are able to stand back from the choice-set they face and utilise some form of self-rule 
in selecting between options, as when an individual chooses which door to go through in Berlin’s 
earlier analogy. Pettit’s preference is for individuals to choose from a given set of options in an 
orthonomous rather than autonomous way.  
Nonetheless, Pettit goes on to note that exactly how individuals choose is immaterial to 
his account of non-domination.79 This is because non-domination is an alternative to the negative 
ideal of non-interference:80 it is a ‘political’ ideal of freedom which is intended to regulate 
interpersonal relations (relations between individuals), not intrapersonal relations (individuals’ 
capacity to achieve self-mastery).81 His account of non-domination is concerned, ‘solely with 
social free will or, in effect, political freedom: that is, with what is required for it to be the case 
that however imperfectly formed your will may be, you are in a position to make your choice, 
without invasion or vitiation, according to that will.’82 This is because, following Berlin, he 
believes that it would be ‘reckless’ to entrust a state with promoting individuals’ capacity to 
achieve self-mastery and, if the state were entrusted with such a task, then it would likely 
degenerate, ‘into an intrusive and oppressive agency.’83 Non-domination is therefore concerned 
with individuals’ ‘revealed’ will, not whether or not that will constitutes their true or real will: 
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whether individuals’ revealed will reflects their real will is an ethical or psychological issue, and 
not one that can be laid to the charge of a coercive state.84 With that said, he does go on to note 
that, ‘Freedom as personal self-mastery, however, is a richer ideal than that of freedom as non-
domination; there can certainly be non-domination without personal self-mastery, but there can 
hardly be any meaningful form of self-mastery without non-domination. Moreover, freedom as 
personal self-mastery ought to be facilitated, if not actively promoted, under a state that assures 
freedom as non-domination.’85 He concludes that in a society which ensures non-domination, 
individuals can be trusted to look after their own personal autonomy or orthonomy.86  
Since Pettit is clear that securing non-domination is a distinct, and more salient, issue 
than securing each individual’s capacity to achieve self-mastery, it would seem that his views on 
orthonomy are redundant to the current analysis of Pettit’s political ideal of freedom. Nonetheless, 
I do not think that this is the case. This is because the concept of orthonomy which Pettit endorses 
seems to provide the prism through which he views the evils of domination: that is, subjection to 
arbitrary control breaks the link between an individual’s capacity to choose or act in accordance 
with the principles that they endorse and undermines their capacity to lead orthonomous (or 
autonomous) lives. So, in Nora’s case, we can imagine that she might endorse some principle of 
gender equality and, pursuant to this, aims to act in a way that ensures her choices cohere with 
her principles by joining a female liberation group. From the perspective of orthonomy, 
domination is a particular ill since it entails that Torvald’s capacity to invigilate Nora’s choices 
breaks the link between her principles and actions. She is forced to act in ways which do not 
cohere with any principles that she endorses.  
We can therefore see that Pettit’s account blends positive and negative liberty in a 
complex way. He is clear that his concern is with the political ideal of freedom as non-domination 
as an alternative to freedom as non-interference. In addition, he acknowledges that securing non-
domination is going to require an underlying assumption of individual autonomy or orthonomy 
(since we cannot conceive of individuals as standing apart from their choices in the required way 
unless we embrace some form of positive liberty), but stipulates that promoting or securing 
individual self-rule ought not to be entrusted to a state. The evil of domination is that, when 
subject to domination, individuals’ capacity to lead their own lives, and choose from a given 
choice-set (in an autonomous or orthonomous way), is undermined. Pettit’s account is therefore 
premised upon a positive conception of individual self-rule, which would ideally take the form of 
individual orthonomy, and a negative conception of political liberty which requires that 
individuals are protected from domination: individuals must be protected from domination so that 
they can lead their lives in a self-ruling way.  
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Turning to the issue of how domination severs the link between principles and actions, 
Pettit argues that there are two categories of factors which undermine an individual’s capacity to 
choose how to act (and therefore undermine individual orthonomy or autonomy). These are 
vitiating and invading factors. Vitiating factors are those that condition and constrain the options 
available to individuals and will hinder an individual’s capacity to lead a free life.87 Invading 
factors are those that directly undermine an individual’s capacity to choose in a reason-sensitive, 
orthonomous way between the options available to them; invading factors are, in Pettit’s view, 
worse than vitiating factors.88  
Starting with vitiating factors, Pettit argues that an individual’s freedom can be 
undermined when subject to a paucity of personal, natural, and social resources. He offers us an 
example of someone wanting to vote in an election in order to understand how a lack of resources 
may undermine an individual’s freedom of opportunity. If they’re physically or mentally disabled, 
they may be unable to pursue the option to vote without significant support. Alternatively, there 
may be a lack of natural or environmental resources to facilitate freedom of opportunity: in this 
case, there may be no election booth within reach, resulting in an individual being unable to 
actually vote. Finally, the social conditions in which an individual makes a choice can undermine 
their capacity to choose freely. If the society that they live in does not make provision for 
individuals to be able to vote, if there are no laws securing a suitable electoral system, an 
individual’s capacity to choose to vote is going to be undermined. These factors can all serve to 
vitiate individuals’ freedom of choice, constraining the range of choices available to individuals, 
and undermining their capacity to choose in accordance with the principles and reasons that they 
endorse.89  
Turning to invading factors, Pettit argues that, ‘To suffer invasion is to be denied the very 
condition by which freedom is identified: to be thwarted in making the choice according to your 
will.’90 When an individual’s choice-set is invaded by another, their capacity to act in accordance 
with their principles and the reasons that they endorse is severed, and another’s will enjoys an 
invigilating or outright interfering influence in that individual’s deliberations over how to act. 
Pettit goes on to outline four ways in which a choice-set might be invaded by another. An 
individual may remove an option from a choice-set, with or without notifying the chooser, such 
that a choice-set which previously included options X, Y, and Z may be reduced to just X and Y. 
Alternatively, an invader may, again without necessarily notifying the chooser, change an option 
in a choice-set such that options X, Y, and Z become options X, Y, and Z-. In each of these cases, 
option Z is no longer included within the choice-set. Importantly, we must distinguish between 
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the problematic replacement of an option with a penalised option, and the unproblematic offer of 
a reward for choosing a specific option. When a penalty is imposed upon an option, that option is 
replaced with a less desirable option: option Z becomes Z-. This is a form of invasion since it 
denies the chooser the options of X, Y, and Z. When a reward is offered for choosing an option, 
however, the original choice-set remains intact but with the added bonus of an extra option: choice 
set X, Y, and Z becomes, X, Y, Z, and Z+. So, when a penalty is attached to an option, the original 
choice-set is changed and includes a less desirable option. When a reward is offered, the original 
choice-set remains intact with an additional, attractive option.  
 The third and fourth ways in which a choice-set might be invaded is through the 
misrepresentation of the options through deception or manipulation. Here, an invader might be 
able to deceive the chooser into believing that the options available in a given set are other than 
they actually are, or that choosing a given option will have unpleasant consequences. The invader 
thereby undermines the chooser’s capacity to rationally choose between the available options by 
misrepresenting the content and consequences of the available set. Manipulation, like deception, 
affects the chooser’s cognitive capacity to choose as they will. Manipulation may involve 
hypnotising, mesmerising the chooser through the offer of extraordinary rewards, playing on the 
chooser’s emotions, or through excessive lies. Such invasion will, again, affect the chooser’s 
capacity to choose in accordance with the principles and reasons that they endorse, thereby 
undermining their capacity to make a reason-sensitive choice.91  
 In summarising the role of vitiating and invading factors in undermining individual 
freedom, Pettit argues that the latter are considerably worse than the former as, ‘it is inherently 
worse to be controlled by the free will of another than to be constrained by a contingent absence 
of resources.’92 He concludes that: 
 
There are two dimensions to freedom of choice: on the one side, the freedom that goes 
with the unvitiated range of choices available; and on the other the freedom that goes with 
not being invaded by others in the exercise of those choices. The unvitiated resources at 
your disposal define a range of effective opportunities, and to the extent to which that 
range is wider, you have greater latitude for choice, greater freedom of opportunity. Being 
in a position to use those resources without invasion – not being subject to the will of 
another, however partially, on the matter of how you exercise the capacity they give you 
– will enable you to exploit those opportunities more effectively. Where the unvitiated 
resources ensure your freedom of opportunity, the absence of subjection and invasion 
ensures your freedom of exercise or control.93 
 
 Securing freedom of choice therefore requires that individuals are properly resourced so 
that they have an adequate range of options to choose from (we will consider below exactly what 
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choices ought to be resourced), and that they are protected against invasion so that they can choose 
an option from a choice-set regardless of their own preference over these options and regardless 
of anyone else’s preferences as to how they should choose. With that said, it is necessary to add 
a further qualification to this account of freedom of choice, and one which more clearly 
distinguishes neo-republicanism from liberal theories of freedom. This is the claim that it is 
possible to have invasion without domination, and domination without invasion. That is, it is 
possible for a choice to be interfered with without this necessarily counting as domination or 
subjection to another’s will; and it is possible for individuals to be dominated through invigilation 
and intimidation without direct interference taking place.  
Starting with the possibility of interference without domination, it useful to begin with 
Pettit’s example of Ulysses’ encounter with the Sirens. Having been forewarned by Circe of the 
dangers of the Sirens’ song, Ulysses plugs the ears of his crew after instructing them to tie him to 
the mast so that he can hear the mantic truths of the Siren’s song without being lured to his death. 
He informs his crew that no matter how much he begs or commands, they are not to release him. 
Hearing the song, Ulysses begs for release but his crew only tighten his bonds as he commanded. 
Ulysses is thereby interfered with by his crew, but it is his commands which guide the crew’s 
interference. As it is Ulysses’ will which guides his crew’s interference, the control that they 
exercise is not arbitrary: the interference is determined by Ulysses’ own will. Had his crew 
countermanded his edicts, and released him from his bonds for whatever reason, it will have been 
the crew’s will which was decisive and therefore an arbitrary or uncontrolled form of 
interference.94 
Pettit’s argument here is that it is arbitrary or uncontrolled interference which is the 
problematic form of interference since it, ‘is interference which is practiced in accordance with 
the arbitrium, or ‘will’, of another,’95 rather than in accordance with the will of the one subject to 
interference. Since the crew’s interference is not practiced in accordance with their arbitrium, 
they act as Ulysses’ servants rather than his master, and they are used as a tool to give effect to 
Ulysses’ own will. The upshot of this argument is that interference which is practiced in 
accordance with the will of those subject to interference, will not represent a dominating form of 
control providing that it materialises on terms dictated by those subject to the interference.96 While 
we will return to this distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary control in the next chapter, 
it should be noted that paternalistic interference, which relies on the interferer’s interpretation of 
the situation, will also represent a form of dominating interference since the interferer’s will 
supplants that of the individual on the receiving end of such treatment. This will only be 
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acceptable when the interference is in accordance with a set of interests which the individual 
subject to interference is disposed to avow, and this avowal can be readily tested and established.97 
 As it is possible to have interference without domination, so too is it possible to have 
domination without interference, and this can be realised through the mechanisms of invigilation 
and intimidation. Invigilation involves standing guard over an individual’s actions, ready to 
interfere should the individual choose an action which the invigilator does not licence. Invigilation 
is the mechanism which characterises Torvald and Nora’s relationship: as argued previously, 
Torvald does not actively intervene in Nora’s life (since he has so far had no need to do so), but 
he stands ready to take up Nora’s reins should she act in inappropriate ways. In this situation, 
Nora’s capacity to choose as she will is dependent upon Torvald’s forbearance. So, let us imagine 
that Nora faces a choice-set of preparing her husband’s dinner or attending a woman’s liberation 
meeting. The issue, here, is that these options are not as they first appear. Nora’s choices are 
actually preparing her husband’s dinner-cum permissu or attending a woman’s liberation meeting-
cum permissu. That is, the objective profile of the options that Nora faces are not X or Y, but X-
if-it-please-Torvald or Y-if-it-please-Torvald, and the original options of X or Y have therefore 
been replaced. Assuming that Nora is aware of her dependence upon her husband’s goodwill and 
the objective change in her choice-set, the cognitive profile of the options will also change and 
she will suffer intimidation. That is, Nora’s awareness of being subject to her husband’s will will 
involve her attaching different values to these options (presumably a negative value to attending 
the women’s meeting), and thereby permitting Torvald’s invigilating will to also achieve an 
intimidating effect over her choices. She will act as though subject to a threat (the threat of 
interference should she choose other than required) and will therefore be subject to both 
invigilation and intimidation.98  
 Although we have only touched briefly on a number of issues in this section, it is now 
possible to see how the neo-republican conception of freedom is distinct from the non-interference 
view, and exactly what being a free person requires. The free person, we have seen, is one who 
has the room and the resources required to pursue an option from a given choice-set, irrespective 
of which option they actually want to pursue, and regardless of the preferences of others over how 
they should choose. This requires that individuals are free, as far as possible, from vitiating factors 
such as a paucity of personal, natural, and social resources, and that they’re free from invasion 
(which may take the form of replacing, removing, or misrepresenting an option). I have outlined 
that underlying this account of free choice is a conception of orthonomy (or at least minimal 
autonomy) which claims that individuals ought to make their decisions in a way which coheres 
with the principles that they avow and the correlative reasons which bear on a given decision. 
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Importantly, invasion and vitiation undermine individuals’ capacity to lead orthonomous lives 
through altering the options available to them and through constraining their choice-sets, thereby 
preventing individuals from acting in accordance with their principles and the requirements of 
reason. I have also outlined Pettit’s further claim that it is possible for an individual’s choice-set 
to be invaded without domination occurring, and that domination can occur without an invasion 
of a choice-set.  
 
Freedom from Dominium 
 
Having now outlined what being a free person entails, and how that freedom can be undermined, 
we can begin to look at how individuals might be protected from others’ capacity to exert arbitrary 
control over their lives. There are, broadly, three possible ways in which we might ensure that 
individuals are protected against others’ uncontrolled interference: we might rely on individuals 
themselves to not exert arbitrary control over others; we might empower individuals so that 
they’re able to check others’ attempts to exert arbitrary control over them; or we might develop 
an external authority which would aim to provide a guard against individuals’ capacity to 
dominate others. My aim is to show that only the third of these options is able to secure individuals 
against domination and, as we will see in later chapters, is of central importance in determining 
how we might address the problem of transnational domination.   
The first of these options, relying on individuals themselves not to exert arbitrary control, 
may secure non-interference but cannot secure non-domination. This is because, as discussed 
above, whether or not Torvald actually interferes in Nora’s life is immaterial from the perspective 
of non-domination: what matters is that she is dependent upon his goodwill to lead a life of her 
own choosing. Indeed, as Pettit notes, individuals may not want others to be dependent upon their 
goodwill but, because of the legal, cultural, and political system in which individuals live, they 
may find that they are implicated in relationships of, ‘inalienable asymmetrical power.’99 That is, 
Torvald might wish that that Nora did not depend on his goodwill to lead her own life and wish 
that circumstances were otherwise, but he will subject her to his will non-intentionally simply 
because of the legal and cultural norms which permit him to control her life. Attempting to address 
domination through promoting individual virtue and forbearance is therefore doomed to failure 
since it will simply establish a series of asymmetrical relationships in which individuals are 
largely free from invasion but nonetheless subject to domination.100 
The second strategy, what Pettit calls the strategy of reciprocal power, would aim to 
ensure that each individual has sufficient resources to be able to check or rebuff others’ attempts 
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to dominate them. The problem with this approach, Pettit notes, is that it gives rise to a Hobbesian 
state of nature and a war of all against all. Supposing that this strategy could be successfully 
realised (and assuming that no individual or group was able to become dominant through the 
successful accumulation or pooling of resources), it would guard against invasion, invigilation 
and intimidation, but would severely restrict the range of unvitiated choice that individuals could 
enjoy. That is, individuals would need to be prepared for resistance from others whenever they 
attempt to carry out an action and would need to defend themselves should others take against 
them, rendering all choices more costly or unrealisable (for example, individuals might need to 
carry arms so that they can successfully see off any potential dominators). 
This leaves the third strategy, what Pettit calls the strategy of constitutional provision.101 
Under this approach, individuals would empower an external third party to secure mutual non-
domination by guarding each against invasion, intimidation, and invigilation, and securing a range 
of unvitiated choice.102 Importantly, this approach would mirror the Ulysses example in which 
Ulysses authorises his crew to bind him. In doing so, they restrict his freedom of choice and 
simultaneously secure him against the Sirens’ lure. In this case, we noted that Ulysses remains 
undominated as it is his will which determines the control that he is subject to. Pettit’s suggestion 
for securing non-domination is to develop a political system which will function in the same way 
as Ulysses’ crew by providing a series of, ‘external checks that remove or replace the interference 
option or put it cognitively off the menu.’103  
It is important to note that this strategy will reduce the range and ease with which 
individuals will be able to exercise their capacity for unvitiated choice. This is because just as 
Ulysses’ crew reduce his unvitiated choice to submit to the lure in order to secure his non-
domination, a political system will similarly restrict the options available to individuals in order 
to secure the community’s non-domination. Pettit argues that this restriction of unvitiated choice 
does not, however, make individuals unfree, but rather makes them ‘non-free.’104 This follows the 
distinction outlined previously in which Pettit argues, following Kant and Rousseau, that invasion 
is qualitatively worse than vitiation because, ‘the human being is dependent on many external 
things…But what is harder and more unnatural than this yoke of necessity is the subjection of one 
human being under the will of another.’105  
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While we will return to exactly how such a political system might be developed in the 
next chapter, and consider the extent to which it would be able to secure non-domination without 
becoming a source of domination, it is sufficient to note, here, that Pettit’s constitutional provision 
strategy seems to be the most plausible means for securing individuals against domination. Unlike 
the goodwill strategy, it ensures that individuals are not dependent on others for leading their lives 
as they wish and, unlike the reciprocal power strategy, it does not suggest that the best means for 
securing non-domination is anarchy which would, in all likelihood, result in the emergence of 
stronger agents who are able to pool their resources and thereby secure a degree of dominance 
over others.106  
It is also of central importance to note, here, that these comments will be particularly 
important when we look at how we might secure international justice and guard against 
transnational domination. Indeed, as we will see in the third chapter, Pettit’s insight into how 
domination can be prevented between individuals will be just as relevant for determining how 
domination can be prevented between corporate and transnational agents (which we will consider 
in detail below). That is, just as relying on individuals to forbear from interfering with one another 
may secure non-interference but not non-domination (since the option to interfere remains within 
individuals’ choice-set), relying on corporate agents to forbear from interfering with one another 
will similarly only secure non-interference and not non-domination. Likewise, the strategy of 
reciprocal power, which Pettit has argued will entail a war of all against all at an individual level, 
will similarly entail an arms race between corporate agents if pursued at a transnational level. 
These comments therefore suggest that just as the strategy of constitutional provision is the only 
way to secure non-domination between individuals (since it removes the option of interference 
from individuals’ choice-sets), it will likewise be the only strategy capable of securing non-
domination between corporate agents and will need to be replicated at a transnational level in 
order to secure international justice.  
Assuming, for now, that an appropriate political system could be developed to guard each 
individual against domination, the next issue that we must confront is the scope of such 
constitutional provision: that is, over what range of choices should individuals enjoy security 
against invasion and vitiation? It should be noted that there has been some equivocation on Pettit’s 
part as his neo-republicanism has developed. Indeed, in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom 
and Government, Pettit outlines a series of policy areas which a republican society ought to be 
concerned with in combatting dominium. These include: securing external defence; guaranteeing 
internal protection; securing personal independence; promoting economic prosperity; and 
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promoting a robust public life.107 His later work, however, has focused on the elucidation of a 
series of basic liberties which would enable individuals to satisfy the ‘eyeball test.’ 
The basic liberties are those choices that meet two criteria. These are that, to qualify as a 
basic liberty, a choice must be capable of being co-exercised and co-satisfied. The first criteria 
requires that each choice which is safeguarded must be capable of being exercised by all adult, 
able-minded citizens, at more or less the same time. This criterion therefore rules out any choices 
which are inaccessible to particular people, and any choices that cannot be exercised more or less 
simultaneously by all individuals. The second criterion requires that each choice which is 
protected must promote the individual enjoyment and welfare of those who satisfy them, and must 
be such that their exercise does not harm others or reduce their capacity to enjoy these choices.108   
Pettit goes on to argue that the choices which will be co-exercisable and co-satisfying 
will vary across societies (an issue which we will return to in later chapters), and that the choices 
which qualify as basic liberties will be those that are general and distal. This means that, where 
possible, the choices which should qualify as basic liberties are those whose protection will secure 
further liberties. For example, rather than securing freedom to speak at a political meeting, we 
should protect the more general freedom of speech as doing so will also secure the more specific 
freedom to speak at a political meeting. In protecting general freedoms which pass the co-
exercisability and co-satisfying constraints, we will also protect a series of related choices. 
Finally, Pettit goes on to list a range of general, distal choices which, though not exhaustive, will 
likely secure individuals against dominium. These include: freedom of thought; freedom of 
expression; freedom of religion; freedom of association; property rights and freedom to trade and 
exchange; employment rights, including the right to change occupation; and freedom of travel 
within the community.109 Guarding against vitiation will also require the provision of a range of 
material resources which secure individuals from dependency.110 It is important to note, however, 
that Pettit claims that, with regard to the entrenchment of the basic liberties, ‘One size may not fit 
all,’111 and that, ‘Culturally diverse societies may call for the entrenchment of divergent sets of 
basic liberties.’112 Pettit’s account of the basic liberties is therefore sensitive to cultural variation, 
acknowledging that in some societies it may not be appropriate to entrench a right to criticise or 
mock others’ religion due to different cultural standards, whereas in others it would be. As such, 
he claims that, ‘there is no reason to think that only a single candidate will be right from the point 
of view of freedom as non-domination.’113 
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The basic liberties, Pettit argues, should be resourced and protected up to the point where 
no more needs to be done. Once this threshold has been met, individuals can be assumed to be 
able to satisfy the eyeball test, and are therefore secure against private domination or dominium. 
The eyeball test, which Pettit argues is grounded in the republican image of a free citizen, requires 
that an individual is able to walk tall and enjoy communal recognition that they’re of the same 
status as the most powerful.114 Importantly, the eyeball test permits deviations from substantive 
equality: as long as all individuals meet the threshold whereby they can look one another in the 
eye as equals, the state need not be concerned with material inequality.  
We should also note two final points. The first is that although material inequalities are 
not necessarily a concern from a republican perspective, there may nonetheless be a need to place 
a limit on the extent of inequality permitted. This is because some individuals may accumulate 
more wealth or power and enjoy a correlative rise in the range of uninvaded and unvitiated choices 
available to them: this may have the effect of raising the threshold of the eyeball test since some 
individuals may be unable to address such people on equal terms. The second point to note is that 
as a society does better at realising the requirements of the eyeball test, the expectations of what 
that test will require will rise correlatively. Indeed, we can suppose that once the threshold is 
reached for everyone, that threshold will rise and the range of choices which individuals believe 
ought to be included as a basic liberty will similarly expand.115 
It is important to end our discussion of what freedom from dominium requires with a brief 
analysis of what would be required to entrench the basic liberties, and consider Pettit’s argument 
for why the protection and promotion of the basic liberties ought to count as a theory of social 
justice. In brief, Pettit outlines three policy areas which would need to address the entrenchment 
of the basic liberties: infrastructural programmes; insurance programmes; and insulation 
programmes. Infrastructural programmes would aim at establishing a suitable range of unvitiated 
choice for individuals and would include: educational and developmental policies which would 
enable individuals to exercise the basic liberties; a legal and institutional framework which specify 
the property conventions and other arrangements which secure the co-exercisable and co-
sastisfiable liberties; and the long-term maintenance of the community through ecological and 
sustainability policies. An insurance programme would require that there be provision for social 
security, medical security, and judicial security, and that this insurance be provided regardless of 
whether individuals require the insurance because of bad luck or bad choices. Finally, insulation 
programmes would be required to protect against criminal behaviour, and secure weaker partners 
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in asymmetrical relationships (such as protecting employees against employers, and women 
against their husbands) as well as protecting individuals from multinationals (which we will 
consider in detail below).116 
 Finally, it is important to note that Pettit considers securing dominium in this way to 
represent a theory of social justice, and one that is superior to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. To that 
end, Pettit argues that unlike other theories of justice, his requires that the state only looks to 
securing the freedom of its citizens (without needing to supplement this with a principle of 
equality, as Rawls’ theory requires) and that, in doing so, it will achieve the relevant balance 
between competing claims. That is, as long as the basic structure of a republican society promotes 
the free and undominated choice of its citizens, under the requirement that it treats them in an 
expressively egalitarian manner,117 then it will ensure that there is a proper balance between 
competing claims. The republican theory of justice is therefore: minimalist, since it only requires 
that the state concerns itself with its citizens’ freedom and treating them as equals (rather than 
promoting any form of substantive equality); and demanding since it requires the proper 
resourcing and protection of individual choice in accordance with the eyeball test which pushes 
for ever greater resourcing and protection across a wider range of choices.118 This approach would 
secure the basic capacities that individuals require to lead minimally decent lives, and would 
enable individuals to look one another in the eye without a need for deference. Pettit concludes 
that, ‘if we pay the price of securing freedom as non-domination in a suitable measure, we will 
have paid enough to secure social justice.’119  
 
Structural Domination 
 
While Pettit’s account offers us a plausible theory of freedom and social justice, it has nonetheless 
been subject to challenge by theorists who argue that domination is a much more pervasive 
phenomena than acknowledged by Pettit. These thinkers argue that domination also has a 
‘structural’ component.120 One such critique, which has been advanced by Sharon Krause, argues 
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that Pettit’s focus on intentional domination, that is domination in which an agent intentionally or 
quasi-intentionally dominates another, is too restricted to identify all of the factors which 
undermine individual freedom.  
Krause claims that in contemporary societies, background norms such as sexism and 
racism are unintentionally invoked by unwitting agents, and these norms severely constrain the 
agency of others. Focusing on the issue of racial inequality, Krause notes that in 2009 blacks were 
twice as likely to be unemployed, three times as likely to live in poverty, and six times as likely 
to be imprisoned as white people, and this constitutes systematic inequality which thwarts the 
agency of marginalised individuals. As an example of such inequality, she offers us the case of a 
young black man going for a job. The white employer is not overtly racist, but harbours a number 
of racial stereotypes which question the candidate’s fitness for the position. In such a situation, 
Krause claims that, ‘To the extent that racial stigma influences this prospective employer’s 
judgement, he obstructs the freedom of the black candidate but without ever intending to do so.’121 
Employing a Foucauldian analysis of power, Krause goes on to claim that the subject/object 
dichotomy which Pettit focuses on (whereby an agent dominates another agent intentionally, and 
this domination is a matter of common knowledge) misunderstands the ways in which power can 
be utilised. Krause claims that our biased social cognitions set up a system in which unfreedom 
arises without anyone necessarily intentionally controlling others. The employer doesn’t seek to 
dominate the employee but his society’s racial views lead him to act in ways which support and 
reinforce inequality, and this systematically undermines the agency of the young black man. This 
leads the young black man to second-guess how others will treat him, censor his own actions, and 
thereby become an unwitting participant in the system of racial inequality.  
Krause’s central claim, then, is that domination can be enacted in non-sovereign ways, 
and that, ‘Unfreedom in this sense happens when one’s efficacy is thwarted by misrecognition, 
or when the identity that one manifests in the world is fragmented or stunted by the force of 
unconscious bigotry, cultural devaluation, or internalised stigma – in short, by social 
inequality.’122 She seems to suggest that inequalities and stigma create a self-perpetuating cycle 
of domination: dominators unconsciously reinforce and perform acts which undermine others’ 
agency (and have their own agency undermined since they unwittingly participate in 
stigmatisation), and those whose agency is thwarted internalise and naturalise their subjection, 
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acting in ways which reinforce their condition of domination: one of the reasons that black people 
are less likely to be employed or live in poverty may be because they have naturalised and 
internalised their inferior status and act in ways which conform to the system of racial inequality. 
Finally, Krause acknowledges that the unfreedom that she identifies would be more rightly 
defined as oppression, but argues that a theory of freedom ought to be expanded to account for 
these non-sovereign forms of unfreedom. A theory of non-domination should therefore be 
supplemented by a theory of non-oppression which seeks to secure recognition and affirmation 
of individuals’ identities, and this can be achieved through, ‘deliberative and contestatory 
exchanges – and solidarity – that over time can dismantle the cultural background of bias that 
unintentionally disrupts the exercise of agency among marginalised groups and hinders 
freedom.’123  
Assuming that Krause is arguing that structures themselves dominate or oppress 
individuals, her thesis ought to be rejected because it misunderstands the inter-agential nature of 
domination. That is, as argued by Lovett, ‘domination is always a relationship between different 
persons or groups, never a relationship between people and structures as such.’124 He argues that 
all instances of domination (including slavery, patriarchy, and feudalism etc.) are characterised 
by social relationships in which an agent, or group of agents, controls another agent or group of 
agents arbitrarily.125 To evidence his point he offers us an example. He asks us to imagine a society 
in which there are property laws which permit slave-ownership but, for the time being, there are 
no slaves. After a period of time, slaves are imported and the masters duly exercise their property 
rights. Realising the error of their ways, the masters later manumit their slaves. Importantly, the 
laws which permit slavery remain unchanged throughout all three periods and yet it is only in the 
middle period, when there are slaves and masters to control them, when domination actually 
occurs. His central point is that it is not the laws or norms which permit slave-ownership which 
dominate the slaves (since the laws still exist after the slaves have been freed in the third period) 
but the masters who dominate the slaves, although this is clearly facilitated and enabled by the 
legal and cultural system which supports the institution of slave-ownership.126 
Lovett is therefore clear that we must distinguish between the sensible claim that 
background conditions may facilitate domination, with the ‘obscure and dubious’ claim that these 
structures themselves dominate individuals in the absence of active dominating agents.127 Indeed, 
he goes on to argue that some norms and ideas in a society’s background structure might influence 
the choice-sets available to individuals and thus increase the likelihood of domination arising. For 
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example, a widespread belief in female inferiority might close off a number of career options to 
women, making them more dependent upon their husbands, and therefore exposing them to a 
greater likelihood of domination. Lovett is clear, however, that in such a case, where there is no 
agent invigilating another’s choices, then domination cannot occur. Indeed, this is not to deny that 
a belief in female inferiority may make it easier for men to dominate women, but it is to deny that 
the belief itself constitutes a source of domination.128 
It is important to note that this account of the structure of domination, as a process which 
requires both agents and subjects of domination, and one which can be made easier or harder by 
background conditions, coheres with Pettit’s arguments. Indeed, he makes clear in Just Freedom 
that we need to distinguish between domination as a ‘relational’ phenomenon, in which agents 
dominate others, and domination as a ‘structural’ phenomenon, where structural domination is 
understood to be comprised of, ‘the practices and institutions of the wider society and world: the 
culture, economy, or constitution under which people live,’129 which, ‘may exercise a reciprocal 
influence on those agents, structuring their perceptions, motives, and opportunities.’130 Pettit goes 
on to note that republican social justice is aimed, ‘at negating the relational effects of such 
structural domination,’131 because he is concerned with addressing the capacity of agents to 
exercise domination over other agents. To see why these structural phenomena do not count as 
agents, it is necessary to briefly digress and consider Pettit’s account of agency.   
To be capable of exercising agency, Pettit argues that an agent must be fit, ‘to be held 
responsible for whatever one does.’132 This requires that an agent is able to make a choice between 
options; that they’re able to identify with that choice (that is, the choice ought to cohere with the 
principles and reasons that the agent endorses); and the agent ought to be protected from others’ 
interference when making a choice. This is simply to restate the conditions of freedom discussed 
earlier with greater emphasis on individual orthonomy, but Pettit goes further. He also argues that 
fitness to be held responsible requires that agents have the ratiocinative and relational capacities 
necessary to engage in discourse with others, and that all decisions are actively or virtually 
controlled by the principles and reasons endorsed by the agent: an agent therefore, ‘not only 
escapes pathologies like weakness of will and compulsion but is present in active endorsement of 
much of its psychology.’133 An agent, then, is an entity which is capable of endorsing a set of 
principles and reasons which then exercise virtual or active control over the decisions that are 
made. Agents can be deemed to be fit to be held responsible when they’re able to perform an act 
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freely; and, to be able to perform an act freely, they must have been able to choose to act 
differently. Simply, an agent must be capable of acting in ways which cohere with the principles 
and reasons that they endorse. However, it is important to emphasise, intentionality doesn’t 
require that these principles and reasons exert active control over the individual’s decision-
making process; often it is enough that these principles exert a virtual, passive influence over the 
decisions made. 
This very brief sketch of Pettit’s account of agency explains why structures such as racial 
stigma, beliefs, prejudices, and other abstract phenomenon cannot exert domination: they lack the 
necessary pre-requisites to count as agents capable of intentionally, or quasi-intentionally, 
exerting arbitrary control over others. They therefore count as unintentional constraints on action 
and, as noted by Pettit: 
 
Were non-intentional forms of obstruction also to count as interference, that would be to 
lose the distinction between securing people against the natural effects of chance and 
incapacity and scarcity and securing them against the things that they may try to do to 
one another. This distinction is of the first importance in political philosophy, and almost 
all traditions have marked it by associating a person’s freedom with constraints only on 
more or less intentional interventions by others.134 
 
This distinction explains Pettit’s decision to focus upon the relational component of 
‘structural’ domination. Norms, traditions, customs, and ideals are components of society’s 
background structure and, as such, do not intentionally control anyone. This is not to deny that 
they can shape and influence individuals’ choices, but they do so through interacting with 
individuals’ capacity to engage in self-rule. The bigger problem, for Pettit, is that such phenomena 
can be employed to control others, as when a racist refuses to hire a black man. We can therefore 
see that Pettit is aware of the problems highlighted by Krause but conceptualises ‘structural’ 
domination in a different way. Since structures are not agents, they cannot exert domination. 
Instead, they can undermine individual agency and vitiate against individuals’ freedom of 
opportunity, and they can be employed by others to exert arbitrary control. Importantly, while 
Pettit is explicitly focused upon addressing the relational component of structural domination, his 
theory is also able to address the ways in which such phenomena may also undermine individual 
agency or self-rule.    
So, when an employer actively discriminates against black people by denying them the 
capacity to work where they want, through raising the barriers to entry, or through subjecting 
them to a more demanding application process (assuming they’re as qualified as the other 
candidates etc.), they will be invading that individuals’ choice-set by removing or altering an 
option. This kind of invasion can be addressed through the development of a series of anti-
discrimination laws and other mechanisms which make it more difficult or costly for individuals 
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to discriminate in this way. In addition, to the extent that a society endorses racist norms, the 
range of unvitiated choice available to black people or other marginalised groups is going to be 
much narrower than it otherwise would be: certain options will simply be off the table or 
extremely costly for black people. This will represent a paucity of social resources since the social 
environment does not make provision to secure a range of opportunities for everyone. To the 
extent that racial stigma, prejudice, and bigotry give rise to an invasion or vitiation of choice, 
domination occurs. Since securing republican social justice requires that individuals are protected 
against invasion and resourced against vitiation of choice, up to the point where they can pass the 
eyeball test, Pettit’s account can easily accommodate this concern.  
With that said, Krause’s argument does highlight a second issue which we must respond 
to, and that is the capacity of background norms, ideals, and customs to undermine individual 
agency. As noted above, when subject to misrecognition or stigmatisation, marginalised 
individuals and groups may internalise and naturalise the ways in which they’re perceived by 
others. This may give rise to situations in which social norms influence individuals’ self-
perception, leading them to conform to racial or other stereotypes (making it more likely, for 
example, that young black men turn to crime), or otherwise adapt their aspirations and life-plans. 
Indeed, as noted by Cecile Laborde, this form of unfreedom, which she calls structural 
domination, manifests as a, ‘structural power relationship which affects…[individuals’] ability to 
think of themselves as agents capable of choice in the first place (Young 1990, Bourdieu 1998).’135 
What this means is that individuals’ capacity to make reason-sensitive choices can be undermined 
by the norms which permeate society, and which structure how individuals view themselves and 
their capabilities: although not directly dominated by other agents, subordinated groups 
internalise and naturalise their inferior status, and adapt their preferences and aspirations to the 
options that they (rightly or wrongly) take to be available to them.136  
While Laborde is mistaken in the belief that this constitutes a form of domination (since 
these power relationships, assuming they lack intentional agents exerting domination, form part 
of the background structure of society), she is right to note that individuals may adapt their 
preferences to accommodate the options that they think are available to them in a society 
characterised by these norms. Indeed, when subject to misrecognition and stigmatisation in a 
society characterised by prejudiced norms and ideas, it seems likely that some individuals will 
conform to these stereotypes or otherwise curtail their aspirations to suit others’ views: we may 
find, for example, that gay people remain in the closet or that black men are more likely to engage 
in crime etc. The problem, however, is not one of interpersonal freedom but, as noted above, is 
instead one of intrapersonal freedom: it is an issue of self-mastery.  
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Indeed, such cases seem to represent instances of what Joshua Cohen, drawing on Jon 
Elster’s work, calls adaptive preferences. He argues that, ‘These are preferences that shift with 
changes in the circumstances of the agent without any deliberate contribution by the agent to that 
shift.’137 As noted by Ben Colburn, adaptive preferences are related to our beliefs about the 
unavailability of certain options rather than the intrinsic qualities of the available options.138 
Colburn goes on to note that the problem with adaptive preferences is that they undermine 
personal independence and an individuals’ capacity to decide, ‘for herself what is valuable, and 
living her life in accordance with that decision.’139 While Colburn’s definition of autonomy is 
strikingly similar to Pettit’s concept of orthonomy, the important point to note is that it is 
individual independence which is undermined through adaptive preferences. This is because when 
an individual adapts their preferences to what they perceive to be the available options (as when 
a black person lowers their aspirations), the link between individual rationality (the principles and 
reasons that that individual endorses) and individual action or choice is broken. It therefore seems 
that adaptive preferences represent a constraint on individual freedom because, when an 
individual adapts their preferences to fit the options that they perceive to be available to them, the 
individual no longer acts on the principles or in accordance with the reasons that they endorse.  
While the problem of adaptive preferences is therefore not an instance of domination, 
properly understood, it is nonetheless a problem from the perspective of republican social justice. 
Indeed, as noted above, this will represent an instance in which structural phenomena, ‘exercise 
a reciprocal influence on those agents, structuring their perceptions, motives, and 
opportunities.’140 As such, adaptive preferences are going to count as personal vitiating factors 
which ought to be guarded against within Pettit’s theory of social justice. This is because adaptive 
preferences undermine the requirement, discussed previously, that individuals have the room and 
resources necessary to make a choice between options, where the requisite resources include 
personal, natural, and social resources. Indeed, Pettit notes that having the personal resources 
necessary to make a choice requires that individuals have, ‘the mental and bodily ability or 
knowhow needed to make the choice, and the awareness of having such a capacity.’141 The 
problem of adaptive preferences seems to be a situation in which an individual’s awareness of 
having the capacity to make a genuine choice between options is undermined. For example, we 
can imagine that a young black man may have a choice between going to college and leading a 
life of crime but, owing to an undercurrent of racial stigma in his society, perceives the former 
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option to be pointless since the likelihood of him succeeding is negligible. It seems in this case 
that adaptive preferences constrain the individual’s freedom of opportunity through making it 
seem that certain options are unavailable or have an altered cognitive profile. To the extent that 
adaptive preferences have this effect, they should be seen to be factors which vitiate against an 
individual’s freedom of opportunity, and should be guarded against through proper resourcing. 
So, in addition to the protections noted above, which would guard against the more obvious forms 
of prejudice and stigmatisation, a theory of neo-republican social justice should aim to redress 
adaptive preferences through providing individuals with the personal resources that they require 
to make a choice between the actual options available to them. 
While we will not explore exactly how we can guard against the vitiating potential of 
adaptive preferences here, since we will do so at length in the next chapter, it is nonetheless useful 
to provide a brief indication of how we might protect individuals from this problem. To that end, 
Cohen argues that in an ideal deliberative process, in which the common good is derived from a 
process of reason-giving, the requirement that individuals advance publicly persuasive reasons 
for a given proposition will have an effect on preference formation. He argues that in such a 
process, ‘Relations of power and subordination are neutralised and…the requirement of 
reasonableness discourages adaptive preferences.’142 This is because deliberation will affirm 
individuals’ identity as agents with deliberative capabilities, reaffirm their status as equals in the 
project of forming the common good, and encourages individuals to advance their true or real 
interests rather than those that they take to be available to them. A society which secures 
meaningful avenues for deliberation is therefore likely to mitigate against the internalisation and 
naturalisation of inferiority, contributing to individuals’ capacity to engage in self-rule.   
Although necessarily brief at this stage, it should be clear that it is possible to address 
both the problematic norms and prejudices in a society’s background structure which can facilitate 
domination, and the problem of adaptive preferences which can undermine individual agency and 
vitiate against freedom of opportunity, without giving up neo-republicanism’s core commitment 
to the inter-agential structure of domination. With that said, there is one final issue which we must 
consider before we look at how a society could secure freedom from dominium without becoming 
a source of domination. This issue is that, as discussed by Pettit, some collective entities do meet 
the conditions for being construed as agents capable of exerting domination. 
 
Corporate Agents 
 
As noted above, Pettit’s account of agency requires that agents are able to act in accordance with 
the principles and reasons that they endorse (with these principles and reasons exerting active or 
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virtual control over an agent’s actions), and that their choices are protected from others’ 
interference or invigilation. They must also be able to engage in discursive control with others, 
such that they are able to hold others praise or blame worthy for their actions and in turn be held 
praise or blame worthy for their own actions.143 We can see, then, that Pettit’s account of agency 
utilises orthonomy in a foundational way: to be an agent requires that individuals are able to rule 
themselves and their actions. This, as argued in the previous section, entails that structural 
phenomena such as norms, traditions, and customs cannot be agents and, since they cannot be 
agents, cannot exert domination. 
 Importantly, this also means that certain kinds of collective groups, such as classes, races, 
and genders, are not going to count as agents either. This is because, just like the abstract 
phenomena that we have considered above, they lack the capabilities necessary to be considered 
agents. For example, white people, as a collective, cannot make decisions in accordance with a 
set of principles or reasons because they lack an institutionalised structure for decision-making: 
because they cannot make choices in the requisite way, they cannot be held responsible for the 
outcomes of their collective actions. Indeed, as noted by Cillian McBride, Pettit’s account of 
collective agency is much stricter than Marx’s, which construes classes as collective agents. He 
notes that for Pettit, ‘it is not clear that [such groups] possess the necessary internal, institutional, 
structure necessary for forming a collective will.’144   
 To be considered a collective or corporate agent, Pettit argues that it is necessary that the 
entity in question is able to resolve the discursive dilemma by collectivising reason, and thereby 
acting in accordance with endorsed premises and judgements, rather than individualising 
reason.145 The discursive dilemma is a generalised version of the doctrinal paradox which arises 
in jurisprudence. The doctrinal paradox highlights that a voting paradox can arise in a multi-
member court where a majority supports each of the premises in a judgement, but where different 
majorities support different premises, and the intersection of these majorities is not itself a 
majority.146 An example in which judges are deciding on whether there was a contract, whether 
there was a breach of that contract, and whether there is liability will make this point clearer: 
 
           Contract?            Breach?             Liable? 
Judge A   Yes   No   No 
Judge B   No   Yes   No 
Judge C   Yes   Yes   Yes147 
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 The problem, here, is that a majority supports each of the premises, but different 
majorities support different premises, and the results are inconsistent with the judgements on each 
of the individual premises. In other words, a majority believe that there was a contract, and a 
different majority believes that there was a breach of that contract, and yet there is not a majority 
in favour of liability. Pettit argues that this paradox arises in a more general form as the discursive 
dilemma, and is relevant for considering how collective entities operate, because of three 
generalisations that he makes. Firstly, he argues that similar issues can arise in social situations 
where people come together to form an opinion on an issue, and believe that this should be 
premised upon the resolution of other prior issues. Pettit calls this the social generalisation. The 
second generalisation, which Pettit calls the diachronic generalisation, outlines that voting 
paradoxes can arise over a prolonged period of time where individuals are consulted on distinct 
but interconnected issues.148 Consider the following example: 
 
         Increase welfare?        Increase other spending?       Increase taxation? 
A   Yes      No   No 
B   No      Yes   No 
C   Yes      Yes   Yes 
 
 What we can see, here, is that over time, individuals might vote in ways which give rise 
to the same paradox, wherein a majority want to increase welfare expenditure, and a different 
majority at a later time want to increase other public spending, but at a third point in time, a 
majority vote against increasing taxation to fund these measures. The third generalisation that 
Pettit outlines, the modus tollens generalisation, essentially claims that it is possible to be 
responsive to individual judgements or collective judgements, but not both. So, this would mean, 
in the above example, that we can follow modus ponens to the conclusion that we should increase 
taxation, and change our latest judgement to comply with our earlier judgements, or we can follow 
modus tollens and work backwards and amend our earlier judgements to comply with our desire 
to not increase taxation.149   
 Pettit goes on to claim that the discursive dilemma leaves groups with a choice between 
two options. They can, ‘let collective decision-making be responsive to the votes of individuals 
on every issue, thereby allowing collective unreason. Or it may enforce collective reason by 
reducing the extent to which collective decision-making is responsive to individual voting;’150 
that is, the group may, ‘form a collective conclusion-judgement directly, relying on a voting 
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procedure of some kind; or to form collective premise-judgements on such a basis and let those 
judgements determine the conclusion to be endorsed.’151 Entities which adopt the former 
approach, allowing members to vote on and determine the collective view on each issue, 
individualises reason. The problem, here, Pettit argues, is that such a procedure does not satisfy 
the requirements of reason because conclusions will not be premise-driven: in the earlier example, 
the judges will decide that despite a majority believing that there was a contract, and that this 
contract was breached, there was no liability. Such entities cannot be rightly cast as collective 
agents because they will pursue the fluctuating and contradictory interests of changing majorities, 
and will therefore not act in accordance with any principles or reasons endorsed by that entity. 
An aggregated collective which acts in this way will therefore resemble an individual who is 
subject to pathological weakness of will and indecision and, just like such individuals, cannot be 
deemed fit to be held responsible for its actions and therefore not fully an agent.152 
 If, however, collectives allow, ‘past judgments to serve as endorsed premises that dictate 
later commitments,’153 then they will, ‘display mental properties in their own right, not just by 
projection from the mental properties displayed by their members.’154 Pettit goes on to argue that 
entities which collectivise reason will act as agents in their own right because, in so far as past 
judgements motivate the collective agent’s later actions, it is likely that the collective agent will 
make decisions which are significantly different from those made by its members; it will act as 
an agent independently of the aggregated interests of its members. Collective agents, then, are 
radically different from aggregated collectives, and represent an agent which acts in response to 
principles and reason independently of the views of its members: they act as agents in their own 
right.  
Such collective agents, ‘may be as small as the small number of individuals involved in 
a collaboration of some kind or as large as a multinational corporation. Integrations of people may 
endure across long periods of time, maintaining the rule of collective reason across changes of 
membership, or they may be more or less episodic.’155 As noted by McBride, the kinds of 
collectives which will qualify as collective agents in the requisite sense includes multinational 
corporations, churches, universities, and states.156 So, unlike classes, which are unable to form a 
cohesive will which responds to principles and reason rather than the aggregated decisions of the 
individuals who compose it, a multinational corporation is able to form an independent will, one 
which is discontinuous with the members which comprise the entity. As such, a class cannot be a 
subject or agent of domination (though obviously a class system can form part of the background 
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conditions which facilitate domination through vitiating against choice or making invasion 
easier), whereas a multinational corporation can be both dominated (when it is subject to another 
agent’s uncontrolled power) and an agent of domination (when it is able to exercise uncontrolled 
power over other agents). 
Importantly, corporate agents, particularly multinational corporations, are a significant 
problem for neo-republicanism for at least three reasons: they have the capacity to exercise 
dominium and thereby undermine attempts to secure republican social justice; they can undermine 
a legitimate democratic government, and thereby mitigate against attempts to secure a political 
order which does not exert imperium; and they can undermine attempts to secure transnational 
non-domination. While we will consider the latter two problems in later chapters, it is important 
to conclude this chapter by outlining exactly how corporate agents can undermine republican 
social justice and exercise dominium over individuals.  
To that end, Pettit acknowledges that: 
 
Examples of corporate domination are commonplace. Think of the case of someone 
abused by a priest in childhood who contemplates bringing a complaint against a powerful 
church. Think of the case of small entrepreneurs who are held to ransom by the primary 
or secondary picketing of a powerful trade union that can put them out of business. Or 
think, even more saliently, of those with a claim for damages – say, damages from an oil 
spillage or explosion – against a large corporation.157  
 
 The problem in each of these cases is that there is a huge asymmetry of power between 
the corporate and individual agents, and the corporate agents are easily able to exert domination. 
For example, churches may be able to shield their priests from investigation, or intimidate abuse 
victims into silence; trade unions may be able to dictate terms to small businesses and invigilate 
or intimidate owners into acting as the union would prefer (the threat of strike action or picketing 
may lead business owners to act as the unions would prefer without the need for outright 
interference); and multinational corporations may be able to act with impunity, tying up court 
cases for many years, making contestation exceptionally costly, and threatening to move their 
operations elsewhere if national governments are not prepared to make concessions for them.158 
Indeed, because of the immense financial, political, and social resources available to corporate 
agents, their capacity to exert domination is particularly salient.  
 Pettit acknowledges that there are no easy solutions to the problem of corporate 
domination, but argues that the best hope may be to establish avenues of complaint and 
contestation in public fora and criminal courts. He seems to believe that corporate agents will 
seek to avoid bad publicity as this will have a negative impact upon their functioning: church 
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congregations may shrink; unions will lose members; and customers will avoid purchasing goods 
or services from corporations.159 There are, however, two significant problems with this approach: 
firstly, it relies upon the corporate agent’s self-interest to secure non-domination; and, secondly, 
it does nothing to address the problem of multinational corporations. 
 Starting with the former problem, we have already considered why non-domination 
cannot be secured through relying on the goodwill of agents of domination. Indeed, as discussed 
earlier in the case of Torvald and Nora, an agent is not free simply because another forbears to 
interfere in their life; the fact that others have the capacity to do so makes them unfree. 
Analogously, relying on corporate agents’ self-interest (hoping that they will not interfere in 
others’ lives for fear of bad publicity) does not neutralise their capacity to dominate others. 
Indeed, fear of bad publicity has not, as a matter of empirical fact, prevented corporate agents 
from acting in dominating ways. Child abuse scandals are well publicised and yet the Catholic 
Church has consistently covered up its priests’ wrongdoings. While church attendance has 
declined over recent decades, it does not seem that a fear of bad publicity has led churches to act 
in ways which are non-dominating. Indeed, even if corporate agents did seek to avoid bad 
publicity, this would still fail to secure non-domination since the power of such agents to exert 
domination will not be subject to external constraints and, as discussed previously, ‘Unless a 
constraint on the exercise of power is somehow externally enforceable, it does not count.’160 The 
problem, here, is that just like Torvald’s benevolence, a fear of bad publicity may cease to 
constrain the agent’s actions at any time. This strategy, as argued previously, cannot secure non-
domination since all agents remain dependent upon the corporate agent’s forbearance.   
 With that said, it would nonetheless be possible to develop legislation which would be 
able to respond to many instances of corporate domination and which, in conjunction with Pettit’s 
suggestion of subjecting corporations to tort and criminal law, would suitably constrain many 
corporate agents and neutralise their capacity to dominate others.161 For example, the powers of 
trade unions can be constrained through legislation which outlines when strike action is 
permissible (thereby ensuring that business owners have secure knowledge of how unions will 
act), and public support can be made available to finance investigations into historic wrongdoing 
by church officials, enabling individuals to properly hold such agents to account.   
Nonetheless, while these mechanisms may be able to constrain corporate agents which 
reside in one territory, they cannot ensure that multinational corporations are prevented from 
exerting domination. This is because, as noted by Pettit, ‘Governments have competed with one 
another to attract multinational companies to their shores by giving them even more rights and 
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powers, apparently oblivious of the impact of corporate power on the freedom of their citizens.’162 
Indeed, he goes on to note that these organisations are able to, ‘warp government policies by 
playing countries against one another in a search for ever lower levels of taxation and ever more 
lenient standards of environmental and financial regulation. The most frequent threat in each 
country is to move offshore, beggaring the local economy or embarrassing local officials.’163  
The fundamental problem with multinationals, from the perspective of securing 
republican social justice, is that governments cannot properly constrain these agents, making the 
satisfaction of the eyeball test unrealisable. Indeed, I outlined above that freedom from dominium 
and republican social justice, is secured when individuals are able, by the most demanding local 
standards, to look one another in the eye without fear or a need for deference, secure in the 
knowledge that they’re, ‘more or less proof against the interference of others; in that sense, they 
command the respect of all.’164 The eyeball test will be unsatisfied because individuals (and 
governments as we will see in the next chapter) are not protected against the interference of 
multinationals, which can act with more or less impunity. This is because, as noted by Pettit, 
governments are often dependent upon the continued residence of multinationals in their territory 
and do not attempt to constrain them for fear that they may leave. Governments may grant 
multinationals special privileges or exemptions because the local economy is heavily dependent 
on these entities, which often employ thousands of citizens and pay significant amounts of tax, or 
because these entities have sufficient resources to be able to influence the formation of public 
policy. In addition, multinationals, when actually challenged, are able to utilise their immense 
resources to contest court cases or tie them up for significant amounts of time. In doing so, they 
may be able to beggar other agents who seek to bring cases against them or intimidate others to 
not even attempt to contest their actions. As multinationals are not subject to the same constraints 
as other agents, we must conclude that individuals do not enjoy secure knowledge that they’re 
protected against interference, and republican social justice will remain unrealised.  
Importantly, because of their multinational status, there seems to be little that national 
governments can actually do to constrain these corporate agents. If they do attempt to legislate 
against multinationals, enforcing tax laws and environmental or employment protections, 
corporations will simply leave. If multinationals do move, they will also take with them much 
needed jobs and thereby making individuals more dependent upon public finances. With other 
countries, particularly those in the developing world, offering more favourable terms, national 
governments are forced to accommodate the whims of multinationals, becoming dependent upon 
their ongoing residence and making decisions with the interests of multinationals in mind (thereby 
allowing these agents to enjoy an invigilating and intimidating influence over national decisions).  
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It is important to note that while we will consider this issue in more detail in the third 
chapter, these comments seem to suggest that securing non-domination, and guarding against the 
depredations of powerful multinational corporate agents, will likely entail a significant challenge 
to the existing state-system. That is, as long as states are dependent upon multinationals for jobs 
or resources, it is unlikely that they will abide by intergovernmental agreements intended to 
regulate multinationals’ actions. Indeed, if governments are unable to adequately secure the basic 
liberties for their citizens, it may be necessary for them to develop incentives to attract 
corporations to their shores regardless of whatever multilateral agreements are in place. This 
seems to suggest that intergovernmental or multilateral agreements are unlikely to properly 
regulate the actions of multinational corporations (since states may have an incentive to disregard 
such agreements), and that resolving the problem of multinational corporate domination will 
therefore require that we explore how a set of external constraints might be developed which 
constrain multinationals and regulate how states might compete with one another to attract these 
agents to their territories. These comments seem to suggest that the only way to address to the 
dominating capacity of multinationals is to look to replicate the strategy of constitutional 
provision at a transnational level with the aim of properly constraining these corporate entities 
and their interactions with states.   
 
Conclusion  
 
My aim in this chapter has been to provide a thorough overview of Pettit’s account of individual 
liberty and thereby provide the foundations for my own suggestions for securing non-domination 
in later chapters. To that end, the first section outlined the historical roots of the concept of non-
domination and noted its gradual eclipse by the non-interference conception of liberty. The second 
section built upon this discussion by outlining Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative 
liberty, arguing that his arguments against positive accounts of liberty are too broad and that 
embracing some form of positive liberty need not lead to authoritarian government.  
 The third section outlined the Hobbesian account of freedom as non-frustration and 
Berlin’s account of freedom as non-interference, arguing that both of these accounts of individual 
liberty are fundamentally flawed and that freedom requires that individuals are free from 
frustration, interference, and domination. We then considered Kramer’s claim that a concern for 
domination can be accommodated by the non-interference account of liberty if we reconceptualise 
the problem as one in which freedom is reduced in accordance with the probability of interference. 
I argued that this fails to address the problem of domination because it claims that if there is an 
extremely low probability of interference, an individual is largely free; and secondly, it ignores 
the fact that individuals can be implicated in a relationship of domination and subjection in which 
the subjected party acts as required in order to stave off actual interference.  
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 The fourth section outlined that being a free person requires that individuals have the 
room and resources required to pursue their preferred option from a choice-set, regardless of their 
own or anyone else’s preferences over how they choose. I also argued that underlying this account 
of political liberty is an ideal of personal liberty, which sees individuals as capable of engaging 
in self-rule, which seems to provide the prism through which Pettit views the evils of domination. 
The fifth section outlined that a theory of republican social justice requires that dominating agents 
are subject to external constraint and that the basic liberties are protected and resourced to the 
point where individuals can satisfy the eyeball test.  
The sixth section focused upon a ‘critical’ challenge to Pettit’s republicanism, 
considering Krause’s arguments for expanding the concept of domination to include cases of 
systemic or structural domination. After outlining Krause’s arguments, I have argued, following 
Lovett and Pettit, that domination is a phenomenon that occurs between agents, not agents and 
background structures (though these background structures can make domination more 
accessible), and that Pettit’s account can accommodate Krause’s concerns. Indeed, to extent that 
racial stigma, prejudice, and bigotry give rise to an invasion or vitiation of choice, domination 
occurs and would be addressed through protecting and resourcing individual choice. In addition, 
I have acknowledged that background structures may give rise to adaptive preferences, which can 
undermine freedom of opportunity, and can be addressed through deliberation.  
 The final section focused upon the problem of corporate agency, arguing that while 
structures do not dominate individuals, some corporate entities can. I then outlined Pettit’s 
suggestions for combatting the dominating potential of such agents, arguing that relying on their 
fear of bad publicity is to simply rely on their forbearance and goodwill which, as discussed 
earlier, does not secure non-domination (since a fear of bad publicity is not an external constraint). 
Nonetheless, I argued that it is possible to develop legislation which would be able to respond to 
many instances of corporate domination and which, in conjunction with Pettit’s suggestion of 
empowering a range of contestatory institutions, would suitably constrain many corporate agents 
and neutralise their capacity to dominate others. This does not, however, address the dominating 
potential of multinational corporate agents which may be able to easily evade attempts to 
constrain them by national governments, suggesting a need to replicate the strategy of 
constitutional provision at a transnational level. With these comments in mind, the task of the 
next section is to consider the issue of democratic legitimacy and explore what is required of a 
theory of neo-republican governance.   
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Chapter Two – Securing Democratically Legitimate Governance 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter outlined that freedom requires that agents have the capacity to make their 
own choices, irrespective of the preferences of any other agent. This requires that individuals are 
free from invasion, invigilation, and intimidation; do not suffer from a paucity of personal, 
natural, and social resources in their exercise of the basic liberties; are protected from the 
relational aspects of ‘structural’ domination; have access to mechanisms which guard against 
adaptive preferences; and are protected against corporate agents’ dominating powers. We have 
also seen that ensuring that individuals are free requires that all agents, both individual and 
corporate, are subject to external constraints which would aim to protect them from being subject 
to domination; and that such external constraints are not going to constitute a form of dominating 
control to the extent that they materialise on terms dictated by those subject to the interference 
(as when Ulysses’ crew controls him). I also noted that a state will constitute an agent in its own 
right because it will collectivise reason, its actions will largely be discontinuous with the 
preferences of its members, and it is therefore capable of exerting and being subject to domination.  
 These comments suggest a central problem with which neo-republicanism must grapple, 
and one which is the focus of this chapter. This is that it is necessary to develop a political system 
which is able to prevent dominium and promote republican social justice, while also ensuring that 
this political entity does not become a source of imperium. Importantly, as Pettit’s neo-
republicanism has developed, he has come to argue that addressing the problem of imperium 
requires that a political system enjoys democratic legitimacy, and that securing democratic 
legitimacy requires that individuals are able to influence and direct their political system. 
Centrally, securing influence requires that individuals have an input into democratic decision-
making, and securing direction requires that democratic decision-making is constrained by the 
common good. Importantly, we will see in this chapter that while it is possible to secure non-
arbitrary governance within democratic communities, citizens may nonetheless not enjoy non-
domination. This is because external agents, including other states and multinational corporations, 
have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in citizens’ lives. This insight is crucial to the remainder 
of this thesis as it suggests that individual non-domination cannot be secured without developing 
an overarching system of global governance which would aim to protect agents from arbitrary 
control. 
 To that end, this chapter will proceed as follows. The first section will again focus upon 
analysing Pettit’s paradigmatic work, outlining his account of democratic legitimacy as well as 
the ‘tough luck’ test which acts as a yardstick for determining whether or not a state enjoys 
democratic legitimacy. The second section then considers two arguments against Pettit’s account. 
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The first claims that Pettit’s account is too constitutional. The second claims that Pettit’s account 
is too democratic. After rebutting these objections, the third section will then look at the 
underlying accounts of the common good which motivate each of these objections. After outlining 
why the common good cannot be determined objectively or through aggregating individuals’ raw 
preferences, the fourth section will focus on Jon Elster’s arguments in favour of determining the 
common good deliberatively through transforming individuals’ raw preferences into informed 
preferences. After noting some problems that we would need to address in adopting this approach 
to determining the common good, this chapter will discuss Pettit’s approach and outline how it 
overcomes Elster’s objections. The fifth section then builds upon one minor gap in Pettit’s 
account, that the deliberative process he proposes does not seem to be intended as an 
institutionalised component of a democratic society, to argue that addressing adaptive preferences 
requires that we develop a more formal, long-term institution for transforming citizens’ 
preferences. After outlining a digital deliberative assembly as a possible solution to this problem, 
the sixth section then outlines how multinational corporations and other transnational actors can 
undermine social justice and democratic legitimacy. The final section will conclude.  
 
Democratic Legitimacy  
 
In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Pettit argues that for political control 
to be deemed non-arbitrary it must be forced to track individuals’ welfare and worldview. Indeed, 
Pettit argues that an act is arbitrary when it is formulated, ‘without reference to the interests, or 
the opinions, of those affected,’165 and that, ‘Under this conception of arbitrariness, then, an act 
of interference will be non-arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and ideas 
of the person suffering the interference.’166 Fundamentally, this requires that, ‘power be exercised 
in a way that tracks, not the power-holder’s personal welfare or worldview, but rather the welfare 
and worldview of the public.’167 Indeed, as briefly noted in the first chapter, Pettit discusses the 
example of Ulysses and the Sirens as a paradigmatic case of non-arbitrary control. After being 
forewarned by Circe, Ulysses commands his crew to tie him to the ship’s mast and stuff their ears 
with wax, so that he might listen to the Sirens’ Song without being lured to his death. The Ulysses 
example provides the prototypical case of non-arbitrary control for Pettit as Ulysses remains free, 
despite being controlled, because the control exercised by his crew tracks his welfare and 
worldview rather than their own.  
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While defining the concepts of arbitrariness and welfare and worldview have been the 
subject of some debate between theorists,168 Pettit now explicitly equates securing freedom from 
imperium with democratic legitimacy, arguing that, ‘Democracy’s entire reason for being, under 
this specification, is to guard against the domination of the state.’169 Indeed, he now claims that 
guarding against imperium requires that individuals enjoy equal, effective control over the state,170 
and that, ‘the citizens of a legitimate state have to enjoy equal access to a system of popular 
influence and that influence has to give the state an equally acceptable direction – that is, a 
direction that they are all actually disposed to accept.’171 Assuming that a state or other political 
apparatus is going to be required to protect against domination between individuals,172 Pettit 
argues that our focus ought to turn towards the issue of legitimacy because the state, ‘assumes 
and exercises a presumptively unchallenged right to coercion…People are not given an individual 
choice on whether or not they will have to follow the laws imposed…The problem of legitimacy 
is how to reconcile such political submission with personal freedom, identifying a sort of regime 
that can coerce citizens without depriving them of their freedom.’173 The issue of political 
legitimacy, then, is whether a political system which secures protections in individuals’ horizontal 
relationships with one another is also able to secure protections for individuals in their vertical 
relationship with the state.  
Importantly, this account of legitimacy, wherein a political system is legitimate when it 
is subject to citizens’ influence and direction, is distinct from the contractualist account of political 
legitimacy. On the contractualist view, state coercion will count as legitimate as long as it attracts 
the actual or hypothetical consent of citizens. This account of legitimacy, however, is flawed for 
two reasons. Firstly, as argued by AJ Simmons, actual consent is not forthcoming in existing 
societies,174 and it is unlikely that any policy could genuinely attract the actual consent of all 
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individuals who will be subject to interference. If we attempt to adopt the hypothetical account of 
consent (wherein individuals can be deemed to consent to a given political system because it 
achieves a given set of acceptable ends or is constituted in an acceptable way, or where we believe 
that individuals would give consent if they were, for example, situated behind the Veil of 
Ignorance),175 we face the issue of it being possible for individuals to give prior consent to certain 
forms of coercion, and for them to later rescind their consent when this coercion no longer controls 
them in ways that they assent to. Indeed, Pettit rejects the idea that individuals can give their 
consent, in a ‘one-off’ fashion, and remain free, since the bases of consent will change over time. 
For example, individuals might consent to higher taxes at one point in time, but instituting a 
system of higher taxation will alter individuals’ circumstances and therefore the basis of consent 
will change, requiring that individuals are consulted again. This leads Pettit to argue that it is not 
consent which makes control legitimate; instead, control is legitimate only when it remains 
subject to citizens’ influence and direction.  
Focusing on Pettit’s recent account of political legitimacy in Just Freedom, he argues that 
ensuring that a society’s political apparatus remains subject to the equal and effective control of 
its citizens requires that they are able to influence the way in which they’re governed, and give a 
designed direction to political activity, one which answers to a preconceived or preferred 
pattern.176 It is important to note that influence and direction can come apart, and it is possible for 
citizens to have influence over political processes without this influence imposing any kind of 
preferred direction on what this process entails. For example, in a minimally democratic society, 
individuals might be able to influence the policies pursued by government through partaking in 
periodic elections and selecting representatives to govern them, but if these representatives are 
not bound by any notion of what it is that the people actually want, they will be able to pursue 
policies which do not cohere with the interests of citizens.177 It is therefore important, from the 
perspective of democratic legitimacy and the popular control of politics, that citizens have equal 
access to a system of popular influence over government, and that this influence imposes a 
direction on government which is equally acceptable to all citizens.178 In addition, this effect must 
be produced, ‘independently of the willingness of any other agency to have the government go 
along.’179 
These comments suggest that certain kinds of political system are going to be 
fundamentally illegitimate from a neo-republican perspective. Think of a benevolent but 
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authoritarian government which secures republican social justice through resourcing and 
protecting the basic liberties. Here, the government will interfere in individuals’ lives for good 
republican reasons but its interference will still be illegitimate. This is because its interference 
does not materialise on terms dictated by the individuals subject to its control, and instead reflects 
its imperium; citizens’ enjoyment of social justice is therefore subject to the authoritarian 
government’s ongoing benevolence which can be withdrawn at any time. This suggests that it 
would be perfectly possible to have a socially just society, one in which individuals are able to 
lead their lives free from dominium and in which they enjoy security in their exercise of the basic 
liberties, but a politically unjust society in which they’re unfree because their enjoyment of these 
liberties is determined at the whim of an authoritarian government or despot. This suggests that 
any form of governance which is not subject to citizens’ influence and direction is going to be 
incompatible with securing individual freedom and cannot be utilised by a legitimate neo-
republican polity.  
With these comments in mind, it might seem that the best way to achieve a mutually-
agreeable influence and direction over government (which is independent of any other agency’s 
involvement or benevolence) would be to embrace some model of direct, participatory 
democracy, akin to Rousseau’s General Assembly.180 Indeed, the plenary assembly would seem 
to ensure that governance is subject to citizens’ influence and direction because it removes the 
need for elected officials who might be able to seize control of the polity’s political apparatus, 
and would therefore ensure that popular governance is not dependent upon officials’ goodwill: on 
this model, citizens would be able to influence and direct governance without intermediaries. 
Setting aside the feasibility issues associated with a plenary assembly model for now, Pettit argues 
that, ‘such a forum would preclude the discussion and deliberation required for coherent, 
collective decision-making.’181 This is because such a decision-making body would fail to resolve 
the discursive dilemma, outlined in the previous chapter, in a way which collectivises reason. 
Indeed, there would be no constraints on the policies it might pursue, permitting the assembly to 
enact incompatible and inconsistent policies: to the extent that it does so, it will individualise 
reason and fail to act as an agent in any meaningful sense. Problematically, Pettit also argues that 
such an assembly would be, ‘liable to be the most arbitrary of powers. It will relate to individuals 
and smaller groups in the role of an arbitrary despot…it would represent, not a corrupt form of 
government, but an utterly capricious one…not only would the people as a whole represent an 
arbitrary, capricious government of this kind…[but] empowering the people in referendums 
would introduce the worst of all imaginable despotisms: a regime under which the most capricious 
of powers remains morally as well as legally uncontestable.’182  
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We can therefore see that although such a model would ensure that influence and 
direction are imposed upon governance independently of the willingness of any officials to go 
along with this control, the plenary assembly would fail to secure non-domination in other ways. 
This is because the incontestable, capricious assembly would not be constrained to protect and 
resource the basic liberties and it would therefore be likely to fail to protect citizens in their 
horizontal relationships with one another and fail to secure republican social justice. In addition, 
an assembly of individuals which vacillates with the electorate’s inconstant whims will not 
represent an agent at all, since it will fail to act in accordance with endorsed premises and 
judgements, and will therefore not be fit to be held responsible for its actions. This will have an 
effect on the collectives’ interactions with other corporate agents, such as multinationals or other 
political systems which do collectivise reason. 
Since a plenary assembly will fail to secure social justice and political legitimacy, Pettit 
argues that the only feasible way to achieve popular influence is to develop and refine the familiar 
system of electoral representation. Indeed, it is through, ‘open, periodic, and competitive election 
to the legislature and perhaps also to other offices,’183 that a government enjoys popular support, 
and the people will enjoy influence over their political system. Importantly, Pettit goes on to argue 
that we should develop mechanisms for, ‘dividing, constraining, regulating, and sometimes even 
sidestepping elected representatives.’184 Indeed, Pettit argues that ensuring that governance is 
subject to citizens’ influence requires that an electoral system is complemented by a constitutional 
system which allows for independent checks on an elected government, and which would enable 
citizens to contest and question government proposals and decisions. These constitutional or 
quasi-constitutional mechanisms might take the form of ombudsmen, statisticians, auditors, 
central bankers, pressure groups, interest groups and judges and perhaps a written constitution.185  
Pettit does, however, acknowledge that constitutional mechanisms have often been 
viewed as restrictions on democracy because they ‘thwart’ the will of the people and prevent 
representatives from being able to enact whatever the public momentarily believes is in their 
interest.186 Pettit disagrees with this characterisation of constitutionalism, and instead argues that 
his constitutional proposals are intended to give effect to the people’s power rather than thwarting 
it,187 and should be viewed as an account of, ‘democratically shaped constitutionalism, not […] a 
constitutional restricted democracy.’188 This is because, in Pettit’s ‘richer’ account of 
representation, judges and other constitutional actors are seen as indicative representatives of the 
people. On the assumption their powers and remits are well defined, these authorities will be able 
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to use their specialised knowledge and skills to interrogate government policies and pursue causes 
which are widely endorsed. In doing so, they will act as unelected representatives of the people, 
utilising their specialist skills and privileged position to represent citizens’ interests. As an 
example of how a quasi-constitutional mechanism can be used to channel the will of the people, 
rather than thwart it, Pettit notes that small deliberative bodies, such as the British Columbia 
Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, can be set up to model the wider community and make 
decisions in a way which would be indicative of the wider population (although in this case the 
wider public did not endorse the Assembly’s recommendations).189 Although not democratically 
elected, such bodies and authorities can ensure that the people’s will is able to exert a significant 
influence over their government. Pettit believes that this system of governance, which combines 
electoral representation and constitutional mechanisms, would secure the required degree of 
popular influence since the people would elect their representatives to make decisions on their 
behalf, and be able to contest and regulate their representatives through other constitutional actors 
and civil society movements.190 With that said, these mechanisms alone are not sufficient to 
ensure that all individuals are able to exert an equally acceptable direction on government.  
In Pettit’s original formulation, securing an equally acceptable direction over government 
required that the government be forced to track a subset of the interests that individuals’ avow. 
Indeed, Pettit argued that it is not necessary that governance tracks every possible claim that 
individuals might make (as noted above, Pettit specifically argues against tracking individuals’ 
subjective preferences on the basis that doing so will give rise to capricious governance and fail 
to adequately resolve the discursive dilemma), but that politics must instead track citizens’, 
‘common recognisable interests.’191 These are those interests which are supported by 
cooperatively-admissible considerations. The cooperatively-admissible considerations are those 
considerations which all individuals countenance as relevant arguments and claims within a 
deliberative process. To see how we might derive these shared common interests, Pettit argues 
that we should look at the way in which deliberative groups operate. He claims that when 
discussing projects or group activities, reasons and justifications are given by the members for 
their own preferred plans. Some reasons would be rejected as being irrelevant for the project, 
while others would be acknowledged as appropriate considerations. Over the course of 
deliberations a set of norms and rules will develop, providing a framework for identifying the 
relevant considerations for the group and its activities; these form the admissible criteria of 
argumentation.192 In a political community, Pettit believes that a framework will emerge from 
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deliberation and contestation between competing conceptions of the good. For example, 
regardless of the views that they advance, shared interests in treating one another as equals, in not 
ignoring public opinion, and in guaranteeing a private sphere free from government intervention, 
will all emerge as aspects of the public good.193 Over time, the members will develop a shared 
conception of what is in the group’s interests, what proposals each can advance, and in what terms 
the proposals must be couched (for example, proposals should be formulated in terms that others 
can accept as relevant for the group).194 Pettit then argues that a neo-republican society should 
track the common interests which are supported by the cooperatively-admissible considerations. 
A government which pursued policies in accordance with the common interest could reasonably 
claim to be non-arbitrary since the common interest would be those policies which cannot be 
reasonably rejected by any citizen.  
In his later work, Pettit has simplified this account of cooperatively-admissible 
considerations into the ‘norm of norms’ of democratic engagement. This norm requires that all 
citizens accept that no-one enjoys any special privileges, and that the arguments made in favour 
of any policy or process should be relevant from each individual’s perspective: it must be a 
consideration that each can endorse as relevant for the matter at hand. This norm requires that, 
‘the partisans of different viewpoints have to recognise that they must find non-partisan 
considerations – considerations that all can see as relevant – to support their proposals.’195 Pettit 
argues that if a democracy acts in fidelity with the norm of norms, then over time a set of more 
specific norms or standards will emerge which will establish what is and isn’t a relevant 
consideration when considering public policies. These considerations would be those which enjoy 
public acceptability, and can be deployed in political debate to support or oppose decisions 
without embarrassment. In fulfilling this role, they will enjoy a ‘trump’ status over decision-
making and will act as the accepted standards of political debate. Importantly, these norms will 
act as a filtering mechanism, barring the pursuit of objectionable policies and, over time, their 
effect, ‘will be to make an infinite number of policies or processes unthinkable. The demos that 
keeps tabs and checks on government will mainly exercise kratos, not in causing this or that to be 
decided on…but in ensuring that a myriad of other policies and processes are never considered.’196 
This is to emphasise a recurrent feature of Pettit’s work whereby citizens do not directly author 
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laws, this being the province of elected officials, but instead exercise an editorial, contestatory 
role over how they’re governed.197  
 An electoral system, supported by constitutional or quasi-constitutional mechanisms and 
actors, and underpinned by the norm of norms, will ensure that citizens enjoy a significant degree 
of influence and direction over the ways in which they’re governed. Citizens would be able to 
select representatives to govern them and ensure that the basic liberties are properly protected and 
resourced. The representatives would be subject to their electorate’s influence and direction 
because the norm of norms would serve to put a number of policies and decisions off the table, 
and other political agents, acting as indicative representatives, would regulate and invigilate 
political activity. In this way, a political system would enjoy legitimacy and citizens would be 
secure in the knowledge that they’re not going to be dominated by their government.  
 Finally, just as the eyeball test serves as a yardstick for measuring the extent to which 
social justice has been secured, Pettit has outlined what he calls the ‘tough luck’ test to assess the 
extent to which a political system enjoys legitimacy and does not exert arbitrary, dominating 
control over its citizens. He claims that we will be able to tell if the democratically-shaped 
constitutional system that he has outlined is able to guard against imperium, ‘if it enables people 
to think that when public structures and policies and decisions frustrate their personal preferences, 
that is just tough luck.’198 That is, people should be able to see that policies which are to their 
disadvantage are not the work of a malign will, but are instead simply a by-product of a policy 
which had inescapable negative outcomes. For example, if a decision goes against a specific 
minority, that minority ought to be able to contest this decision in a public institution, perhaps 
through the judiciary or through an ombudsman, who will then test to make sure that the particular 
decision, and the process for making that decision, did not transgress accepted local norms and 
that the decision is therefore compatible with the community’s accepted standards. Indeed, if the 
decision does not transgress accepted norms, and was made by an elected legislature, enacted by 
an elected executive, overseen by a non-partisan judiciary, and regulated by a range of quasi-
constitutional actors and civil society groups, then those who disagree with the outcome should 
be able to see that the outcome was a matter of bad fortune. As Pettit concludes, ‘What democracy 
would ideally ensure for the subjects of a government is that when things go against them, this is 
not a sign of subjection to a malign will. It is a product of tough luck,’ and, ‘A society will pass 
the tough luck test only if people truly enjoy an equally accessible form of influence that channels 
government…in an equally acceptable direction.’199 
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Against Constitutionalism – Against Democracy  
 
While Pettit offers a plausible account of political legitimacy, which would largely ensure that 
political control is non-arbitrary and not dominating, it is nonetheless subject to objections from 
two directions. As noted above, Pettit acknowledges that many theorists will object to the 
constitutional component of his theory of political legitimacy, and will argue that 
constitutionalism is incompatible with securing non-domination because it thwarts the people’s 
capacity to exert influence and direction over government. On the other side, we find that that 
some self-styled republicans argue that Pettit’s theory is too responsive to the will of the people 
and, on the assumption that individuals are subject to norms which shape their agency in 
problematic ways, the democratic component of Pettit’s theory permits domination to become 
entrenched and routinised within the political process. It is useful to consider and rebut each of 
these objections. 
In response to Pettit’s earlier account, Richard Bellamy has argued that substantive legal 
constitutionalism, wherein a legal constitution is enforced and protected by judges, is 
incompatible with the aims of neo-republicanism, and that we therefore ought to abandon 
substantive legal constitutionalism in favour of democratic constitutionalism. Since Bellamy’s 
arguments are directed against Pettit’s earlier theory, it useful to briefly outline Pettit’s discussion 
of constitutionalism in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government before we consider 
Bellamy’s criticism of this approach in detail. To that end, Pettit’s earlier work outlines three 
broad requirements for a non-dominating society which would ensure that democratic 
mechanisms cannot be manipulated. 
 The first condition is what Pettit calls the empire-of-law condition, and requires that all 
laws are general and applicable to everyone, including legislators; be public and made known in 
advance to those subject to them; be intelligible, consistent, and not subject to continuous change; 
and that these laws guide political decision-making, superseding any particularist policies.200 
Broadly, the aim of this condition is to ensure that government is not capricious, and is instead 
subject to known legal constraints. The second condition, the dispersion-of-power condition, 
requires that the power to make laws, the execution and administration of laws, and the 
adjudication on the applicability of the law, is dispersed across different agents. The rationale for 
this condition is straightforward: if one body were to exercise each of these functions, it would 
be able to act with impunity, making and amending laws to suit its whims. This condition would 
therefore require that powers be separated across executive, legislative, and judicial bodies; likely 
entail bicameralism and federalism or devolved governance; and necessitate the creation of 
supranational bodies which would exercise defined powers which are derived from inter-
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governmental agreements.201 The third condition, the counter-majoritarian condition, requires that 
majorities are not easily able to enact significant constitutional amendments (although this should 
not mean that laws cannot be changed). Indeed, because majorities are apt to vacillate and act 
capriciously, this condition would likely require super-majorities for significant constitutional 
amendments, and would likely necessitate the creation of a bill of rights subject to judicial review 
and enforcement.202 Importantly, this argument for individual rights reappears in Pettit’s later 
work, although Pettit stresses that constitutionally protected rights, while removing issues from 
the popular agenda, should be seen as a component of a well-functioning democracy rather than 
a constraint on it; this is because constitutionally protected rights secure individuals’ equal access 
to influence.203  
 It is this process of constitutional entrenchment, whereby specific policies and processes 
are removed from the purview of elected representatives and entrusted to unelected judges, which 
motivates Bellamy’s objection to Pettit’s theory. Bellamy argues that the circumstances of politics 
(that there is a need for collective decisions on a range of issues but where there is reasonable 
disagreement over how to resolve these issues), combined with a need to secure non-domination 
requires that a political system meets two criteria. Firstly, citizens must feel that there is no 
difference in status between themselves and any other citizen, including those entrusted with 
political power. Secondly, the outcomes of decision-making must not be premised upon the idea 
that some views are right whereas others are wrong, and therefore all views must be treated as 
equally valid inputs to decision-making.204 That is, a neo-republican society must therefore treat 
all citizens as equals and not pre-determine the outcome of any decision because doing so will 
treat some individuals’ views as right and others’ as wrong.  
 Bellamy goes on to argue that an electoral democracy meets these two criteria. 
Straightforwardly, citizens’ equal status is secured through each individual’s vote only counting 
for one and, as long as each decision is subject to the proper democratic process, individuals can 
be assured that their views are not treated as right or wrong: they’re simply on a winning majority 
or losing minority on a given issue or in the selection of representatives. Importantly, Bellamy 
argues that the democratic process is inherently non-dominating since it involves citizens 
accepting that their view is just one among many, and that equal concern and respect are owed to 
their fellows’ views: in simply aggregating individuals’ views, all are treated with equal 
consideration and respect, and outcomes are not moralised. Democracy therefore addresses the 
circumstances of politics through developing a fair mechanism to determine how to proceed when 
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there is reasonable disagreement, and secures non-domination because it secures each individual’s 
equal political status.205 
 Bellamy’s concern with Pettit’s constitutionalism, particularly the entrenchment of 
individual rights and the process of judicial review, is that it does not secure each individual’s 
equal status and it does not ensure that citizens’ views are treated as equally valid inputs to 
decision-making. This is because unless the entrenched rights correspond to views that each 
individual avows, they’re going to represent an instance of treating some views as right and others 
as wrong, thereby failing to treat all views as equally valid inputs to decision-making. Bellamy 
acknowledges that Pettit’s theory attempts to surmount this problem by developing an account of 
the common interest (those items which find support in the cooperatively-admissible 
considerations and which cannot be reasonably rejected by anyone, and which we’ll consider in 
more detail below) which, if correct, would seemingly permit these views to enjoy constitutional 
protection. That is, if every individual did avow the interests which comprise the common interest, 
then there would be no problem in guaranteeing them constitutional protection since everyone’s 
views would enjoy the same treatment.  
Though sceptical towards the possibility of deriving a set of interests avowed by all, 
Bellamy goes on to argue that even if it were possible to do so through a deliberative process, we 
face the problem that granting such shared interests constitutional protection and entrenchment 
undermines citizens’ equal status. This is because the process of judicial review, which ‘is often 
justified in terms of their being a check on irrational, self-interested or plain myopic populist 
sentiments,’206 entails that the judiciary is empowered to strike down or amend popular decision-
making when it is deemed incompatible with a constitution. So, while judges do not claim a 
superior status to their fellows, their legal expertise and capacity to apply, amend, and interpret 
constitutional requirements effectively grants them a superior status. This is because they’re able 
to supplant the common interest with their judgements.  
Bellamy’s concern with constitutional judges is that, ‘Given their freedom to interpret the 
law in diverse and inconsistent ways, according to the moral, ideological and legal positions they 
hold…their rule cannot be other than arbitrary and hence dominating.’207 The problem with 
substantive legal constitutionalism, Bellamy argues, is that citizens are not treated as equals since 
judges have the capacity to override popular decision-making (and do not have to answer to the 
electorate as representatives do), and their status, and the views that they advance, are treated as 
more important than those of other citizens. This undermines the requirement that all views are 
treated as equally valid inputs into decision-making and the requirement that all citizens enjoy the 
same status. As a solution to this problem, Bellamy suggests that we embrace ‘actually existing 
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democracy’ as an effective constitutive and constitutional mechanism. That is, through 
prescribing fair procedures, primarily built around the ideal of one person one vote, we can be 
assured that all citizens are treated equally, and that all views are treated as a valid input to 
decision-making. Indeed, he claims that a democracy characterised by elections and majoritarian 
parliamentary decision-making will be constitutional in the sense that it secures a political 
arrangement which avoids arbitrariness and domination, and one in which citizens can engage in 
collective self-rule.208 
  While Bellamy’s account seemingly provides a more democratic alternative to Pettit’s 
theory and avoids granting extensive powers to unelected officials, it is nonetheless unable to 
adequately respond to three problems with unqualified democracy which Pettit outlines. Indeed, 
Pettit acknowledges that even if an electoral system could be designed so as to give equal weight 
to each vote (perhaps through redrawing electoral boundaries so that all votes are equally 
weighted rather than, as occurs in the UK, votes carrying more weight in swing seats), it can still 
fail to secure equal influence and direction for all individuals and will thereby fail to ensure that 
political control is non-arbitrary. 
The first reason why this may be so is that unqualified democracy cannot surmount the 
sticky minority problem. The sticky minority problem highlights that it is possible for some 
groups to be persistent minorities on many issues; such groups will consistently lose out in 
electoral representation and fail to enjoy equal influence over government direction. For example, 
religious minorities such as the Amish or ethnic minorities such as First Peoples may find that, 
although they have equal voting rights with other citizens, their views are not sufficiently 
represented in government because their cultural values are so distinct from those in the larger 
society. If these groups are granted equal voting rights they will enjoy formal participatory 
equality but, substantively, they will not enjoy the same degree of influence over political 
decision-making. As a result, they will not enjoy equal influence over the way in which they’re 
governed and therefore be subject to imperium.209 
The second problem with unqualified democracy, the party interest problem, highlights 
that representatives may act so as to ensure that they or their party enjoy continuous access to 
government, and thereby secure a great deal of power over how their society is governed. Indeed, 
as noted by Pettit, parties and representatives may exploit their political power to redraw electoral 
boundaries (thereby ensuring that they have a majority in enough districts to take control of the 
legislature), or manipulate economic and other data so as to make their achievements seem more 
impressive, their failures less significant, and convince the electorate that they’re securing the 
public interest and thereby increase the likelihood of re-election.210  
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The third issue, the influential lobby problem, highlights that securing citizens’ influence 
over government can be undermined by representatives being pressured and motivated into 
advancing the interests of those who finance their campaigns or who control the media.211 Indeed, 
in electoral systems where campaigns are not publicly funded, we will find that political parties 
become dependent on donors and seek to advance their interests over the electorate. Similarly, 
we know that media moguls, such as Rupert Murdoch, have close links with many senior 
politicians, and exercise an unduly large influence over democratic governance, sometimes in 
direct opposition to the needs and views of the electorate. 
Each of these problems therefore highlights that it is possible, if not extremely likely, that 
unqualified democratic governance will fail to secure equal influence over government. The 
constitutional and quasi-constitutional mechanisms that Pettit has outlined as necessary 
components of securing influence and direction over government therefore appear to be integral 
to the aim of securing non-domination. This is because they are able to ensure that minority’s 
views enjoy an equal influence on governance (perhaps through setting aside seats in the 
legislature for minorities, or through granting exemptions from majority decisions, as when the 
Amish were exempted from sending their children to school beyond 8th grade in the case of Yoder 
vs. Wisconsin); remove issues from popular decision-making (as when commissions are set up to 
redraw electoral boundaries, or when ombudsmen and regulatory bodies audit government 
figures); and through setting up independent watchdogs and regulators who ensure that 
governments act in accordance with the public’s interest, and hold them to account when they fail 
to do so. Without such mechanisms, it is likely that individuals will only have a very loose form 
of influence over government and will be subject to domination.  
Assuming that the above comments are correct, we have to consider another objection, 
one which would dispute the necessity of including democratic mechanisms in our attempts to 
secure non-domination. Indeed, Thompson, who I briefly noted in the first chapter as advancing 
an account of perfectionist positive liberty, appears to argue that non-domination cannot be 
secured through democratic mechanisms because individuals are subject to a dominating false 
consciousness. To that end, Thompson argues that there are some cases which, ‘Although they 
minimally meet the requirement of being arbitrary in some basic sense, they do not meet Pettit’s 
other criteria for domination.’212 These cases are those in which social power is deployed to shape 
an individual’s consciousness and values, normalising and legitimising forms of authority and 
obligation, such that individuals come to see social structures as neutral and fail to identify them 
as mechanisms employed by elites to subjugate and control society for their own benefit.213 
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Thompson refers to these processes as ones of ‘constitutive domination.’214 Thompson goes on to 
argue that, ‘For Pettit, a key element of his theory of freedom is that I possess the capacity to act 
on the choices that I make and which I desire. But the deeper problem of domination is one where 
the webs of norms and values that pervade my society and which are internalised by my 
consciousness affect my desires and my interests.’215 Therefore, Thompson claims, as a social 
system comes to enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy, through the more successful socialisation 
of citizens, less constraint on free choice will be necessary as individuals come to act as elites 
would prefer through habit and (manipulated) personal choice. This means that people could be 
entirely dominated and yet still appear to have the capacity to exercise free choice as the 
overarching system in which individuals make their choices actually constrains the options which 
are available to them and determines which choices individuals are permitted to make.  
Importantly, Thompson believes that because individuals are subject to processes and 
structures which systematically constitute their agency without them ever realising it, they cannot 
see what is in their ‘real’ interest. As a result, individuals’ subjective preferences and shared ideals 
will be the product of manipulation and dominating socialisation, and individuals will be led to 
believe that what is actually in their objective interest, is not. Politics, therefore, cannot be 
required to track individuals’ views through democratic mechanisms because this will merely 
facilitate domination by tracking manipulated considerations which support capitalist domination. 
Instead, for Thompson, it is necessary for politics to fulfil a ‘positive’ function in creating the 
institutional and social conditions in which people can develop as free community-oriented 
individuals, and where everyone is prevented from subverting common resources to private ends. 
This would require, for example, that the state takes control of all economic, cultural, material, 
moral, and educational resources, ensuring that this common fund of resources is used to enhance 
the lives of the community as a whole; and that the state prevents capitalist enterprises from 
emerging, and instead encourages the creation of cooperative, self-governing firms, which the 
state is to steer towards the enhancement of the common good.216  
Before responding to Thompson’s concern with tracking manipulated interests, it is 
important to note that Thompson follows Krause in construing domination to be a process which 
undermines individuals’ ability to choose freely between options, affecting how they view the 
world and the social relationships in which they’re situated. As such, it is subject to the same 
objection to Krause that I outlined in the previous chapter. Contrary to Thompson, we have seen 
that the structures themselves do not dominate individuals, though it is possible that capitalism 
may constitute a component of a society’s background structure which makes domination more 
easily exercised. For example, in staunchly capitalist societies industries may not be properly 
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regulated or there may be a lack of employee protections, increasing the likelihood that employers 
can dominate their employees (a problem that Pettit is aware of).217  
If Thompson is correct that tracking manipulated interests (or, more accurately, adaptive 
preferences) will reinforce a background structure which makes domination more easily 
exercised, we are seemingly forced to conclude that democracy will simply buttress domination. 
This is because if all individuals believe that their only option is to support a capitalist society, 
then they’re likely to elect representatives who are staunchly pro-capitalism; this will lead to more 
deregulation and fewer employee protections, and thereby make it easier for employers to 
arbitrarily control employees. If true, this would seem to suggest that the only way to address 
domination would be to jettison the democratic component of Pettit’s account and develop a fully 
constitutional solution to the problem of domination. This approach, however, suffers from two 
distinct problems.  
The first is that it is based on the demonstrably false premise that all, or even a majority 
of, individuals are subject to the kind of false consciousness which, if tracked by democratic 
means, would simply reinforce domination. Indeed, even if it were true that capitalists were 
manipulating everyone’s preferences, undermining individual agency and giving rise to adaptive 
preferences, it is a matter of fact that a great many people who are supposedly socialised into 
upholding capitalism actually do oppose this system. Thompson therefore requires us to believe 
that capitalism’s opponents have surmounted these complex processes of indoctrination and 
manipulation, and can see the world for what it really is, whereas those who support capitalism 
must have been manipulated into doing so. It surely seems just as plausible, if not more so, to 
suggest that the fact that so many people do oppose capitalism evidences that the problem of 
manipulation is nowhere near as widespread as Thompson suggests, and it is more likely that 
some individuals do have an interest in capitalism, whereas others do not. This is not to deny that 
some individuals may suffer from adaptive preferences (whereby they wrongly assume that their 
only option is to live in a capitalist society, or avow pro-capitalist preferences), but it is to deny 
that false consciousness is such a pervasive phenomenon that no-one is able to exercise 
meaningful agency.  
The second issue with this approach is that such a system of governance, though intended 
to address domination, is wholly paternalistic, and therefore dominating. Indeed, as noted in the 
first chapter, paternalism occurs when an interferer’s interpretation of a situation supplants the 
interpretation of those subject to paternalistic invigilation. In this case, if the state were to stipulate 
that domination is facilitated by capitalism, and can only be addressed by the state taking control 
of all economic, cultural, material, moral, and educational resources, the state would be acting 
paternalistically. This is because the state would supplant individuals’ wills by stipulating that 
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they’re dominated, whether or not they know this, and will therefore subject them to arbitrary 
control. Indeed, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to concede the previous point, and 
grant that individuals are subject to a false consciousness which undermines individual agency, 
Thompson’s solution does not remedy this problem: it simply substitutes one interfering will for 
another. So, Thompson is concerned that capitalism and its attendant processes constitute 
individuals’ agency to such a significant degree that individuals make decisions which are not in 
their own best interest. Assuming that he is correct, replacing the agency-constituting effect of 
capitalism with the agency-constituting effect of the state does not resolve the problem as it will 
not be the individual who exercises agency in deciding how to lead their life. Thompson’s 
solution, then, in which the state takes charge of securing citizens’ objective good, supplants 
individual agency in exactly the same way that he believes capitalism does. Such an approach 
would give rise to a paternalistic, perfectionist theory of governance, one which undermines 
individual agency and entirely dominates individuals because the state’s will supplants the will 
of the individual: it is unlikely that individuals will be disposed to avow the interests that the state 
imputes to them. 
Having said all that, Thompson’s concerns do evidence a further issue which neo-
republicanism must grapple with and one which has been briefly touched upon. This issue is 
determining exactly what it is that political institutions must be responsive to in order for political 
control to be legitimate.  
 
The Common Good – Two False Starts 
 
The notion of the common good, Pettit argues, is central to the republican tradition because, if the 
state were forced to track the common good, the control it exerted would be non-arbitrary.218 As 
noted above, Pettit has variously suggested that political control is non-arbitrary when it tracks 
the welfare and worldview of citizens (understood as those preferences and ideals which are 
supported by cooperatively-admissible considerations) and, more recently, when the norm of 
norms and its attendant considerations filter out problematic arguments and policies and shape 
political debate and decision-making. This stands in stark contrast with Thompson’s claim that 
political institutions should aim to secure citizens’ objective good, and with Bellamy’s account in 
which democratic institutions are simply required to respond to citizens’ aggregated raw 
preferences. Each of these accounts therefore posits a distinct conception of the common or public 
good which political control is required to track. Although we’ve already seen why Thompson 
and Bellamy’s criticisms of Pettit’s democratically shaped constitutionalism fail, it is also 
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necessary to consider why their underlying accounts of the common good are incompatible with 
the aims of neo-republicanism. 
For Thompson, the common good must be determined objectively: that is, citizens 
themselves cannot be consulted on what they think is in their shared interest. This is because, 
owing to his underlying commitment to the false consciousness thesis, Thompson believes that 
individuals are subject to processes and structures which systematically facilitate their domination 
and manipulate them into misunderstanding what the common good ought to consist of. On this 
view, the common good cannot be conceptualised in terms of citizens’ shared interests or 
individual’s preferences because this will merely facilitate domination by tracking manipulated 
considerations which support capitalist domination. Instead, Thompson believes that the common 
good would need to be specified objectively; that is, it would have to be defined with reference 
to what individuals would want were they not subject to false consciousness.  
 Such an approach, indeed any approach which defines the common good objectively, is 
going to be incompatible with neo-republicanism for two distinct reasons. Firstly, and as noted 
above, it will entail paternalism and perfectionist governance, giving rise to domination. This is 
because stipulating an objective account of the common good supplants the will of those subject 
to interference with the will of the stipulator. For example, claiming that the state ought to take 
charge of all common resources and enforce an economic system characterised by workers’ 
cooperatives, without any scope for individuals to pursue their own private enterprises, ignores 
the will of those who would not like to live in such a society, and replaces it with the will of a 
paternalistic interferer who knows what is best for everyone. This, as noted in the first chapter, 
will entail perfectionist governance, and will represent an instance of exactly the kind of positive 
liberty which Berlin argues against. Indeed, in Thompson’s theory, the state is, ‘in a position to 
ignore the actual wishes of men,’219 in its efforts to secure the common good.  
The second reason why the common good cannot be defined objectively is because such 
an approach would also undermine the requirement that citizens are able to exert direction over 
governance. Indeed, as noted above, having influence over governance is insufficient for securing 
freedom from imperium and democratic legitimacy, and it is therefore necessary that citizens are 
able to enforce an equally acceptable direction over their government. Pursuing an objective 
account of the common good, however, will fail to secure this aim because it will not be citizens 
who actually determine the direction of governance; instead, the direction of government will be 
determined at the behest of the paternalistic interferer. Determining the common good objectively, 
then, will entail domination because it gives rise to paternalistic, perfectionist governance, which 
fails to secure citizens’ direction over governance.  
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Bellamy’s account avoids these two problems. In defending democracy, unfettered by 
constitutionalism, as a means for securing non-domination, he ensures that governance is not 
paternalistic, and that citizens enjoy a directive influence over governance (although, as we will 
see below, this direction is not equally acceptable to all citizens). Importantly, it seems that 
Bellamy defends a social choice theory of the common good because he sees politics as a means 
for determining an, ‘optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private 
interests.’220 That is, the common good for Bellamy seems to be the outcome of a fair procedure 
which aims to aggregate individuals’ disparate preferences and views. Whatever policy or party 
enjoys the most support can be deemed to be in the public’s good. It is useful to briefly outline 
exactly what social choice theories entail because, as we will see below, any theory which 
determines the common good through aggregating citizens’ raw preferences is going to be 
fundamentally incompatible with the aims of neo-republicanism.    
Jon Elster argues that social choice theories are structured as follows. Firstly, it is 
assumed that there is a given set of individuals (ignoring the issue of political boundaries and 
fluctuations in the set of individuals) faced with a choice between a given set of alternatives, in 
which they select between these options based on a given set of preferences that each holds and 
which are assumed not to change through the political process. Importantly, these preferences are 
assumed to be ordinal (such that individuals cannot express how intense their preferences are and 
outside observers cannot compare the intensity of individuals’ preferences), and individuals’ 
preferences are assumed to have the formal property of transitivity such that if an individual 
prefers option A over option B, and prefers option C to option A, then they also prefer option C 
to option B. Building upon these assumptions, social choice theories are focused upon arriving at 
a social preference ordering of the alternatives where the ordering must satisfy the following 
criteria. Firstly, the social group’s ranked preferences must also be complete, transitive, and 
Pareto-optimal, such that there is never a socially preferred option when another is individually 
preferred by everyone. Additionally, a social choice between two options should only depend 
upon how individuals rank these options relative to one another, and should therefore be 
insensitive to changes in citizens’ preferences over other options. Finally, all individuals should 
count equally in the aggregation of preferences; no individual should be able to dictate the 
outcome of the social choice; all individuals should have some private domain in which their 
preferences are decisive (i.e. not every decision should be subject to social decision-making); and 
it should not pay for individuals to express false preferences.221 
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The problem with attempting to derive the common good through social choice theories 
such as Bellamy’s, Elster argues, is that the preferences which individuals express may not be a 
good guide to what they actually prefer, and what individuals actually prefer may not be the best 
foundation for determining the outcomes of social choices. Indeed, Elster argues that preferences 
are never given in the sense of being observable; instead, they must be expressed by individuals. 
Importantly, there are many situations in which it may not be rational for an individual to express 
their preferences as they are, and instead may express false preferences which will get them a 
preferred result.222 For example, a racist may not actually express a preference for racist policies 
since to do so would likely affect their standing in others’ eyes, result in some kind of punishment, 
or have counter-productive consequences. Indeed, we can imagine a situation in which a state 
attempts to redefine its immigration policy. If the racist were to express his real preference for 
ending immigration, that he doesn’t like foreigners, he would likely harm his cause since many 
other individuals will not harbour such overtly racist prejudices. It would be more rational, then, 
for the racist to express false preferences, perhaps arguing that the community’s resources are 
insufficient to support immigration, in order to achieve his real aim of preventing foreigners from 
entering his nation.  
In addition to expressing false preferences, there is the further issue that individuals’ real 
preferences are dependent upon the causally feasible set of options. The problem, here, is that 
tracking preferences which are shaped by an individual’s perception of what is feasible, may 
simply result in tracking second-best preferences, or those that the individual doesn’t really hold. 
As an example, Elster invokes Aesop’s fable of the fox and the grapes. In the fable, the hungry 
fox tried to jump and obtain some grapes hanging high on a vine. Unable to reach them, the fox 
left, declaring that he didn’t want to eat the sour grapes anyway. The problem, here, is that the 
fox seems to be subject to the phenomenon of adaptive preferences which we considered briefly 
in the first chapter. That is, because the fox believes that eating the grapes is an unrealisable 
preference, he decides that he would actually prefer not to eat the grapes: his preferences are 
formed by what he takes to be his feasible option-set. To reduce cognitive dissonance, he then 
forms the belief that the grapes were sour and therefore shouldn’t have been eaten even if he had 
wanted to. The problem here is that the expressed preference of the fox, to not eat the grapes 
because they’re sour, does not actually represent his real preference which was to eat the grapes.  
If these comments are correct, it would suggest that if expressed preferences are tracked 
as components of the common good, we may simply be responding to preferences that individuals 
don’t really have, and instead we may be tracking the preferences that they think they have, or 
that they think are realisable, or those which they falsely express. If this is indeed a possibility, 
and there seems no way to guarantee that individuals will always express their real preferences, 
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it, ‘becomes very difficult to defend the idea that the outcome of the social choice mechanism 
represents the common good, since there is a chance that everybody might prefer some other 
outcome.’223  
This would seem to suggest that aggregating individuals’ raw preferences and premising 
political activity upon individuals’ unfiltered adaptive or false preferences, is going to be 
incompatible with neo-republicanism for two reasons. Most obviously, it will fail to address the 
problem of adaptive preferences which, as discussed in the previous chapter, will represent a 
constraint on individuals’ capacity to lead lives of their own choosing and which a legitimate state 
ought to take steps to guard against. Indeed, rather than responding to the problem of adaptive 
preferences, such an approach guarantees them a privileged role in determining how citizens are 
controlled. Secondly, it will fail to secure an equally acceptable direction on governance. This is 
because, as just noted, the preferences which determine government direction may well not 
represent anyone’s real preferences (since everyone might express adaptive or false preferences) 
and the direction that they impose upon government will therefore be unacceptable to most 
citizens. This will undermine democratic legitimacy and entail imperium.224  
This brief discussion of defining the common good objectively or through the aggregation 
of raw preferences has highlighted two key issues which a neo-republican account of the common 
good must address. Firstly, the common good cannot be objectively defined without input from 
citizens: to do so would give rise to paternalistic, perfectionist governance and thereby entail 
domination. Secondly, the common good must cohere with citizens’ ‘real’ preferences rather than 
false or adaptive preferences, such that the direction exerted over governance is a direction that 
all citizens are disposed to avow, where this avowal can be readily tested and established. While 
the first issue can be readily avoided, the second issue, ensuring that the common good coheres 
with citizens’ ‘real’ interests rather than their expressed preferences, is more difficult. Elster does, 
however, suggest that it is possible to surmount the problem of false or adaptive preferences 
through the transformative power of deliberation. 
 
The Deliberative Good 
 
Since the common good cannot be determined objectively without collapsing into paternalism, or 
through aggregating individuals’ raw preferences without giving rise to the possibility of false or 
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adaptive preferences, Elster suggests that we look at how we might transform individuals’ 
preferences through public, reasoned deliberation. On this view, the preferences which would 
form the common good would be, ‘informed and other-regarding preferences.’225 Indeed, building 
upon Jürgen Habermas’ ideal speech situation, he argues that the aim of deliberation would be to 
screen out selfish, false, adaptive, and private interests in order to derive a set of shared, rational 
preferences which each individual can avow as being in their shared interest.  
Elster notes that underlying the ideal speech situation are two interlinked premises. The 
first is that in public deliberation there are some arguments or claims which simply cannot be 
advanced in public, and that, ‘In a political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a 
given argument should be chosen just because it is good for oneself. By the very act of engaging 
in a public debate – by arguing rather than bargaining – one has ruled out the possibility of 
invoking such reasons.’226 Indeed, in engaging in public deliberation, individuals are committed 
to a form of self-censorship in which they screen out their own preferences in order to meet a pre-
commitment to the idea of rational decision-making and, at the very least, pay lip-service to the 
common good. We might find, for example, that a racist cannot publicly avow an interest in racial 
segregation because they cannot give sufficient public reasons for this preference: such a 
preference will therefore be screened out of the deliberative process by the requirement that 
individuals only give publicly-acceptable reasons for their preferences. The second premise 
underlying this account of ideal deliberation is the assumption that, over time, individuals will, 
‘come to be swayed by considerations about the common good.’227 This premise is therefore a 
psychological one in that it assumes that, in order to reduce cognitive dissonance, individuals will 
bring what they think in line with that they say. Now, this can be problematic, as when the fox 
brings his desires in line with his circumstances, but Elster argues that in the process of 
deliberation dissonance-reduction need not take on this problematic cast. This is because 
individuals’ preferences are being adapted in accordance with the requirements of rationality and 
reason rather than what they take to be their feasible options. So, unlike the fox who has a 
reasonable preference for eating the grapes, and which is adapted because of his perceived 
circumstances, an individual in the ideal speech situation is assumed to start with less than fully-
informed preferences which are transformed through reasoned deliberation. Adaption, here, is 
seen as a positive outcome of deliberation and one which facilitates the transformation of private, 
raw preferences into informed preferences. Elster goes on to argue that: 
 
The conceptual impossibility of expressing selfish arguments in a debate about the public 
good, and the psychological difficulty of expressing other-regarding preferences without 
ultimately coming to acquire them, jointly bring it about that public discussion tends to 
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promote the common good. The volonte generale, then, will not simply be the Pareto-
optimal realisation of given (or expressed) preferences, but the outcome of preferences 
that are themselves shaped by a concern for the common good.228 
 
 If realisable, such an approach for determining the common good would: avoid the 
paternalism objection (since citizens themselves would be deciding together what constitutes their 
shared interests); secure an equally acceptable direction over governance (since, assuming a 
consideration survives the deliberative process, it can be assumed to be a shared, public interest); 
and address the problem of false or adaptive preferences (because citizens’ preferences will have 
been transformed through the deliberative process). Elster does, however, outline seven potential 
objections to determining the common good deliberatively, each of which warrants further 
examination.  
 The first of Elster’s concerns is that the requirement that individuals participate in 
political deliberation may represent an instance of paternalism: that is, insisting on rational, public 
debate may be experienced as an unwarranted and unwanted interference in the lives of 
individuals who have no interest in determining the common good. In outlining this problem, 
Elster acknowledges that those who are interested in public deliberation are likely to be the 
wealthy or well-educated, creating a self-selecting elite whose motivation for participation is the 
acquisition of power rather than discerning and advancing the common good. There may, 
therefore, be a need to strike a balance between mandatory participation, to avoid the emergence 
of self-selecting elites, and ‘low-profile participation’ in order to avoid the paternalism 
objection.229 
 The second and third objections that Elster outlines are as follows: even assuming that 
there is unlimited time for discussion, unanimous and rational agreement may not result; and, 
assuming this is true, then there will need to be some kind of aggregation method to resolve the 
deadlock. The problem, here, is that even if individuals do participate with the intention of 
resolving problems rationally, unanimity is unlikely to arise, necessitating the inclusion of an 
aggregative mechanism to resolve the deadlock. These objections therefore seem to show that 
deliberation can only ever supplement the aggregation process, not replace it entirely.230 
 Elster then acknowledges that it is possible to grant the validity of this concern but 
nonetheless maintain that deliberation will improve the outcome of the political process. The 
fourth objection would challenge this view, arguing that it is possible for social outcomes to be 
worse than if participants advanced selfish preferences. As an example of this kind of problem, 
Elster outlines a situation in which two boys find a cake. The first boy declares that he’d like to 
eat the whole cake whereas the second boy protests that they should share it equally. An adult 
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arrives and determines that they compromise: he awards three quarters of the cake to the first boy 
and one quarter to the second boy (since this outcome is halfway between their preferences of a 
whole cake vs half a cake). The problem with this kind of situation is that the outcome of the 
deliberation between the boys is that neither is satisfied, and the first boy’s preferences are 
counted twice in determining the outcome (his expressed preference for the whole cake, and in 
the second boy’s suggestion that they share the cake equally). It would have been better, therefore, 
for the second boy not to have deliberated and instead asserted his initial preference without a 
view to compromise. 
 The fifth objection to the ideal speech situation is that it may be the case that increased 
deliberative participation may make individuals more selfish or irrational than they otherwise 
would be if their expressed preferences were simply aggregated. Indeed, Elster notes that, ‘The 
mere decision to engage in rational discussion does not ensure that the transactions will in fact be 
conducted rationally, since much depends on the structure and framework of the proceedings.’231 
The concern, here, is that the design of a deliberative process must take into account the need to 
counteract phenomena such as ‘group-think’ (the phenomenon whereby participants marginalise 
or exclude dissenting views in order to attain unanimity or compromise), and points us towards 
the need to take the issues of institutional and constitutional design seriously. 
 The sixth concern, and one that focuses more explicitly on the problem of group-think, is 
that if the deliberative process does yield unanimity, this may be due to conformity rather than 
rational agreement. Indeed, Elster notes that if there is no opposition to an outcome, this may be 
because some people are simply following the majority on an issue, thereby evidencing what 
social psychology has called the bandwagon effect. For Elster, unanimous agreement may 
therefore evidence adaptive preferences rather than the outcome being the most rational one.232  
Elster’s final concern is that forcing individuals to couch their preferences in terms of the 
common good is unlikely to purge these desires of all selfish content because the distinction 
between general and special interests is not well defined. Indeed, Elster notes that it is possible 
that, ‘private benefits may causally determine the way in which one conceives of the common 
good.’233 That is, because individuals may benefit from a specific policy, they may argue for it in 
terms of the common good. For example, individuals who benefit from capitalism may argue that 
it is promotes the common good through increasing society’s overall welfare, including the 
welfare of those at the bottom, and rewarding good choices. But, if these individuals did not 
benefit from capitalism themselves, they may not defend capitalism as being a general interest. 
 In concluding his discussion of the possible objections to determining the common good 
deliberatively, Elster notes two final points. The first is that we cannot assume that we will reach 
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a good society by acting as though we have already arrived. That is, the deliberative ideal is 
premised upon the assumption that we have already eliminated political and economic 
domination, enabling individuals to freely and equally deliberate over the common good. But, in 
the real world, we have yet to eliminate these sources of inequity, and it seems unlikely that free 
and rational discussion will converge on the elimination of all political and economic domination. 
Elster therefore notes that it might be necessary to employ propaganda to push individuals towards 
the elimination of these sources of inequity so that individuals can then engage in proper 
deliberation. Secondly, and as noted above, the deliberative process is imperfect, being vulnerable 
to adaptive preferences, conformity and group think. While Elster therefore believes that the best 
alternative to social choice theories is to develop some kind of ideal speech situation in which the 
common good is determined deliberatively, he is nonetheless concerned that such an approach 
may be overly idealistic and fail to adequately address the problems of adaptive preferences and 
group think.  
With these comments in mind, we can turn to Pettit’s account of determining the common 
good deliberatively. In order to develop his argument, Pettit starts from the assumption that the 
common good might be understood as the people’s ex ante net common avowable interests (that 
is, those interests which everyone actually avows before the formation of a decision or policy), 
but goes on to argue that this conception of the common good is flawed. Indeed, he argues that, 
‘it is extremely unlikely that among the different sets of practices and policies available to a state, 
there is one that will be in the avowable net interest of each…The fact that people differ in their 
capacities and circumstances, their tastes and commitments, means that there is little or no chance 
that among feasible alternatives one and the same set of practices and policies will be in the 
avowable net interest of each.’234 As an example, he suggests that it is unlikely that someone 
talented, adventurous, confident, and in favour of a laissez-faire economy will share the same 
interests as someone with modest capacities and an interest in a robust welfare state.235 
With a seemingly justified pessimism towards ever deriving a set of common ex ante 
interests, Pettit turns to a second conception of the common good. On this second reading, it is 
not the common good itself which is said to be in the avowable interest of each individual, but 
instead citizens are deemed to have an avowed common interest in the creation of a political 
system which is forced to track the common good. Pettit goes on to cite Brian Barry’s argument 
to the effect that even though three different policies, A, B, and C, may not be in everyone’s 
avowed interest, individuals will nonetheless share a higher-order common interest in the 
development of processes which are able to resolve such issues of disagreement. On this view of 
the common good, it is the process by which political decisions are made which is deemed to be 
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in citizens’ net interests, not necessarily the actual policies being pursued.236 Pettit goes on to 
argue that, ‘Assuming that ‘the common good’ refers to matters of common interest, the obvious 
suggestion is that the phrase refers to the interests that people share in their role as citizens…it is 
in the avowable net interest of each that there should be a state that is forced to track people’s 
common interests as citizens.’237  
On this reading of the common good, then, citizens are deemed to have an ex ante interest 
in a political system which is forced to track their shared interests, but only the interests they share 
in their role as citizens. Indeed, it is important to note that Pettit, following Barry, distinguishes 
between individuals as citizens of society, with community-oriented ‘political’ interests, and as 
occupants of particular roles, with private, self-serving interests. Each individual therefore has a 
set of private interests and a set of public interests. An individual’s private interests arise from 
their particular circumstances, needs, and role in society, whereas their public interests are those 
that arise from membership in a community which they want to see progress and flourish.238  
It is also important to note that Pettit argues against Habermas’ ideal speech situation as 
a means to determine the common good. The reason for this, he argues, is that the common good 
which would emerge from an ideal discussion is unlikely to be the same as that which would 
emerge from a discussion in the non-ideal world.239 Instead, what is required is that we attempt to 
replicate real-world deliberative practices in which individuals are committed to a shared 
enterprise but disagree over how to proceed with their project. The key to understanding such 
deliberative processes, Pettit argues, is to look at the considerations which all members’ 
countenance as relevant for the matter at hand. As an example, he suggests that we consider the 
ways in which a condominium managing committee would deliberate. Each member of the 
committee would have their own private interests in, for example, the management of their own 
apartment, but each would also have shared interests in the ways in which the condominium is 
managed and maintained. As they discuss the property’s management, certain reasons will be 
deemed to be relevant for discussion, whereas other, self-serving, interests will not. It would be 
unlikely, for example, that the committee would accept a member’s proposal that they use shared 
resources for a member to redesign their own kitchen. This would represent the insertion of a 
private interest into a discussion about the committee’s shared interests. But the committee would, 
for example, accept the proposal that the funds be used to paint the building’s exterior since all 
will benefit from the work. Over time, the members will develop a shared conception of what is 
in the group’s interests, what proposals each can advance, and in what terms the proposals must 
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be couched (for example, proposals should be formulated in terms that others can accept as 
relevant for the group).240 
Pettit then argues that we can identify the shared considerations of a political community 
in the same way. Much as the members of the condominium management committee will have 
different ideas that they wish to advance, citizens have different ideas, perspectives and values 
which they will believe should inform political activity. In the committee example, a framework 
would emerge through deliberation, enabling participants to identify which ideas are relevant for 
the group. In the political community, Pettit believes that a similar framework will emerge from 
deliberation and contestation between competing conceptions of the good.241  
Importantly, the deliberative process in Pettit’s theory does not operate in the form of a 
deliberative assembly: citizens do not come together to deliberatively determine the common 
good or decide on political policies. Instead, deliberation is decentralised, with deliberation 
occurring across many political and civic sites (including in the media, in the courts, in civil 
society, in political decision-making etc.), and gradually producing regulatory norms (which are 
in accordance with the norm of norms) which would then serve to constrain political decision-
making.242 These norms would exert a filtering effect over political decision-making, putting 
certain policies off the table and ensuring that governance occurs in accordance with a set of 
considerations which are publicly avowed by all citizens.243 Pettit is also clear that over time 
episodic deliberation will become less necessary, and the deliberative norms generated will 
become embedded within institutional processes.244 We can therefore see that the cooperatively-
admissible considerations and norm of norms are devices for securing something like a real-world 
ideal speech situation: they serve to filter out private preferences and ensure that the direction 
exercised over governance is equally acceptable to all citizens. Significantly, because Pettit 
eschews utilising a deliberative assembly to derive the common good his account is also able to 
surmount each of Elster’s objections.  
In response to Elster’s first objection, that requiring individuals to participate in public 
deliberation may represent an instance of paternalism, it is important to reiterate that Pettit’s 
account of public deliberation is different to the one envisioned by Elster. That is, whereas Elster 
sees the deliberative ideal as a process for determining outcomes in specific decision-making 
scenarios, for Pettit the deliberative ideal is a community-wide, iterative process which produces 
norms and ideals which regulate public business. In Pettit’s account it is not necessary that citizens 
come together in some form of deliberative assembly to determine a rational, collective response 
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to every policy disagreement since democratic mechanisms are utilised to select politicians to 
resolve such issues. Instead, public deliberation will occur, ‘on a number of occasions at a number 
of sites,’245 and will gradually produce regulatory social norms which each is disposed to avow, 
and which will then regulate the decisions made by elected representatives. They will do so by 
putting policies off the table which are not supported by citizens’ shared values, and by enabling 
citizens to contest their representatives if they fail to act in accordance with the common good. 
Individuals are therefore not forced to deliberate unendingly, as they would be in certain varieties 
of neo-Athenian republicanism, thereby avoiding the paternalism objection, and the process will 
preclude the emergence of deliberative elites. There will still be political elites tasked with 
decision-making, but they will be democratically elected and bound to act in accordance with the 
public’s shared interests. 
 Elster’s second and third objections, that unanimous agreement may not arise and an 
aggregation process will be necessary to resolve deadlocks, do not apply to Pettit’s account. As 
the deliberative ideal in Pettit’s account is used to generate regulatory norms, it is unlikely that 
there will be a lack of unanimous agreement. Indeed, as noted by Pettit, regardless of the particular 
worldviews that individuals avow, they’re all likely to endorse a set of core norms which are 
necessary for them to pursue their own good. This overlapping consensus is likely to include, for 
example, the requirement that all individuals are treated equally and that the government takes 
steps to secure a private sphere.246 These norms are therefore broad enough to be able to attract 
unanimous support and thereby avoid the need for aggregative mechanisms to supplement the 
deliberative ideal (although, as noted above, there will still be aggregative mechanisms in a 
republican society in the selection of legislators etc.).  
 The fourth objection that Elster levels against the deliberative ideal, that it is possible for 
social outcomes to be worse if citizens deliberate rather than if participants advance selfish 
preferences, does not undermine Pettit’s account. The concern here is that some people’s 
preferences will count for more than others if individuals are forced to compromise in order to 
reach a unanimous decision. We can see something like this happening in a political scenario if 
we imagine citizens deliberating over whether or not to adopt a welfare system. We can suppose 
that roughly half of the citizens advocate a full welfare system with a universal basic income and 
other redistributive mechanisms, whereas the other half prefer a society with no safety net. In 
attempting to reach a compromise, it is determined that there will be a welfare state, but the 
universal income will not be included. In this case, those advocating the welfare state have their 
preferences count for more in the determination of a compromise since their original preference 
was more demanding than their opponents’. This kind of problem is unlikely to arise in Pettit’s 
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account because of the inclusion of the norm of norms as a regulatory ideal. That is, because 
individuals can only advance arguments which can be endorsed from all standpoints, the actual 
considerations which will emerge from the process are likely to few in number, loosely specified, 
and relatively uncontroversial (such as the requirement that all individuals are treated equally) so 
as to command common assent. This means that it is unlikely that individuals will be able to 
advance the kind of selfish preferences that Elster is concerned with without them falling afoul of 
the norm of norms or others considerations derived from that norm.  
 The fifth objection, that deliberation may make individuals behave irrationally or 
selfishly, is not a significant concern for Pettit’s account of the deliberative good. Indeed, 
irrationality and selfish behaviour are, again, precluded by the requirement that deliberation be 
premised upon the underlying norm of norms. Importantly, Pettit believes that compliance with 
the norm of norms would be achieved in a society in which patriotism is sufficiently embedded: 
indeed, he claims that, ‘Let patriotism prevail and there are unlikely to be divisions of the kind 
that would undermine the emergence of society-wide norms.’247 The suggestion, here, seems to 
be that the process is self-perpetuating: that is, as long as sufficient numbers of individuals do 
embrace the norm of norms, and deliberate in the requisite manner, it will force others to do so 
too, leading them to couch their arguments in terms that others can accept. Indeed, the 
condominium committee provides an example of this. Once the initial premises of deliberation 
are endorsed by all (i.e. that no-one is entitled to preferential treatment, that private interests are 
not admissible considerations etc.) others are forced to abide them such that should an individual 
move to the condominium, they will be required to deliberate in the requisite fashion. A similar 
approach would support norm-producing deliberation within a republican society. As long as 
individuals are able to abstract from their private interests, and see themselves as community-
oriented, patriotic individuals with public interests which arise from membership in a community 
which they want to see progress and flourish,248 the norm of norms will able to shape individuals’ 
deliberations and, over time, this process will become self-perpetuating. As a result of this process 
(and the requirements that all individuals accept that their views are entitled to no preferential 
treatment and that they can only advance preferences and viewpoints which are couched in terms 
that others can accept), the only norms which will emerge from the process will be broad-based 
regulatory norms that each individual can endorse from their particular perspective. The norm of 
norms would therefore filter out the kind of irrational and self-regarding preferences that Elster 
is concerned with. 
 The sixth objection, that unanimity is likely to evidence that some individuals have 
advanced adaptive preferences or engaged in group think is not, in this instance, a problem for 
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Pettit’s theory. This is because the process is specifically designed so as to transform individuals’ 
raw preferences: that is, through the deliberative process and requirement that norms cohere with 
the norm of norms, individuals’ selfish, irrational or otherwise inappropriate preferences will be 
screened out or transformed so that the outcomes, which will exert a direction on governance, can 
be deemed to be shared norms which each can avow from their particular perspective. In this way, 
we might say individuals are subject to the phenomenon of adaptive preferences but, importantly, 
the preferences are adapting in accordance with the requirements of rationality and the need to 
develop an equally acceptable direction on governance rather than in accordance with the options 
that they take to be available to them. That some people’s preference for, for example, some kind 
of segregated society will be forced to adapt (because such a preference will be incompatible with 
the norm of norms) or be concealed is not an issue from this perspective since the aim is to 
transform citizens’ raw, selfish preferences into a set of shared, rational norms. 
 Elster’s seventh objection, that requiring individuals to advance their preferences in terms 
that others can accept from their particular perspective is unlikely to purge such preferences of 
selfish content, is inapplicable to Pettit’s deliberative ideal. This is because, unlike in the process 
envisioned by Elster, in which individuals deliberate over specific outcomes which will confer a 
range of benefits and burdens on themselves and others, Pettit’s citizens are simply deliberating 
over a set of regulatory norms which will then constrain governance in ways that will be difficult 
to anticipate. Indeed, as discussed above, the norms derived from the deliberative process will not 
directly determine political decisions but will instead exert a filtering effect upon government 
decisions. Individuals therefore cannot know exactly what kind of benefits will accrue to them 
from advocating specific norms since they are loosely specified and will constrain different 
governments in different ways. For example, if citizens do avow a norm which requires that the 
government secures a private sphere, they cannot know exactly how this norm will shape 
government policy. Indeed, depending on the specific government, this norm might entail that the 
government maintains a rigorous distinction between the public and private spheres with all issues 
relating to child-rearing, employment, welfare etc., being deemed to be beyond the purview of 
the government, or the government might be considerably more interventionist, leaving only a 
few core issues within the private sphere itself (for example, whether families choose to have 
children). As the norms will need to be loosely-specified and relatively broad in scope in order to 
command common avowal, they will leave a lot of room for governmental interpretation. This 
will make it difficult for citizens to advocate selfish preferences disguised as the common good 
since they cannot know exactly how specific norms will be interpreted and affect their lives. 
Individuals therefore cannot stand to profit from the deliberative process in the way envisioned 
by Elster. 
While Pettit’s account is therefore able to address each of Elster’s concerns, there does 
seem to be one further issue which we need to respond to. This is that, as noted above, Pettit sees 
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the deliberative process as becoming more sporadic as the regulatory norms become routinised 
and embedded within a political system. Now, while he does note in his earlier work that a neo-
republican society should implement democratic institutions which act to search out and remain 
responsive to changes in citizens’ common good,249 it seems that the deliberative process is not 
envisioned as a long-term component of Pettit’s theory: its sole purpose is to derive the common 
good through transforming citizens’ raw preferences into a loosely-specified set of shared norms 
which will then exert an equally acceptable direction on governance. Laudable though this process 
is, it seems unlikely to be able to address the problem of adaptive preferences over a prolonged 
period of time because, as citizens’ shared interests become embedded within the political system, 
the deliberative process which transforms citizens’ preferences will become less necessary and, 
presumably, eventually abandoned. It is important to stress that this is not to suggest that Pettit’s 
account does not have other deliberative components: indeed, as noted above, he advocates a 
range of other deliberative mechanisms, including the use of deliberative assemblies such as the 
British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, to model the wider society’s views 
on an issue, as well as creating other deliberative bodies which hold the government to account. 
Nonetheless, Pettit’s account does lack a formal, long-term institutional process for ensuring that 
individuals do not suffer from adaptive preferences. It therefore seems that the problem of 
adaptive preferences, which neo-republicanism must grapple with since it undermines 
individuals’ personal resources, will be addressed in the short-term through deliberation but may 
later reappear as the deliberative process becomes more sporadic or is abandoned. There seems 
to be a need, then, to supplement Pettit’s decentralised, informal deliberative ideal with a more 
formal, long-term, institutionalised deliberative process which would be expressly intended to 
address the problem of adaptive preferences and transform raw preferences into informed 
preferences. Doing so would enable us to make sure that the common good remains free of 
adaptive preferences, and would therefore ensure that the shared interests which direct 
governance, and thereby secure democratic legitimacy, are those that represent the public interests 
of citizens.  
 
The Deliberative Assembly  
 
Assuming that the above comments are convincing, it seems to be necessary to supplement Pettit’s 
account of democratic legitimacy with an institutionalised deliberative process in order to guard 
against adaptive preferences and ensure that informed preferences determine the common good. 
As such, the first point to note is that in order to ensure that the deliberative process is able to 
mitigate against adaptive preferences, it will be necessary to ensure that the norm of norms is 
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upheld within deliberations, such that, irrespective of the issue at hand, all individuals are required 
to couch their arguments in terms that others can accept, and acknowledge that they and their 
views enjoy no privileged status. The norm of norms would therefore fulfil a similar role in this 
deliberative process to the one that it fulfils in Pettit’s account: it would aim to screen out selfish, 
adaptive, and irrational preferences and facilitate the transformation of individuals’ preferences 
into informed preferences.  
The second point to note is that a deliberative process intended to address adaptive 
preferences should not be constituted as a decision-making plenary assembly. In addition to the 
likelihood of such a body coming into competition with the other democratic and constitutional 
mechanisms that Pettit has outlined as components of securing democratic legitimacy, a 
deliberative assembly empowered to make political decisions would be, ‘liable to be the most 
arbitrary of powers. It will relate to individuals and smaller groups in the role of an arbitrary 
despot…a regime under which the most capricious of powers remains morally as well as legally 
uncontestable.’250 This is because, as we saw in the preceding chapter, a collective group which 
individualises reason will not act in accordance with endorsed premises or the requirements of 
reason, and it would therefore be apt to act capriciously and arbitrarily. The aim of this process, 
then, is not to enable citizens to engage in direct self-governance: instead, this deliberative process 
would be focused on creating the framework in which citizens can deliberate over political and 
social issues, thereby creating the conditions in which adaptive preferences can be transformed 
and in which civic-mindedness and patriotism can be encouraged amongst individuals. While 
specifying exactly how this institution might be designed, how discussions might be moderated, 
and who might set the agenda for deliberation, are all issues which are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is sufficient to note that there are a number of different models for deliberation which 
such an institution might aim to replicate. For example, it might be possible to create online 
deliberative polls, develop a digitised version of town hall meetings, or simply create a moderated 
discussion board which allows individuals to raise and discuss any issue that they think is relevant.  
Thirdly, it is important to acknowledge that the size of modern states precludes the 
creation of any kind of deliberative forum or assembly that requires citizens to convene in specific 
places. Indeed, requiring physical attendance would render the deliberative process inaccessible 
for huge numbers of people, particularly those who have to work long hours, those with children, 
the elderly, and the disabled. The problem, here, is that requiring physical attendance may result 
in only the affluent being able to participate in the process. It is therefore imperative that the 
deliberative process is designed in such a way that participation is open to all citizens irrespective 
of their particular commitments and circumstances. 
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The fourth point to note is that citizens may lack the motivation to actually want to 
participate in deliberating over political issues, and we must therefore account for the possibility 
of individual apathy. Citizens may be apathetic towards deliberation for a variety of reasons: the 
process would require a significant time commitment; they’re disengaged or disenchanted with 
politics; this commitment will not confer any material benefits on those participating since the 
process does not include any decision-making responsibilities; it prevents citizens from having 
an immediate effect upon their society; and because the process may make political participation 
too demanding in Pettit’s society because of the need for deliberation over regulatory norms, 
democratic participation, civil society participation, and this suggested additional need for 
deliberative participation to guard against adaptive preferences.  
With these preliminary comments in mind, my suggestion for how we might address the 
problem of adaptive preferences would be to utilise emerging technology to develop a digitised 
assembly that would provide the space in which citizens could deliberate over political and social 
issues, with the aim of facilitating the transformation of adaptive preferences into informed 
preferences. This would involve, ‘the use of information and communication technology (ICT) 
and computer mediated communication (CMC) … for purposes of enhancing political 
democracy,’251 in order to transcend the traditional limits of time, space, and other physical 
conditions on democratic participation.252 Indeed, academics have looked at a variety of ways to 
incorporate the use of ICT and CMC into existing democratic practices, suggesting a range of 
proposals from online political discussion groups, to online petitions, to clicktivism, to internet 
voting, to conducting election campaigns online.253 Examples of the development of digital 
democratic processes include: the U.K. government’s launch of an online e-petition website in 
2011, which aimed to bridge the gap between individuals and parliament; and Minnesota E-
Democracy, which enables citizens to debate local and national issues via digital forums.254  
Importantly, a digitised deliberative assembly would surmount the accessibility and 
motivational issues noted above. Indeed, a neo-republican society concerned with addressing 
adaptive preferences would be able to provide the infrastructure (including internet connection 
and devices to participate) to its citizens, ensuring that individuals need not be physically present 
at any location to be able to participate in online discussions. The ease of participation should 
largely mitigate against political apathy, making it easy for citizens to engage with one another. 
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In addition, participating in deliberative discussion would not be compulsory, mitigating against 
the concern that the ideal is overly demanding, but would confer a range of tangible and intangible 
personal benefits upon citizens, encouraging them to participate. For example, we might find that 
citizens enjoy becoming better informed about political issues, or perceive that deliberation 
actively helps them by transforming irrational or selfish preferences. We can also anticipate an 
increase in individual self-respect, a greater appreciation for their fellow citizens’ views, and 
greater individual empowerment, perhaps leading citizens who deliberate to engage more actively 
with other democratic mechanisms. This may lead them to participate in electoral politics, stand 
for office, join pressure or special interest groups, or volunteer to join citizen advisory boards. 
A deliberative assembly would also support Pettit’s account in three key ways. Firstly, it 
would make it easier for democratic institutions to track any changes in citizens’ shared norms. 
Through simple observation it would be possible to determine whether any new shared norms 
have emerged from public debate, or if existing norms are no longer supported by citizens, and 
take steps to accommodate such changes. Secondly, it will enhance citizens’ contestatory role in 
their democracy: through individual empowerment and participation, citizens will be better placed 
to keep tabs on their government and contest any decisions that they believe are incompatible 
with the common good. This leads into the third benefit to Pettit’s theory, and that is that ongoing, 
institutional deliberation will encourage greater vigilance amongst citizens. Indeed, Pettit 
approvingly cites Machiavelli’s arguments in the Discourses on Livy to the effect that citizens can 
only ever be truly free from government tyranny when they exercise, ‘eternal democratic 
vigilance.’255 Ensuring that citizens have access to a community-wide, and easily accessible forum 
will ensure that citizens are able to alert one another to any governmental depredations, and enable 
them to mobilise quickly in the event that the government fails to be directed by the common 
good. 
Turning to the specific benefits of such a forum for addressing adaptive preferences, it is 
important to acknowledge that theorists such as Elster, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
have outlined a range of benefits associated with deliberation. The first of these is that outcomes 
can be deemed to be more legitimate since they will have survived the demanding deliberative 
process. While I have argued above that the deliberative assembly would lack decision-making 
powers, this benefit is nonetheless relevant for our purposes. Indeed, it suggests that the 
preferences that survive the deliberative process will similarly be more legitimate, or at least 
suggests that citizens will be more justified in holding their preferences since they will have been 
defended deliberatively with others and will, presumably, cohere with the norm of norms.256 To 
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that extent, we can assume that surviving preferences will be better ‘informed’ than those that 
will have been discarded. The second benefit of deliberation is that it has been shown to improve 
the moral and intellectual capacities of deliberators. This would seem to suggest that the educative 
powers of deliberation may further encourage the transformation of adaptive preferences. The 
third way in which deliberation may address adaptive preferences is through encouraging the 
development of civic virtues and inculcating an attitude of civic-mindedness. Indeed, a culture in 
which deliberation forms a significant component of social interaction, particularly one which 
encourages individuals to act in accordance with the norm of norms, will likely lead to citizens 
taking a greater interest in political and social activity, and encourage a greater sense of social 
awareness.257 This, we can hope, will have the effect of transforming selfish preferences into more 
other-regarding preferences and will contribute to the advancement of the common good.  
Importantly, the capacity of deliberation to transform adaptive preferences also finds 
support in empirical research. Indeed, James Fishkin’s and Robert Luskin’s work on deliberative 
polling has shown the following results: that a statistically significant number of participants’ 
opinions change through deliberation; that individuals’ voting intentions also change; that 
participants experience significant information gains in both the issues under consideration and 
about politics more generally; that preference-changes are information driven; that policy 
attitudes and voting intentions tend to hinge more on normatively desirable criteria after 
deliberation; and that preferences do not necessarily polarise into homogenous groups.258 They 
go on to argue that while, ‘People may ordinarily not know or think much about politics, and have 
poorly developed political views as a result,’ their deliberative polls have shown that for many 
participants it is, ‘clearly possible for them to learn and thus change their views as appropriate.’259  
Importantly, changes in views and knowledge gains arise even in situations in which 
individuals are deeply divided in outlook and beliefs, providing us with further evidence that 
institutionalised deliberation may go a long way towards addressing adaptive preferences. A 
deliberative forum undertaken in Omagh, Northern Ireland, a region recently characterised by 
sectarianism and violence, found that, ‘some of the participants’ perceptions of the other 
community became still more positive, as did some of their beliefs regarding inter-community 
relations. Protestants came to see Catholics as more trustworthy than they had previously, while 
Catholics came to see Protestants as both more trustworthy and more open to reason than they 
                                                          
deliberative process and enforce compliance: the norm of norms, if properly embedded, would 
be sufficiently self-perpetuating to ensure that individuals deliberate in the requisite way.   
257 Jon Elster, ‘Introduction’, in Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-18 (p. 11); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
Why Deliberative Democracy? (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 10-13. 
258 James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: 
Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion’, Acta Politica 40 (2005), pp. 284-298 (p. 290-292). 
259 Ibid., p. 293. 
97 
 
had previously.’260 While the authors of this study acknowledge that the individuals who 
participated were more favourably disposed towards one another than might have been 
expected,261 they nonetheless claim that their forum showed that deeply divided groups:  
 
Can be assembled to discuss policy issues; that, once assembled, they have enough in 
common to permit meaningful and constructive deliberation; that they tend to emerge 
better informed about the policies under discussion; that their policy attitudes often 
change as they learn, think and talk about the issues; that at least some of those changes 
tend to be in the direction of policies involving greater religious mixing and otherwise 
plausibly serving the interests of the society as a whole; and that the opposing sides tend 
to grow more respectful and trusting of each other.262 
 
 The evidence of deliberative polling therefore seems to show that deliberation has a 
significant transformative effect upon individuals’ preferences, leading many to discard what 
might be their raw or uninformed preferences in favour of better supported, informed preferences. 
Indeed, in the case of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, we can see that attitudes have 
changed precisely because deliberation has encouraged participants to learn about one another’s 
viewpoints, increasing civility between opposing groups, and giving rise to informed preferences 
which aim at the common good rather than narrow sectarian interests. It is also important to note 
that Fishkin has conducted a series of internet-based deliberative polling projects. He found in 
one poll that the results online were broadly similar to the face-to-face results,’263 and that 
participants’, ‘responses were plausibly connected to large increases in information (as measured 
by separate information questions).264 These comments all suggest that a formal, institutionalised 
deliberative institution, digitised to surmount accessibility and motivational issues, can facilitate 
the transformation of individuals’ raw preferences into informed preferences, and thereby 
mitigate against the problem of adaptive preferences. With that said, there are some objections to 
this model of digitised deliberation which we must consider.  
The first objection to utilising a digitised deliberative assembly to transform individuals’ 
preferences would be that such an approach may make politics increasingly divisive. Indeed, as 
noted by Benjamin Barber, a problem with digital democracy, ‘is the proclivity toward 
atomism.’265 He argues that the internet has made it possible for special interest groups, political 
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parties, and like-minded individuals to congregate and interact with one another, isolated and 
insulated from others, thereby reducing the need for inter-group deliberation and dialogue. 
Importantly Barber goes on to argue that this, ‘Segmentation only undermines community…by 
dividing us into groups and special interests without common ground, it may foreclose the 
globalisation of our local communities.’266 Indeed, Fishkin similarly notes the possibility of 
internet ‘echo chambers’ in which deliberation produces more extreme views by enabling 
individuals to deliberate solely with like-minded individuals. The problem, here, is that a digital 
assembly may make politics more divisive by enabling individuals to eschew compromise and 
negotiation with others who hold different views, and encourage individuals to simply engage 
with other likeminded individuals.   
 While this is indeed a significant concern for this account of deliberation, I want to 
suggest three reasons why the proclivity towards atomism might not be as straightforward or 
probable as Barber seems to indicate. The first point to note is that, as argued by Fishkin, group-
based deliberation does not necessarily polarise discussion, nor do ‘preferences homogenize 
within groups.’267 Indeed, Fishkin notes that polarisation occurs in around half of the small groups 
involved in deliberative polling,268 suggesting that polarisation is not as common as it may be 
thought to be. The second reason why such polarisation is unlikely to completely undermine the 
model being developed is that norm of norms will exert a filtering effect over the deliberative 
process by preventing individuals from advancing excessively polarising, selfish, or irrational 
preferences. Indeed, if this process is self-sustaining and self-perpetuating, as suggested above, 
we can hope that individuals will voluntarily comply with the requirements of the norm of norms 
and couch their arguments and interests in terms that others can accept as admissible criteria for 
argumentation: this should filter out excessively polarising, selfish, and irrational preferences. 
This will hopefully have the effect of encouraging citizens to seek common ground in their 
deliberations, and thereby actively reduce the number of cases in which polarisation occurs. The 
third point to note, in anticipation of later chapters, is that a civic education will also go some way 
towards mitigating against polarisation and political divisiveness. Indeed, we can hope that a well-
designed education may also have a transformative effect upon the democratic process by creating 
a more politically aware and engaged citizenry who, rather than seeking to avoid engaging with 
other viewpoints, would be empowered to deliberate with others in pursuit of their common good. 
Although these comments do not decisively refute Barber’s concerns, they do suggest that a 
digital assembly which ensures that citizens are able to engage in reasoned deliberation, and in 
which the stakes are ‘low’ (i.e. there are no winners or losers since political decisions will be 
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taken elsewhere in the democratic system), may be able to avoid a problematic degree of 
polarisation. 
The second issue with digitised deliberation is that it seems unlikely to be realised in the 
short-term. Indeed, it might be argued that relying on individuals to actively participate in online 
deliberation is excessively utopian in light of well-documented voter apathy. In response to this 
concern it is important to note that although digital democracy is largely in its infancy, digitised 
deliberation is being developed in various guises across the world, and is being used successfully 
to supplement existing democratic procedures. Indeed, in addition to the rise of e-petitions in the 
UK, Minnesota has developed its own E-Democracy system, providing an online forum which 
aims to facilitate internet-based dialogue and deliberation between citizens, enabling citizens to 
discuss local and national issues.269 Estonia provides another example of a successful digital 
democratic revolution. With its ‘e-Estonia’ system, the country offers its citizens access to internet 
voting, an online document sharing platform (DigiDoc), an e-Court system, an e-Prescription 
system, and a huge other range of services, many of which can be accessed via free Wi-Fi access 
throughout the nation. We can see, then, that digital processes have the capacity to significantly 
alter the ways in which democratic procedures are conducted and suggests that a deliberative 
assembly, along the lines suggested here, could be realised in the near future.  
Finally, it is important to note that a digital deliberative assembly would surmount each 
of the concerns that Elster levels at deliberative democracy. In eschewing compulsory 
participation, we ensure that deliberation does not become a paternalistic constraint on 
individuals’ lives, and in withholding decision-making powers from the assembly, we make it 
less likely that a deliberative elite will emerge to acquire important powers. In addition, since the 
assembly is simply a process for transforming citizens’ preferences, we will not need to enforce 
unanimity or develop mechanisms for resolving deadlocks. Indeed, because the assembly would 
lack decision-making powers, social outcomes cannot be made worse by deliberation: social 
outcomes would be determined elsewhere in the political system, primarily through the 
determination of regulatory norms, the selection of representatives, the actions of the indicative 
representatives, and the decisions made by representatives in accordance with the common good. 
We have also already seen above that group polarisation and atomisation can be mitigated against 
within this model, and so Elster’s concern that deliberation may make individuals more selfish or 
irrational need not overly concern us. Indeed, the empirical research shows that the proclivity 
towards atomisation only occurs in around half of deliberative groups, and when combined with 
the norm of norms and a civic education, we have reason to hope that citizens’ preferences will 
become less irrational or selfish and will not polarise around extremes. This also suggests that 
Elster’s sixth objection, that unanimity may be the result of group think rather than rational 
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agreement, is not a concern for this model because we are not seeking unanimity and participants 
are not required to reach a consensus: it is simply a process for transforming individuals’ 
preferences and reasonable disagreement is still likely to exist after deliberation. Finally Elster’s 
seventh concern, that requiring citizens to couch their preferences in terms of the common good 
may enable them to pursue selfish interests, is not a significant concern for a non-decision-making 
assembly. Indeed, while it would be possible for individuals to attempt to persuade others to 
support their selfish preferences, there will be no immediate gains for individuals who do so: 
decision-making powers are reserved for representatives who are constrained by the common 
good. Attempting to derive benefits from the political process through manipulating others 
deliberatively will therefore take a considerable amount of time and will most probably be 
unsuccessful. This is because doing so will require that manipulators convince others to support 
their aims; and then attempt to convince them to elect representatives to pursue these aims; in a 
way which will not be contested by other constitutional actors within the political system; and in 
a way which does not transgress society’s regulatory norms. It therefore seems unlikely that 
individuals could successfully pursue selfish preferences through the deliberative assembly since 
Pettit’s account of the state, in which this assembly would be situated, disperses power across a 
range of actors and institutions, ensuring that the system remains subject to the influence and 
direction of its citizens. 
Although my suggestion of creating a digitised deliberative assembly has only been 
outlined in broad strokes, it does seem that an institution of this kind would be able to go a long 
way towards addressing the problem of adaptive preferences if adopted as a supplement to Pettit’s 
account of the state. It would also be able to support Pettit’s account of democratic legitimacy by 
making it easier to track changes in the common good, by empowering citizens to fully participate 
in their society and contest their government if it fails to act in accordance with the common good, 
and helps to secure citizens’ capacity to exercise eternal vigilance over their government and 
thereby safeguard their liberty. 
 
Undermining Democratic Legitimacy  
 
We can now see that Pettit’s account provides a robust theory of democratic legitimacy which 
ensures that citizens are able to exert influence and direction over governance, thereby guarding 
against imperium, and which, if supported by a deliberative institution such as the assembly 
outlined in the previous section, would also be able to go some way towards mitigating against 
the problem of adaptive preferences and thereby support the aim of securing social justice. 
Assuming that such an institutional system could be realised, and that republican social justice 
were secured within this system, we would seemingly have cause to proclaim that the citizens of 
such a state are free from domination. This would, however, be premature for two interlinked 
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reasons. Firstly, multinational corporations have the power to undermine republican social justice 
(as noted in the previous chapter) and democratic legitimacy. Secondly, other states and 
transnational actors have the power to undermine social justice and democratic legitimacy. It is 
therefore useful to end this chapter by briefly considering each of these problems. 
 The first way in which multinational corporations might undermine democratic 
legitimacy is through utilising their wealth and power to fund the campaigns of representatives 
who will help them to pursue their aims. Pettit is aware of this problem, what he calls the 
‘influential lobby problem’ and suggests that constitutional mechanisms, including independent 
watchdogs, will guard against any undue corporate influence. Nonetheless, we may have reason 
to be concerned that particularly powerful agents may be able to circumvent these mechanisms 
by also influencing the workings of watchdogs, judges, and the media. Indeed, owing to the 
resources and power that multinationals can utilise, it would be possible for them to obtain an 
inordinate amount of influence over many democratic and constitutional actors, undermining the 
requirement that citizens, and citizens alone, are able to influence and direct their government. In 
doing so, they would undermine democratic legitimacy, rendering governance arbitrary and 
dominating. 
 Even if multinationals did not engage in outright corruption by buying influence, their 
capacity to relocate their operations to other, more amenable, states enables them to exert an 
excessive degree of control over the workings of an otherwise democratically legitimate state. It 
would be perfectly plausible for a situation to arise in which virtuous representatives and other 
political actors are forced, in the interest of securing social justice, to grant the preferences of 
multinationals an undue level of consideration in the formulation of policies so that the 
corporations do not leave. Indeed, if a state were unduly dependent upon corporations for jobs or 
taxes, this may lead political actors to deregulate industry, to suspend or more heavily regulate 
union activities, or permit multinationals to pollute more intensely. The need to secure social 
justice and resource the basic liberties may, for example, require that governments provide social 
welfare or free healthcare in order to secure individuals against dependency, and may lead 
governments to grant exemptions or privileges to multinationals in order to secure an increased 
revenue to fund these measures. This, again, will undermine the requirement that citizens exert 
influence and direction over governance, since multinationals’ interests will actively mitigate 
government’s pursuit of the common good, and would lead to domination. 
 Indeed, multinationals’ capacity to undermine democratic legitimacy consists of two 
distinct powers: the threat to leave; and actually leaving. Governments who are financially 
dependent upon multinationals, or countries in which significant numbers of citizens are 
employed by multinationals, will be acutely aware of a need to placate these agents and will seek 
to please them of their own volition. As noted above, this may involve pursuing policies which 
directly advantage multinationals, or it may involve including them in some way in the decision-
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making process. This will undermine democratic legitimacy because governments will be forced 
to pursue corporations’ good in order to secure their citizens’ good. If governments do refuse to 
kowtow or bow to multinationals, the implicit threat to leave may become a reality. In such a 
case, the jobs, resources, and prosperity secured by the corporations’ presence will be lost and 
governments will be less able to secure individuals’ basic liberties because there are fewer jobs 
and public funds available. The problem, then, is that we find that states may become dependent 
upon multinationals in a way which mirrors Nora’s dependence upon her husband, with 
multinationals exercising invigilation and intimidation over governments. Should governments 
attempt to increase corporation taxes, regulate industry, or increase worker protections, 
multinationals can simply announce their intention to leave. This will have the effect of correcting 
dependent governments’ actions, thereby evidencing that whatever policies are pursued by 
governments are done only with the permission of these corporations. If governments are aware 
of this relationship, and they most likely will be, it is probable that they will be intimidated into 
not even attempting to pursue such policies, leading them to act as though subject to a threat. In 
either case, multinationals will successfully dominate states, undermining both the people’s 
freedom (when conceptualised as a corporate agent), and individuals’ freedom (since they will no 
longer be influencing and directing their government).  
 While we will consider Pettit’s account of international politics and sovereignty in more 
detail in the next chapter, it is useful to briefly note, here, that absent an international system of 
regulation, it is also possible for nations to undermine the democratic legitimacy of other nations, 
and similarly undermine their capacity to secure social justice. The most obvious way in which 
nations may dominate one another is through invasion and colonialism. In this case, the 
democratically legitimate government of a state is supplanted by another, and the new government 
is unlikely to be one which is constrained to further the common good of citizens. Examples of 
this would include the various puppet governments set up by the Soviet Union, which governed 
other nations through local communist parties. As noted in the first chapter, the republican 
concern with Britain’s colonial governance was that the colonists were entirely dependent upon 
the goodwill of the British Parliament which was not subject to the laws that it passed. In addition 
to these more obvious forms of international domination, there is the possibility of powerful states 
imposing economic or other sanctions on legitimate governments (undermining their capacity to 
secure the basic liberties for their citizens), enforcing coercive trading agreements, luring away 
talented individuals or those with skills required in weaker states (the brain drain effect), and 
undertaking action to destabilise legitimate governments. 
 Importantly, in addition to actually intervening in the governance of other states in these 
ways, it is possible for invasion, sanctions, coercive agreements, and destabilising action to be 
threatened or implied. Indeed, many smaller or weaker states may act as their oppressors want 
without any need for action or a threat: in the same way that Nora acts cum-permissu, weaker 
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states may find that their decisions are subject to invigilation and intimidation by their more 
powerful neighbours. In this way, democratically legitimate states may be unable to secure the 
basic liberties for their citizens, thereby failing to secure social justice, and be forced to act 
contrary to their citizens’ will, thereby failing to secure democratic legitimacy.270 
 Although brief, these comments highlight a significant concern for neo-republicanism: it 
is impossible for states to secure freedom for their citizens without an overarching framework 
designed to protect states and their citizens from other external dominators. Indeed, because other 
nations and international actors are able to undermine democratic legitimacy, forcing 
governments to act contrary to the will of their citizens, we must surely conclude that the tough-
luck test will remain unsatisfied. Citizens cannot accept, as a matter of tough luck, that their 
society is heavily polluted if a corporation has been granted special exemptions by a corrupt 
government. Citizens cannot regard it as tough luck that their government pursues a policy of 
deregulation if the government must do so for fear that huge corporations will move elsewhere. 
Citizens of weaker, developing nations, which invest their resources in training key workers, 
cannot regard it as a matter of mere tough luck that their doctors and nurses are lured to wealthier 
countries which are able to drain them of the resources that they need. What each of these 
examples shows is that no state can secure non-domination for its citizens if its capacity to protect 
and promote the basic liberties and ensure that citizens enjoy influence and direction over 
governance is dependent upon the forbearance or goodwill of transnational, international, and 
multinational agents. Of equal importance, and as we will see in the next chapter, it may be 
possible for transnational agents to control individuals within just states without necessarily 
controlling the state itself. These issues, which we can broadly call instances of transnational 
domination, are the focus of the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
My aim in this chapter has been to outline Pettit’s account of democratic legitimacy in detail in 
order to show that it is possible to secure political control without giving rise to imperium, while 
also arguing that Pettit’s account requires a minor amendment to address the problem of adaptive 
preferences. Centrally, I have indicated that individuals may not be free from domination even if 
their government secures social justice and is subject to their influence and direction. This is 
because external agents, including multinational corporations and other states, have the capacity 
to exert arbitrary control over democratically legitimate governments, and suggests that individual 
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freedom can only be secured in an overarching political system which acts as an appropriate 
constraint on all agents.  
 To that end, the first section outlined Pettit’s account of democratic legitimacy, in which 
legitimacy is secured when citizens’ exercise influence and direction over governance, and Pettit’s 
argument that citizens’ influence over government is secured through an electoral democracy 
supplemented by constitutional and quasi-constitutional mechanisms. I then outlined Pettit’s 
accounts of the cooperatively-admissible considerations and norm of norms as mechanisms for 
deriving the common good which would act as a constraint on government action and secure an 
equally acceptable direction on governance. The first section ended with a brief discussion of the 
‘tough luck’ test which acts as a yardstick for measuring the extent to which a government is 
democratically legitimate.  
 The second section then outlined two counterarguments to Pettit’s account of democratic 
legitimacy. The first, advanced by Bellamy against Pettit’s earlier work, argues that constitutional 
and quasi-constitutional mechanisms, particularly a bill of rights and the process of judicial 
review, are incompatible with securing individual non-domination. I responded to Bellamy’s 
concerns by outlining three problems that Pettit argues should lead us to combine democracy with 
constitutionalism. These are the sticky minority, party interest, and influential lobby problems, 
and show that democracy on its own cannot secure non-domination. I then outlined Thompson’s 
claim that it would be inappropriate to track citizens’ interests through democratic processes 
because individuals are subject to manipulation and adaptive preferences and tracking these 
warped interests will simply entrench domination. I responded to this objection by arguing that it 
is unlikely that all individuals are subject to manipulation, and that Thompson’s preferred solution 
to the problem of domination is wholly paternalistic and perfectionist and, as argued in the first 
chapter, therefore dominating.  
 The third section then turned to a more foundational issue for an account of democratic 
legitimacy, and that is exactly how we should determine the common good which exerts direction 
over a legitimate government. After outlining and critiquing Thompson’s objective account of the 
common good, I argued that Bellamy’s aggregative approach should be understood to be a version 
of social choice theory. As such, it is subject to a series of objections which Elster outlines, 
primarily that if expressed preferences are tracked as components of the common good, we may 
simply be responding to preferences that individuals think they have, or that they think are 
realisable, or those which they falsely express. This is problematic for two reasons: it will fail to 
address the problem of adaptive preferences, and will instead grant them a privileged role in 
determining how citizens are controlled; and it will fail to secure an equally acceptable direction 
on governance because the common good may be comprised by a set of norms that no-one actually 
prefers. 
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  The fourth section examined Elster’s suggestion that we determine the common good 
deliberatively and then analysed Pettit’s account of the common good which aims to derive a set 
of regulatory norms (which cohere with the norm of norms) from dispersed deliberative 
interactions between citizens at a range of political and civil sites. After outlining Pettit’s 
deliberative ideal, I then argued that his account of the common good is able to surmount each of 
Elster’s concerns, while also arguing that it requires amendment to address the problem of 
adaptive preferences.  
The fifth section argued that Pettit’s account of the state and democratic legitimacy should 
be supplemented by a formal institution tasked with enabling citizens to transform their raw 
preferences into informed preferences. As a suggestion for how we might design such an 
institution, I outlined a digital deliberative assembly, as well as discussing how it would support 
Pettit’s theory and mitigate against the problem of adaptive preferences.  
The final section briefly outlined that even if a society secured the basic liberties and met 
the requirements for democratic legitimacy, it would be premature to believe that its citizens are 
free from domination. This is because a state’s capacity to secure the basic liberties and enjoy 
democratic legitimacy is dependent upon the ongoing goodwill of external agents such as 
multinational corporations, other nations, and supranational institutions. I have concluded that no 
society will enjoy non-domination if its capacity to protect and promote the basic liberties and 
ensure that citizens enjoy influence and direction over governance is dependent upon the 
forbearance or goodwill of transnational, international, and multinational agents, and indicated 
that individuals may also be subject to control by transnational agents which bypasses the state.  
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Chapter Three – The Problem of Transnational Domination 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Two argued that while it is possible for states to secure social and political justice, as 
well as address the problem of adaptive preferences, citizens may still nonetheless be subject to 
domination. This is because internally just states may be subject to arbitrary control from external 
agents such as other states, international institutions, and private transnational agents such as 
multinational corporations. While Pettit is correct to identify this problem, there is an additional 
way in which transnational domination might occur. This is that transnational agents may exert 
control which affects spatially dispersed individuals who reside in socially and politically just 
states without dominating these states themselves, giving rise to the problem of ‘individualised’ 
transnational domination.  
My aims in this chapter are threefold. Firstly, I aim to show that there are two distinct 
forms of transnational domination which neo-republicanism ought to be concerned with. The first 
is the form of domination which Pettit identifies, wherein transnational agents interfere or threaten 
to interfere with states. The second form, ‘individualised’ transnational domination, occurs when 
transnational control bypasses the state and interferes in the lives of individuals. Secondly, I aim 
to show that Pettit and James Bohman’s theories of transnational governance are unable to address 
both forms of transnational domination and suffer from a number of other problems. Finally, I 
aim to show that securing global non-domination requires that we acknowledge both of the ways 
in which transnational domination might occur, and that we develop a transnational political 
system which would prevent transnational agents from dominating one another, while also 
responding to the ways in which control is exerted across borders. This chapter is therefore central 
to the aim of developing an account of neo-republican freedom as it will outline the central issues 
which we will need to consider in developing an alternative account of global non-domination in 
the next chapter. 
To that end, this chapter will proceed as follows. The first section will outline Pettit’s 
conception of transnational domination, which sees transnational domination as a problem in 
which states are subject to interference (or the threat of interference) by other transnational agents. 
It will then discuss the problem of individualised transnational domination and the possibility of 
control bypassing the state and interfering in the lives of individuals. The second and third 
sections will then outline and critique Pettit’s accounts of transnational non-domination as 
presented in A Republican Law of People’s and Just Freedom respectively, arguing that both 
accounts are subject to critiques that Pettit himself has offered in his previous work. The fourth 
section will then consider Bohman’s Democracy across Borders in detail, arguing that while his 
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suggestions may address individualised transnational domination, they will fail to protect states’ 
capacity to secure social and political justice. The fifth section will then draw together the insights 
of the preceding discussion in order to argue that addressing the problem of transnational 
domination should lead us to pursue a strategy of constitutional provision at a global level, as 
endorsed in Pettit’s earlier work. This would entail the creation of a multi-level system of 
governance in which states’ abilities to secure social and political justice are protected from 
external interference, and would require a transference of powers from the states to transnational 
and sub-state levels of decision-making so that we can develop a means for ensuring that control 
which differentially affects spatially-dispersed individuals can be rendered non-dominating. The 
final section will conclude.   
 
The Two Faces of Transnational Domination 
 
We have seen in the previous chapters that even if a state secures social justice and democratic 
legitimacy, the citizens of that community may still be unfree because external agents can 
dominate them. Indeed, Pettit concisely outlines that, ‘If such a state were dominated by an 
outside agency, then its citizens would also be dominated by that agency, since any restrictions at 
the level of the state would inevitably involve restrictions on their democratic lives. And so we 
see that the ideal of the free person or citizen requires that the state that protects people against 
private domination ought to be, not only internally undominating, but externally undominated as 
well.271    
 Such external agents, Pettit argues, will include other states, non-domestic, private 
associations with power and resources comparable to states (including multinational corporations, 
churches, terrorist organisations, and powerful individuals), and non-domestic, public bodies 
created through international agreements (including the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation).272 Before we consider Pettit’s evolving account of how we might secure states 
against external domination, it is useful to outline exactly how each of these external agents can 
exert domination over states and their citizens. 
 Starting with inter-state domination, Pettit argues that there are a variety of ways in which 
states may exert arbitrary control over other weaker nations. They might, for example, undertake 
the following activities: engage in military intervention; infiltrate a society with secret agents; 
bribe or blackmail officials; exert economic pressure (perhaps through dumping goods on the 
world market to undercut another nation’s competitiveness, selling another nation’s currency and 
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thereby deprecating it, or freezing other nations’ holdings in banks); exploit other nations’ 
dependence on resources such as water or energy in order to extract concessions; or through 
utilising democratic pressure to create bad publicity, triggering problems with allies and trading 
partners, and working to undermine nations’ influence in transnational decision-making. 
Importantly, and as noted in the previous chapter, states may not actually need to resort to these 
measures in order to be dominating. It would be possible for states to invigilate the actions of 
weaker communities, standing ready to intervene in any of these ways should the weaker state act 
in any way which stronger states do not approve of. Even more problematic is the fact that weaker 
states may be aware of this relationship of dependency and will act accordingly: in being subject 
to invigilation and intimidation in this way, they will act as the stronger states prefer of their own 
volition. Pettit concludes that, ‘This is the most powerful form of alien control, requiring nothing 
of A and allowing B to pretend to its independence, as it may wish to do for a variety of 
reasons.’273 This will ensure that the dominating state gets its own way without having to stoop 
to actual interference and permitting it to avoid condemnation. 
 Pettit goes on to argue that multinational corporations and other non-domestic private 
associations can primarily utilise their non-domiciled status and resources to exercise arbitrary 
control. They can do this, as noted in the previous chapters, through establishing themselves as 
sources of employment or as a significant tax contributor, and then moving offshore. This can 
have the effect of causing serious economic problems for states, and can create problems for local 
communities who are heavily dependent upon these sources of employment. In addition, they 
may be able to utilise their immense resources to fund political campaigns of supportive 
representatives or fund opposition candidates if representatives are uncooperative. Similarly, they 
can use their resources and political power to lobby governments for special exemptions or 
privileges (this might include, for example, securing favourable tax rates, an easing of 
environmental regulations, or securing a church’s charitable status), finance negative publicity 
campaigns, and challenge legislation in courts, using their immense resources to tie up the 
enactment of legislation for years. As with states, it is possible for multinational corporations and 
other private associations to exercise their power without direct interference. They would be able 
to invigilate government decisions, standing ready to intervene should governments pursue 
unwanted policies, and intimidate governments into pursuing their ends without actively 
interfering if governments are aware of their dependence upon these organisations for jobs, taxes, 
or political support. Indeed, ‘The powerful corporation may never need to make a threat of moving 
elsewhere or of financing an opposition or of supporting negative publicity in order to control the 
government of a representative state. It will already enjoy control just insofar as the state is 
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disposed to go along with its wishes, say because of wanting to court the corporation’s 
goodwill.’274 
 Finally, it is also possible for states and their citizens to be dominated by international 
organisations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Such institutions can 
do so in the following ways: denying specific states benefits that they make available to 
comparable states, undermining that state’s capacity to compete on equal terms with others; deny 
states credit; increase interest rates on loans; denying them access to sources of funding; or 
downgrading a state’s credit rating. As with the other agents, it is possible for international bodies 
to exercise domination without actually engaging in intervention. Indeed, rather than denying 
states credit, such institutions can make clear that states will need to make certain changes or 
concessions in order to access funds, leading states to pursue the aims of international bodies 
without these institutions having to directly interfere. This has the advantage of concealing the 
control being exercised, and thereby enables international institutions to avoid outright 
challenge.275 Importantly, such institutions might also be controlled by powerful states or 
individuals, enabling these agents to control other states without this control being evident to the 
subjects of domination. 
We can see, then, that Pettit is primarily concerned with the ways in which states might 
be subject to domination by other transnational agents. Nonetheless, I think it is important to 
enlarge our focus and look at the ways in which control can bypass the state and interfere with 
individuals. For example, if a state were to decide to close its borders against all Muslims, this 
policy would not directly coerce a specific state but would control many spatially dispersed 
individuals. Similarly, if a multinational corporation decided to flood the world’s markets with a 
specific good (which, for the purposes of this example, we can assume is not an integral 
component of any state’s economic policies), then this decision will again interfere with many 
individuals whose livelihoods depend on selling this good, and yet the multinational corporation 
will not be interfering with any specific state. That is, in flooding the market and ruining their 
competitors, the corporation will have interfered with other individuals’ lives and yet the state 
may remain unaffected by this action: indeed, if the multinational pays the appropriate amount of 
tax, the state may actually benefit overall from this action. It seems that in both of these examples, 
it is possible for transnational agents to interfere in individuals’ lives without interfering with a 
state. 
What these examples show is that interference does not occur solely between 
transnational agents (i.e. between states, international organisations, transnational private 
institutions, and multinational corporations) but can be exercised by a transnational agent over 
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spatially dispersed individuals. That is, control can cut across national borders, exerting a 
significant degree of coercion over individuals in states which might enjoy external protections 
against domination. This form of domination, what we might call individualised transnational 
domination, is therefore distinct from the form of transnational domination identified by Pettit 
because control is exercised over individuals rather than states. 
Indeed, this problem has been explored at length by James Bohman, who argues that, 
‘increased global interconnectedness [has] differential impacts that increase the potential for 
domination and impose a scheme of cooperation on those affected by increasingly indeﬁnite social 
activity.’276 These social activities are indefinite in that they affect an indeterminate number of 
spatially and temporally dispersed groups, who we can identify but not individuate. For example, 
he argues that the actions of huge corporations and institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) or International Monetary Fund (IMF) which regulate global markets, exert 
a great deal of influence over the choices of many individuals across the globe. We cannot easily 
specify which individuals are affected, or the specific ways that their life-choices are constrained 
or impacted upon, but we know that this process happens.277 This leads Bohman to argue that: 
 
If social actions are indeﬁnite in this way, then we cannot choose those with whom we 
must cooperate, and in the absence of such a choice the existing scheme of cooperation 
must be open for negotiation and deliberation. Interdependence via indeﬁnite activity thus 
establishes the scope of political obligation, precisely because the circumstance of global 
politics emerges through nonvoluntary inclusion in indeﬁnite cooperative schemes. 
Inclusion in such schemes is a form of domination.278 
 
 An additional problem, Bohman argues, is that states’ attempts to respond to 
globalisation, through the creation of transnational institutions and authorities, has resulted in 
authority becoming deterritorialised and denationalised.279 Problematically, ‘While delegated 
authority need not be tyrannical or coercive, it easily becomes a form of domination when it fails 
to offer opportunities for ex ante inﬂuence and post hoc accountability.’280 There is a concern that 
with the delegation of authority to supra-national institutions, such as the WTO or European 
Union, that individuals, ‘are now included in various schemes without being individuated, [and] 
globalization has certainly broadened the scope of potentially arbitrary authority… It has also 
been destructive for many political communities and thus undermined the capacity of those who 
are nonvoluntarily included in such plans to contest the authority that others exercise at a 
distance.’281 
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 Bohman claims that, ‘to have robust nondomination is to have a particular kind of 
normative status, a status allowing one to create and regulate obligations with others. This is the 
status of being a citizen.’282 Securing such a status is necessary in an increasing globalised world 
in which there has been an, ‘emergence of incompletely defined forms of international political 
authority that are no longer contained within a political community,’283 giving rise to the new 
circumstances of politics. These new circumstances are that global activities now affect an 
indefinite number of individuals, who we cannot individuate but can specify, and who find 
themselves involuntarily co-opted into schemes which they have no control over. As an example, 
Bohman notes that, ‘The actions of a large multinational corporation or of institutions that regulate 
financial markets influence the life possibilities of indefinite others – as when, for example, 
decisions in China affect workers in many, but not all, locations.’284 
 As a result of this extension of control across borders, Bohman claims that the old 
republican claim that to be free is to be a citizen of a free state is no longer sufficient. That is, 
being a citizen of a state which is internally just and which enjoys protections against external 
interference is insufficient for securing non-domination because transnational institutions and 
corporations have the capacity to control individuals within free states, suggesting a need to 
rethink how we conceptualise the concepts of membership and citizenship in order to respond to 
the problem of transnational domination.285 In addition, because control is dispersed and impacts 
upon different people in different ways, the ideal of a self-legislating demos, in which citizens 
engage in self-rule (as in Pettit’s democratically legitimate state), is becoming increasingly 
redundant as it relies on a clearly delineated political community, ‘consisting of all those and only 
those who are full citizens.’286 While such communities are failing to secure their citizens’ non-
domination, they can also come to occupy the role of dominators by controlling other agents and 
denying them influence and direction over the ways in which they’re controlled.287 
 It is important to be clear, here, that the various transnational agents capable of interfering 
with states which Pettit discusses are also capable of exerting individualised transnational 
domination. For example, a state which unilaterally closes its borders to another state as a 
punishment for not doing what it wants will be exerting transnational domination but if the same 
state decides instead to close its borders to a specific group of spatially dispersed individuals it 
will be exerting individualised transnational domination. The distinction, here, is between the 
United States refusing to allow the citizens of specified countries to enter its borders, exerting 
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control over these peoples, and the United States implementing a blanket ban on Muslims entering 
the country. In the latter case, Muslims are a dispersed group of individuals whose co-nationals 
might not be subject to similar control: a British Muslim would be denied entry whereas another 
British citizen would not be.  
Importantly, we find a similar distinction between the kinds of control which might be 
exerted by private transnational corporations and international organisations. Indeed, if a 
multinational corporation extracts favourable terms from a state for not moving elsewhere, it will 
be dominating that people. But it may also be able to dominate individuals rather than a people 
by, for example, undercutting competitors and using its immense resources to sell services and 
goods at a loss in order to ruin other corporations and individuals’ livelihoods. These actions will 
interfere with the lives of individuals without necessarily impacting upon the people or state. 
Alternatively, imagine that a multinational is operating in a deprived area in a given state, 
providing local inhabitants with numerous jobs and providing the state with the taxes that it needs 
to pursue social justice. We can further imagine that the underpaid local citizens decide to 
unionise in order to improve their bargaining power with the corporation. The corporation, 
however, does not want to concede anything to the workers and so moves to another deprived 
area within the state. In this case, the corporation deprives specific citizens of employment but 
does not dominate the state since it remains within the state’s borders, paying the same taxes. In 
this case, the multinational is surely not dominating the people or state but it is dominating 
individuals within that state.     
Finally, it is also possible to imagine a situation in which an international organisation 
might dominate individuals rather than peoples or states. For example, suppose that an 
organisation such as the EU were to begin to legislate against the rights of the Roma or the Jewish 
diaspora living within EU Member States. In this case, the legislation would not control a specific 
state but would instead impact upon the lives of spatially dispersed individuals living within 
states.  
There are, then, two forms of transnational domination with which neo-republicanism 
ought to be concerned. The first form of transnational domination, identified by Pettit, occurs 
when control is exercised over states by other states, transnational institutions, and private 
transnational associations (including churches and multinational corporations). Individualised 
transnational domination, however, is concerned with the ways in which control can bypass the 
state and be exerted over individuals. With these comments in mind, we can now turn to an 
examination of Pettit and Bohman’s suggestions for securing global non-domination. Since Pettit 
addresses these issues at length in A Republican Law of Peoples and Just Freedom,288 my focus 
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will be on outlining and analysing these accounts of international justice, showing that they are 
unable to secure non-domination and are inadequate according to Pettit’s own arguments in 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. 
 
Global Reciprocal Power 
 
In A Republican Law of Peoples Pettit defends a global version of the strategy of reciprocal power, 
a strategy which we saw in the first chapter is rejected by Pettit at the domestic level. Indeed, after 
outlining that it would be foolish to allow a single state to assume the role of a world police force 
(since this state would become an unconstrained source of domination), he goes on to argue 
against the creation of an international regime, modelled upon the domestic state, charged with 
constraining states and other international agents. He does so because he believes that a world 
state, (even if subject to the usual republican mechanisms of electoral representation, a separation 
of powers, the rule of law, and subjection to sanction by constitutional and quasi-constitutional 
agents), would be inefficacious. This is because he argues that a world state would lack the 
requisite resources for policing the entire globe, and it would be utopian to expect more powerful 
states to agree to a power-sharing arrangement with weaker states in which each has an equal say 
in the governance of the world. He goes on to argue that while a regional body such as the E.U. 
might be able to achieve a high degree of discipline over its member states (although this is less 
pronounced with stronger members), it is unlikely to occur on a global scale. Indeed, as an 
example he notes that in 1986 the International Court of Justice ruled that the United States had 
broken international agreements in supporting guerrilla warfare in Nicaragua and mining in 
Nicaraguan ports. The United States responded by rejecting the idea that the Court had jurisdiction 
in this case and withdrew temporarily from the jurisdiction of the Court.289 This example, Pettit 
argues, shows that attempts to create an overarching system of governance to constrain states and 
other international agents would ultimately fail because powerful states would simply refuse to 
be bound by its rulings. 
 Pettit goes on to argue that while international bodies would therefore be ineffective in 
policing the world, they could be instrumental in the emergence of a set of international 
cooperatively admissible considerations: that is, they could facilitate the emergence of a set of 
norms which all agents recognise as valid considerations, and lead to the emergence of something 
like a global common good which mirrors the domestic common good. This would be conducive 
to securing global non-domination, Pettit argues, because a system of international regulatory 
norms would exert some constraint on the actions of states who would be concerned with avoiding 
ostracism and ignominy for failing to adhere to globally accepted norms. Importantly, this will 
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not preclude all forms of domination, such as the exertion of economic or diplomatic power, and 
Pettit suggests that it may be necessary for weaker states to combine into groups which would 
allow their collective power to weigh against the power of stronger states. These blocs would 
provide a check on powerful states, and would force states to engage in deliberation (in 
accordance with globally accepted norms) to resolve their problems. Pettit concludes that, ‘Each 
aspect of the package recommended involves multilateral action: on the one side, the ‘totilateral’ 
organization of all states behind international agencies and, on the other, the ‘plurilateral’ 
organization of different subgroups of states into blocs that can effectively compete with their 
stronger rivals.’290 Finally, Pettit also argues that if states fail to be representative or secure non-
domination, there may be a need for multilateral intervention because, ‘representative states will 
have commitments that give them normative reason for a concern with rectifying the problems of 
those who live under ineffective and non-representative states.’291 This intervention might entail, 
‘ineffective and non-representative regimes being replaced by states that are representative in the 
requisite sense,’292 because such states: 
 
May provide a home ground for terrorist organizations that threaten the best-ordered 
states; they may contribute massively to problems of world health, incubating diseases 
that threaten global epidemics; they may be sources of environmental damage, even 
global climate change, due to projects of deforestation or the lack of pollution controls; 
they may become the main providers of dangerous drugs, to be exported illegally to first-
world markets; and they may generate waves of illegal immigration into richer countries, 
threatening the political cultures of those regimes.293 
 
While the suggestions in A Republican Law of Peoples seem to offer an initially plausible 
account of transnational non-domination, it is important to note that they run counter to arguments 
that Pettit himself has made in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Indeed, if 
we adopt the proposed measures then we will be committed to something like the strategy of 
reciprocal power, a strategy for securing non-domination which we discarded in the first chapter. 
This is because, as we’ve seen above, Pettit argues that it will be necessary for weaker states to 
organise into blocs which would be able to check stronger states’ capacity to exert domination 
over them (in addition to developing a set of global cooperatively-admissible considerations). We 
can see that this directly mirrors the strategy of reciprocal power because, ‘each achieves non-
domination through having resources sufficient to ensure that every act of interference by another 
can be effectively resisted:’294 combining into blocs is a means for resisting the depredations of 
powerful states.  
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 There are, however, two significant problems with this approach, both of which Pettit has 
outlined. The first is that following this strategy will create something like a global arms race. 
Indeed, we can imagine a situation in which one state enjoys a degree of dominance over other 
states, and smaller states respond by combining into a bloc with the aim of securing a balance of 
power (assuming that these states are reasonably altruistic and only want to check others’ power). 
The powerful state will then find itself opposed by an alliance of states: in such a situation this 
state would rightly fear that it may become subject to the alliance’s power since it is dependent 
upon the alliance only seeking to maintain the balance of power rather than exerting arbitrary 
control. Since the powerful state cannot enjoy non-domination as long as it is dependent upon the 
alliance’s forbearance and goodwill in only aiming to secure a balance of power, it would be 
rational for the powerful state to seek to secure itself against others through creating its own 
alliances or through developing its technological or military capacities. We can further imagine 
that each state would act similarly: since all are concerned about others’ capacity to dominate 
them, each would seek to secure itself through alliances or increasing its power. Problematically, 
‘if everyone seeks to protect themselves against interference from others…then the result is bound 
to be a war of all against all.’295 This is because, ‘Each will naturally prefer a strategy of self-
protection, including pre-emptive self-protection, to a strategy of involving unilateral 
disarmament…People will dig themselves into a hole; they will individually act in a way that is 
collectively self-defeating.’296 
 Something like this imagined situation occurred before the outbreak of World War I. Late 
in the 19th century the new German state bound itself to Austria-Hungary and Italy in order to 
counter-balance the power of the Tsars, with France later allying with Russia to combat the threat 
of German dominance in central Europe. Britain, finding itself isolated, signed an agreement with 
France, and later with Russia. Thus emerged two blocs, the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 
the members of which sought to protect themselves against the power of others by coalescing into 
blocs. Sadly this did not have the effect of containing powerful agents and instead precipitated a 
war because combining into blocs to combat the power of others simply resulted in the 
encirclement of Germany and heightened tensions. Indeed, had war not broken out in 1914 over 
the assassination of the Austrian Heir, the strategy may have proceeded to its logical conclusion 
with more states being drawn into the conflict to bolster the strength of whichever side was 
momentarily weaker. It would be bizarre to conclude that states acting in this manner enjoyed 
anything approaching non-domination: instead, and as noted by Pettit in the context of a domestic 
state, a political system in which agents sought to maintain a balance of power would give rise to 
a war of all against all and no one would enjoy non-domination or security.297 
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 Even supposing that this first issue could be surmounted through the creation and 
maintenance of a global balance of power, the second problem that we face is that, ‘While people 
might enjoy non-domination under such a scenario – assuming that no one person or group 
becomes dominant – the range and ease of undominated choice would be savagely reduced.’298 
Indeed, Pettit notes that, ‘When war becomes a sustained prospect, and when states defend 
themselves against one another by threat and counter-threat, then the cause of non-domination is 
compromised.’299 The reason for this is that, ‘the logic of threat and counter-threat means that the 
different sides have to spend more and more on military defence, that the citizens of the countries 
in question have to bear those costs, and that the extent of undominated choice that they can then 
enjoy is severely reduced.’300 The problem that we can see here is that securing a global balance 
of power may require that states restrict the resourcing and protection of the basic liberties, 
undermining their capacity to secure social justice, and force them to act in unconstitutional or 
undemocratic ways, undermining political justice. Indeed, combining into blocs, or ensuring that 
a state remains as powerful as others, may require states to take an active role in, for example, 
increasing their military capacity, increasing technological innovation, or restricting citizens’ 
capacity to criticise the government’s actions. In an international system in which each state 
attempts to secure their own non-domination through checking others’ attempts to dominate them, 
we will surely find that citizens will be forced to make concessions: they may have to pay 
increased taxes or be forced into national service in order to ensure that their state can compete 
economically or militarily with others in the international arena. In any of these or similar ways, 
we will find that states will fail in their primary role of securing social and political justice in 
order to secure the external non-domination of their peoples.  
 There is likely, then, to be a trade-off between securing internal and external non-
domination in this system of governance: if each state is to combat external threats by securing 
themselves against others’ power, and thereby avoid dependence upon other states’ goodwill and 
forbearance, they will have to restrict their citizens’ liberty. Indeed, in such a system all states 
would be continually seeking to bolster their position relative to other states so as to secure 
themselves against domination, and each would be forced into endless vigilance. Such a system 
could not be maintained by states which remain subject to their citizens’ influence and direction 
(since they would likely revolt against living on a permanent war-footing), and states would be 
unable to resource and protect the basic liberties for all of their citizens (since, for example, taxes 
would need to be used for external defence and alliance-making, popular dissent would have to 
be quelled, freedom of speech and association may need to be curtailed, and citizens may be 
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directed towards certain forms of employment or into conscription). The strategy that Pettit 
outlines in A Republican Law of Peoples is therefore unlikely to secure global non-domination.  
 
Self-Regulating Multilateral Governance  
 
Pettit’s most recent account of global governance, outlined in Just Freedom, seemingly avoids 
the problems associated with the strategy of reciprocal power since it proposes a more fully 
entrenched international framework for securing global non-domination. Indeed, on this 
approach, states would be required to agree to a series of multilateral arrangements which would 
create a global framework in which each state can exercise their sovereign liberties. International 
institutions would be created and would act as forums in which states could come together to 
discuss issues (in accordance with the norm of norms), and would regulate the activities of states 
(through, for example, setting limits on pollution and providing medical support). Such 
institutions would be populated by states’ representatives and would be subject to oversight by 
NGOs. States would also freely agree to a set of regulatory laws which would tackle the problem 
of multinationals and would be permitted to intervene in failing or oppressive states if other states 
agree to multilateral action. While this system of governance avoids requiring states to combine 
into blocs to secure a balance of power, we will see below that it nonetheless fails to secure non-
domination for reasons that Pettit himself has outlined in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom 
and Government. That is, it relies on states themselves forbearing from exerting domination over 
one another and, as we saw in the first chapter, such forbearance can, at best, secure non-
interference but will not secure non-domination since the option to interfere remains within 
transnational agents’ choice-sets. 
In Just Freedom Pettit claims that states must be internally undominating (through 
securing social justice and democratic legitimacy), and they must be externally undominated. 
Indeed, ‘If such a state were dominated by an outside agency, then its citizens would also be 
dominated by that agency, since any restrictions at the level of the state would inevitably involve 
restrictions on their democratic lives.’301 Pettit goes on to qualify this claim, noting that securing 
external non-domination for each state, as occurred with the Westphalian settlement, would be 
problematic because it would permit ineffective and oppressive states to fail to secure non-
domination within their borders, while enjoying non-domination without. As a result, he suggests 
that we look to the external non-domination of peoples and their representative states,302 since 
doing so would enable us to keep sight of the fact that peoples can be dominated by their 
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government’s lack of democratic legitimacy or failure to secure social justice, and can be 
dominated when multinationals, international institutions, and other states exert arbitrary control 
over them.303  
He goes on to argue that, ‘the ideal of republican liberty, transported to the international 
arena, can be seen as an ideal of externally undominated peoples; in that respect, it is akin to the 
ideal pursued by John Rawls (1999) under the title The Law of Peoples.’304 Following Rawls’ 
approach, Pettit’s discussion of international justice is split into two parts. He firstly considers 
what international justice would require if all states secured social and political justice, and then 
considers what international justice would require in the real world where many states fail in this 
regard.305 Indeed, Pettit acknowledges that many states may fail, to a lesser or greater degree, in 
either of their two roles but argues that, for the purposes of developing a theory of global 
sovereignty, it is useful to simply assume that all states are effective and representative in the first 
half of the analysis, and then acknowledge that some are not in the second part.306 He therefore 
seemingly follows Rawls in assuming that once a state is internally just, we need only look to 
securing such states against external coercion at the transnational level.307  
 He starts his analysis by reiterating that the existence of states should be taken for granted. 
Indeed, whereas Pettit had previously argued that there is nothing especially sacred about states 
and that they’re simply a product of historical chance,308 from the publication of On the People’s 
Terms onwards he argues that living in a state is a historical necessity on a par with living under 
the laws of physics, and that states have arisen because of the, ‘mutual adjustments of different 
populations.’309 Indeed, he now claims that states are locked into a state of ongoing necessity: 
should a state resign its obligations, it would create a vacuum in which other states would seek to 
extend their governance. As a result, he claims that citizens are not dominated by the requirement 
that they live in a specific state because states are a feature of the world, as immutable as the law 
of gravity.310 This claim is refined and developed in Just Freedom, wherein he argues that there 
is no point in considering the possibility of a stateless world because a coercive state is necessary 
for securing social justice.  
He then argues against the possibility of a world state because global pluralism would 
make it unlikely that we could develop processes for governing everyone in accordance with 
standards that each avows. Indeed, he argues that trust is in short supply and it is therefore unlikely 
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that we would be able to establish a democratic system, complemented by a range of constitutional 
and quasi-constitutional indicative representatives, ‘who could credibly claim to make decisions 
in line with shared standards.’311 Pettit therefore believes that we are unlikely to see a world state 
in the feasible or foreseeable future.312 He concludes that we therefore have no reason to prefer a 
stateless or one-state world, and proceeds on the assumption that there are many states and each 
of these states has special obligations towards its own citizens that it does not have towards 
citizens of other states (an obligation to secure social justice and democratic legitimacy). Pettit 
acknowledges that this view is in direct opposition to theories of cosmopolitan justice, according 
to which there are no important differences in the obligations that states have to their own citizens 
and to human beings more generally, but argues that his view does not entail that there are no 
obligations to non-citizens: instead, and as we will see below, these obligations are simply of a 
different kind.313 
 With these comments in mind, Pettit argues that securing the external non-domination of 
peoples would require, ‘a global framework in which each people is entrenched against 
domination from other states and from the various non-state actors – agencies, churches, 
corporations – that have international dimensions.’314 This, he argues, amounts to an ideal of 
globalised sovereignty, in which, ‘sovereignty [is] extended to every people on earth.’315 Pettit 
goes on to argue that just as protecting the basic liberties secures social justice, and ensuring 
democratic legitimacy secures political justice, securing global sovereignty will give us an 
account of international justice, and claims that, ‘As the free citizens of a just and democratic state 
will be each entrenched on a public basis in the enjoyment of certain basic liberties, so in this 
ideal the free peoples of the world would be each entrenched on a public, international basis in 
the enjoyment of a corresponding set of internationally recognised sovereign liberties.’316 
 In an analogous move to his development of a theory of social justice, in which the aim 
is to protect and resource individuals’ basic liberties, Pettit argues that the sovereignty ideal 
requires that a people should similarly be free from domination in the exercise of a range of 
specific choices.317 Aside from the requirement that states do not have any freedom of choice that 
would undermine citizens’ enjoyment of social justice, Pettit argues that states and peoples, 
‘should enjoy all and only those sovereign liberties that are consistent with the enjoyment of 
similar liberties on the part of other representative states and peoples.’318 The sovereign liberties 
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that each people would be deemed to have are those that are co-enjoyable and co-exercisable. 
This would include, for example, liberties of speech, expression, and association, and, with 
suitable rules in place, peoples would be permitted to exploit national and common resources, and 
organise trading arrangements. These sovereign liberties would need to be protected but, unlike 
with individuals, they will not require resourcing since states, ‘will generally have all the 
resources they need.’319 
Pettit goes on to argue that representative states would need to create a series of binding 
multilateral arrangements which would create a framework for securing global infrastructure, 
insurance, and insulation (mirroring the infrastructure, insurance, and insulation enjoyed by the 
citizens of domestic states). This global framework would enable cooperation in creating global 
public goods through international trade and research, and would enable the global community to 
combat global ills such as atmospheric pollution and climate change. Pettit also suggests that 
states, acting together, may be able to negotiate terms for the proper regulation of multinational 
corporations. Although he does not develop this idea, he seems to suggest that the problem of 
multinationals could be addressed if all states freely agreed in international forums to develop 
rules which would regulate, ‘what each country may and may not be able to do in such respects.’320 
The suggestion here, though not made explicit, seems to be that states might agree to not compete 
with one another to attract such organisations through lowering taxation or making other 
concessions, and thereby make it less lucrative for multinationals to move from uncooperative 
states. Indeed, Pettit concludes that, ‘States can hope to enjoy freedom and sovereignty in relation 
to other states and other international bodies only under an internationally agreed, and 
internationally institutionalised, set of rules and conventions.’321 This seems to suggest that while 
Pettit believes that multilateralism is the best means for securing global non-domination, he 
nonetheless acknowledges that it is actually the system of rules and conventions which emerge 
from multilateral decision-making which secure states against domination. 
 Pettit further argues that the norm of norms, outlined in detail in the previous chapter, 
must also operate at an international level. Indeed, since states have different populations and 
resources and unequal bargaining power, it is necessary that they all, ‘argue for any policies they 
support, any procedures they recommend, on the basis of considerations that can pass muster on 
all sides – considerations that all states, large and small, can acknowledge as relevant.’322 This is 
necessary as otherwise powerful states would be able to utilise their advantages to extract 
concessions from weaker or smaller states, and dictate terms to them in a dominating way. With 
that said, Pettit is clear that while international rules will be needed to regulate states’ interactions, 
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there must be flexibility within these rules to account for differences between states: this might 
permit larger states to emit more greenhouse gases or demand more attention from the World 
Health Organisation. Despite this need for flexibility, Pettit argues that it is important that states 
co-determine the laws and regulations which will govern them from a position of relative equality: 
to do otherwise would enable stronger states to dictate terms to smaller states.323 
Turning to the prospects of implementing and upholding such an ideal, Pettit claims that 
states, much like individuals, seek approval and want to avoid disapproval. As such, he believes 
that states will be pressured and policed into upholding this international order of their own 
volition because they may fear to lose esteem or international influence: that is, states will be 
ruled by a system of global norms of behaviour which will regulate their actions because they will 
want to avoid ignominy, ostracism, and a loss of prestige. Indeed, he goes on to argue that it will 
be in each state’s self-interest to uphold and conform to global norms of behaviour to avoid 
condemnation, and argues that free-riding will not be a problem since there are not that many 
states and free-riding can be readily identified and corrected. This process would also be 
facilitated by international agencies created by multilateral treaties such as the United Nations.324 
 Pettit then acknowledges that the creation of international, public agencies raises the 
further issue that such institutions, which are intended to support the entrenchment of the 
sovereign liberties, may become sources of domination. In response to this concern, Pettit argues 
that international agencies will not dominate peoples as long as they are contestable and 
controllable by the peoples subject to their dictates. Indeed, Pettit argues that, in direct parallel 
with the domestic process for securing non-domination, it would be necessary to give member 
states a vote in the governance of these institutions, and empower international non-governmental 
bodies and review forums to oversee, contest, and regulate the activities of such institutions. This, 
Pettit argues, would make international agencies accountable to the peoples of the world and non-
dominating.325  
 Turning to the issue of how non-domination might be secured in a world where some 
states are unable or disinclined to secure social justice or democratic legitimacy, Pettit argues that 
those who should address failing or oppressive states are other representative states who, ‘should 
establish an international order in which such problems of poverty and oppression are effectively 
addressed.’326 Indeed, his argument for such intervention seems to be that addressing failing states 
inability to secure non-domination would be beneficial to the citizens of representative states, 
since doing so will increase the opportunities for commerce, increase general prosperity, reduce 
the likelihood of terrorism, and address the spread of global diseases. Acknowledging that this 
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argument seems somewhat self-serving, he goes on to claim that the fact that citizens of 
representative states do demand that their governments respond to violence, famine, and natural 
disasters elsewhere suggests that humanitarian considerations are a component of states’ common 
good (supported by the norm of norms and other considerations) and states should therefore act 
as their peoples’ require.327  
 Assuming, then, that such intervention is justified, Pettit proceeds to outline a series of 
constraints which would govern intervention in failing or oppressive states. These are that no state 
may intervene elsewhere if doing so would undermine democracy at home, and that no state 
should intervene in a way which undermines the ideal of globalised sovereignty. This, Pettit 
argues, would likely only permit intervention in response to impoverishment and oppression, and 
only on the basis of multilateral action (so that the citizens of the intervening state do not feel that 
they’re engaged in one-sided philanthropy).328 Importantly, this also creates a right for individuals 
living in impoverished and oppressive states to claim assistance from other states to remedy their 
situation.329 Pettit goes on to argue that it would be necessary to ensure that addressing poverty 
does not create a relationship of dependency since this will likely degenerate into a relationship 
of domination wherein one state becomes entirely dependent upon another. In addition, Pettit 
argues that intervention in oppressive states must be justifiable, with the costs of intervening not 
outweighing the benefits. With that said, Pettit is optimistic about the prospects of addressing 
oppressive states without outright intervention. This is because such states will forgo the 
protections and support afforded to representative states (as well as the global standing that 
representative states will enjoy) and a combination of penalties and self-interest will compel states 
to act as required.330   
 Finally, just as he has developed the eyeball and tough luck tests for measuring the extent 
to which individuals are protected against private and political domination, Pettit has developed 
a ‘straight talk’ test for measuring the extent to which the ideal of global sovereignty is 
entrenched. This test requires that, ‘peoples - via suitably representative states - to relate to one 
another in a manner that parallels the way free citizens under a just regime would relate to one 
another.’331 Peoples and their representatives in government ought to be able to engage with others 
in the manner of equals, without resorting to subservience, and be able to negotiate in a straight-
talking, open manner. If states were able to engage with one another in this way, we could be 
assured that no state is dependent upon others and that no state is subject to domination by 
another.332 
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Nonetheless, we have good reasons to suppose that states may fail in this regard. Indeed, 
as noted in our analysis of A Republican Law of Peoples, Pettit cites the actions of the United 
States in 1986 as an example of powerful states refusing to follow the dictates of international 
agencies. As we’ve seen, this example shows that it is impossible for international agencies, which 
rely on states for the enforcement of their decisions, to enforce their rulings against powerful 
states if those states do not wish to comply. Indeed, we can see that the legitimacy and power of 
the international regime is only as effective as states allow it to be: if strong states refuse to respect 
the decisions handed down by the international agencies which they create, there is very little that 
can be done about it. Furthermore, if powerful states refuse to comply with or recognise the 
jurisdiction of international agencies, it seems unlikely that other states would be inclined to do 
so either. The fundamental issue, here, is that in the absence of an overarching authority 
empowered to enforce compliance, i.e. an authority more powerful than the strongest states, we 
face the reality of powerful states acting with impunity and undermining the legitimacy of the 
entire system. 
Importantly, while powerful states such as the United States might decline to be bound 
by transnational decisions, and be able to extricate themselves from inconvenient commitments 
(since other states and the agencies themselves will be too weak to enforce compliance, as in the 
case of the American withdrawal from the ICC’s jurisdiction), they are much more likely to force 
compliance upon weaker states. Indeed, had it been a smaller state which supported guerrilla 
warfare abroad, it seems likely that a coalition of powerful states, including the United States, 
would have sought to punish the offending state. This suggests that it may be in powerful states’ 
interests to set up a multilateral system of governance and then utilise such institutions and 
arrangements to constrain weaker states while evading their own responsibilities. This would 
render the international regime subservient to powerful states’ interests, and would result in 
weaker states being dominated by more powerful states via international institutions.333 
 Even assuming that powerful states might be induced to act in accordance with the 
requirements of the sovereignty ideal, it seems unlikely that weaker or poorer states would have 
good reasons to comply; indeed, there is good reason to believe that they would need to be coerced 
into agreeing to the regulations that Pettit outlines. On this point, it is important to recall that Pettit 
argues that it is necessary that states’ sovereign liberties are protected but not resourced since 
states, ‘will generally have all the resources they need,’334 and that states would develop a set of 
rules to regulate, ‘what each country may and may not be able to do,’335 with regard to 
multinational corporations. If it were the case that states enjoyed roughly comparable levels of 
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resources and were able to resource the basic liberties without competing for multinationals, we 
can imagine that states might agree to international regulations such as these. Nonetheless, the 
fact that some states do not enjoy access to sufficient resources and cannot secure the basic 
liberties for their citizens, suggests that it will be unlikely that states would (or indeed, should) 
agree to regulate their interactions in this way. Indeed, given the huge disparities in wealth and 
resources between states, it seems odd to conclude that poorer or weaker states would voluntarily 
agree to such regulations: to agree to forgo a potential source of employment and tax revenue 
from multinationals or to agree to environmental regulations which impede industrialisation, 
would be an irresponsible action if the state in question is unable to protect and resource its 
citizens’ basic liberties. These comments suggest that weaker states would either not agree to be 
constrained by the international system that Pettit outlines, since it would not be in their citizens’ 
interests to do so, and would have to be coerced into supporting and obeying the international 
regime, or they would agree to the constraints and seek to extricate themselves from obligations 
which actively undermine their capacity to secure the basic liberties for their citizens.336  
The overarching problem with Pettit’s proposals in Just Freedom, then, is that they rely 
on all states continuously acting virtuously in their dealings with other agents (when it may not 
be in the interests of powerful or weak states to do so), and this is a strategy which we rejected in 
the first chapter when looking at how individuals might be secured against domination. Indeed, I 
outlined in the first chapter that we cannot rely on Torvald’s goodwill to secure Nora’s freedom 
as, even if Torvald vowed to not interfere with her, the fact that he retains the capacity to renege 
on this vow means that Nora is always dependent upon her husband’s goodwill and is therefore 
dominated. This, we have seen, led Pettit to argue that, ‘My power of interference in your choice, 
and my domination over you, can only be contained by external checks that remove or replace 
the interference option or put it cognitively off the menu,’337 and led us to embrace the strategy 
of constitutional provision. 
 These comments are relevant for considering Pettit’s strategy in Just Freedom because, 
even if states do accept that it is wrong to interfere with one another, the quasi-external constraints 
on interference (including treaties, international agencies and forums), are upheld and enforced 
by states themselves. This gives rise to a situation in which each state might enjoy freedom from 
interference, if all other states voluntarily agree to uphold and comply with international 
regulations, but not non-domination because each state is dependent upon other states’ voluntary 
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compliance in continuing to uphold and obey the international order. As we have seen with 
Torvald and Nora, this is insufficient for securing neo-republican freedom because it relies upon 
agents’ ongoing goodwill and forbearance which, in the absence of external constraints, can be 
withdrawn at any time. Indeed, just as Nora is subject to Torvald’s dominium as long as she is 
dependent upon him resolving to forbear from interfering with her, states will be similarly subject 
to domination while they’re dependent upon all other states agreeing to uphold and support the 
international order. In each case, interference remains a viable option because there is no external 
authority removing or replacing the option of interference or putting it cognitively off the menu.  
We therefore face the fact that non-interference will only be secured as long as states are 
inclined to support this goal, and non-domination will remain unrealised because, as per Pettit’s 
own arguments, each state is dependent upon others’ ongoing voluntary compliance. Importantly, 
Pettit seems to acknowledge this problem since he argues that states would act as required through 
fear of ostracism, ignominy, or a loss of prestige. Irrespective of the fact that this just isn’t how 
states necessarily behave (the United States was not concerned about its prestige when it withdrew 
from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice) and it is unlikely that states will be 
motivated by their image rather than their strategic interests, the biggest problem with this claim 
is that the constraint, a fear of condemnation, is an internal constraint on action. As such, it is 
directly analogous to Torvald’s vow to not interfere with his wife and, as we have already seen, 
this is insufficient to secure non-domination.  
Indeed, Pettit argued that such a strategy is doomed to failure when he asked, ‘Can I 
alienate my power of interference, and suspend the domination I practice, by persuading myself 
that it is wrong to interfere in your choice? Will the moral constraints that I thereby recognise act 
as checks on my will and serve to liberate you, whether wholly or in part?’338 At the individual 
level, Pettit answered in the negative because, ‘Even if I form the view that it is wrong to interfere 
with you, it remains the case that I may prefer to practice interference, whether out of weakness 
of will, out of malice, or out of a will for evil; the option continues to lie within my capacity.’339 
If individuals cannot be trusted to forbear from exerting domination, there seems to be even less 
hope of states acting virtuously since they, like multinational corporations, ‘lack the vulnerability 
and the capacity for empathy that individuals generally display.’340  
We therefore have good reasons to believe that non-domination will not be secured in an 
international system in which states are free from externally-enforced constraints which would 
put the option of interference off the menu. Just as individuals cannot be relied upon to always 
forbear from interfering with others, and must therefore be subject to external constraints which 
would remove the option of interference from their grasp, states similarly cannot be relied upon 
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to uphold an international order when it is not in their interests to do so, and will also need to be 
subject to external constraints which put the option of interference out of reach. As long as agents, 
whether individuals or states, retain the capacity to interfere with one another, all are dependent 
on others’ forbearance and goodwill, and therefore subject to domination.  
It therefore seems necessary to conclude that Pettit’s attempts to secure global non-
domination in A Republican Law of Peoples and Just Freedom must be judged to have failed. 
Indeed, they have failed within the context of Pettit’s own theorising because each account 
embraces a strategy discarded in his earlier work as incompatible with securing non-domination. 
Importantly, Pettit’s accounts of global non-domination also have nothing to say about the 
problem of individualised transnational domination wherein transnational agents interfere with 
individuals rather than the state. It is necessary to be clear that I am not suggesting that Pettit is 
unconcerned with the ways in which individuals’ lives are affected by transnational control: 
clearly he is, since he states that, ‘since any restrictions at the level of the state would inevitably 
involve restrictions on their democratic lives.’ Nonetheless, it would be perfectly possible in 
Pettit’s account of international justice, in which states are secured against external interference, 
for individuals to be subject to individualised transnational domination. As noted above, we can 
imagine a situation in which a state unilaterally closes its borders to all Muslims. In this case, the 
closing of the borders will not necessarily affect specific political communities (although it may 
have that effect if a state were organised as a Muslim state), but will instead affect a spatially 
dispersed group of individuals who live in different political communities. Pettit’s account has 
little to say about such issues because he ignores the fact that control can be exercised across 
borders, affecting the lives of individuals without directly interfering with the state or its activities. 
It is necessary, then, to consider how we might address the problem of individualised transnational 
domination, and it is to Bohman’s account of cosmopolitan republicanism which we can now 
turn. 
 
Individualised Transnational Domination and Deliberative Polyarchy 
 
As noted above, Bohman argues that individuals, ‘are now included in various schemes without 
being individuated, [and] globalization has…thus undermined the capacity of those who are 
nonvoluntarily included in such plans to contest the authority that others exercise at a distance.’341 
Indeed, he argues that the new circumstances of politics, wherein global activities now affect an 
indefinite number of individuals who we cannot individuate but can specify, necessitates a 
reconsideration of the republican claim that to be free is to be a citizen of a free state. Bohman’s 
suggestion for addressing individualised transnational domination is to focus on securing what he 
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calls the democratic minimum. The aim, he argues, should be to secure each individual’s capacity, 
‘to form and change the terms of their common life,’342 and ensure that each individual has, ‘the 
capacity to initiate deliberation and thus take up the common activity of deliberating about 
common concerns, including the agenda of political institutions and the rules which guide 
political activity within them.343 Globally, this would require the creation of a democracy of 
demoi, a deliberative polyarchy of political communities, which organise inquiry into, and 
deliberation on, the rules and conditions of ongoing cooperation.344 Indeed, a democracy of 
demoi, characterised by robust deliberative connections, would secure a dispersal of power across 
demoi, and would ensure that citizens are able to determine the rules and terms of their 
associations.345  
 Indeed, Bohman defends an interactive polyarchy at the transnational level precisely 
because, ‘Often authority is unresponsive not because citizens as a collective body are 
disempowered, but because these democratic structures were constructed for a public that is 
different from the one that currently exists.’346 The problem, here, is that existing democratic 
institutions, including national parliaments, were created before the onset of the latest phase of 
globalisation, when it was still possible for such institutions to respond to the people’s common 
good and enforce their decisions. In the globalised world, states cannot respond to many pressing 
international issues alone (including famine, the spread of global diseases, poverty, migration 
etc.), and may be unable to address domestic issues because of global circumstances (for example, 
states may be unable to secure a sufficient standard of living for their citizens because of global 
financial markets or a need to pay off international debts). In addition, existing democratic 
institutions cannot address the problem of multinational corporations who are able to dictate terms 
of cooperation to states, undermining national democracy.347 The problem, then, is that 
globalisation has made existing democratic institutions insufficient for securing non-domination.  
Bohman’s response to this problem is to argue that if non-domination is to be realised, 
then all issues, including national borders, must be included in an open agenda for deliberation, 
otherwise persons who are excluded from having a say in the formulation of decisions will be 
subject to domination. For example, questions of EU enlargement do not just affect those 
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currently located within the EU but also those who are looking to apply for accession. While these 
comments might seem to suggest a need to develop a global government to ensure that all 
individuals possibly affected by a decision have a say in the formulation of that decision, Bohman 
argues that, ‘A larger, global, self-legislating demos would only repeat the same problems as at 
the national level since it is the limits of political control by such a mechanism that leads to a need 
for principal-agent relationships… This overarching demos would be an agent for the constitutive 
demoi, and thus be a potential dominator.’348  
 As a result, Bohman argues that is necessary to focus on the emergence of publics and 
their cross-border communication (facilitated by technological innovations such as the Internet) 
which creates a, ‘new sort of distributive rather than unified public sphere, with new forms of 
interaction…that decentres the public sphere; it is a public of publics rather than a distinctively 
unified and encompassing public sphere in which all communicators participate.’349 Indeed, 
because the Internet is ‘aterritorial’ Bohman believes that it is well suited to supporting the 
emergence of different networks of individuals whose concerns cannot be addressed by outdated 
democratic institutions.350 Bohman goes on to argue that rather than relying on existing 
democratic institutions to respond to shifting demoi’s will, the transformation of public spheres 
through communicative freedom will create the conditions in which new democratic institutions 
can emerge which map onto the relevant demoi. Indeed, Bohman claims that this will result in, ‘a 
transformation both of what it is to be a public and of the institutions with which the public 
interacts. Such interaction will provide the basis for determining how the functions of the new 
form of political organisation will be limited and expanded.’351 Importantly, the scope of these 
new political organisations will be determined through experimentation (a point we will return to 
in the next chapter when we look at Charles Sabel’s ‘experimentalist’ approach to global 
governance). 
 Such an approach would ensure that transnational democracy is interactive and reflexive, 
enabling publics to shape the institutions that will, in turn, shape their freedoms and powers.352 
This will secure non-domination as it will enable an individual, ‘to avoid having his terms set by 
others,’353 and ensure that everyone can challenge the rules of cooperation and exert influence 
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over the ways in which they’re governed.354 Bohman also notes that his account is able to realise 
Pettit’s dispersal of power condition, noted earlier, because in a deliberative polyarchy, power 
would be dispersed across multiple levels, creating a system in which individuals are able to 
realise their ‘differentiated citizenship’ as members of various demoi. This, Bohman, argues, will 
secure robust non-domination since it creates the conditions in which individuals can make 
legitimate claims on a variety of authorities, ensuring that they’re not subject to the depredations 
of a single coercive government.355 
 Bohman goes on to cite the European Union as an example of a democracy of demoi and 
claims that, ‘From the criterion of non-domination implied by the democratic minimum, it follows 
that some distinctly transnational form of federalism is the proper general type of institutional 
design.’356 Indeed, he claims that the, ‘institutionalization of human rights in the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the recent 2000 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union,’357 alongside the accompanying European Court of Human Rights, 
helps to secure a system in which citizens of the EU member states are empowered to invoke their 
rights, and lead their lives in a system of overlapping demoi.358 That is, in holding both European 
and national citizenship, citizens are better able to realise their rights in multiple demoi which 
secure to them diverse entitlements.359 While citizens of EU member states are better positioned 
to dictate and reconstruct the terms of their cooperation than other individuals who are not 
members of multiple demoi, Bohman goes on to argue that the EU itself may come to represent a 
dominator in the way that it differentiates between citizens and non-citizens: that is, while it 
secures some rights for non-EU citizens, these rights are of a lesser kind than those granted to EU 
citizens. As such, Bohman claims that it would be necessary to embed the EU in a larger 
overlapping demos or demoi in order to create the conditions in which EU and non-EU citizens 
would be able to realise their communicative freedom and reconstitute the terms of their 
cooperation.  
 Bohman’s argument, then, is that individuals across the world are non-voluntarily 
included within transnational schemes which exert a great deal of indirect control over their lives. 
When, for example, multinational corporations make decisions which impact upon global 
markets, individuals themselves are controlled (since the global markets will significantly impact 
upon the choices available to individuals) and yet such actions will not directly interfere with 
states (in the sense of deliberately interfering with states’ options). As a result, securing external 
protections for peoples will not address this form of domination. Addressing individualised 
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transnational domination, Bohman argues, requires that emerging cross-border deliberative 
publics co-determine the terms of their cooperation and reconstitute democracy and democratic 
institutions in accordance with their emerging and changing needs. As such, Bohman thinks it 
would be necessary to create a multi-level, federated system of global governance in which 
individuals enjoy membership in a variety of demoi which are engaged in an ongoing discussion 
of how to govern themselves. This would ensure that democracy is responsive to accelerating 
changes and would seem to address individualised transnational domination by ensuring that 
citizens are able to initiate deliberation and redesign the world around them rather than being 
subjected to control which they have no influence over.  
While Bohman’s suggestion of creating a global, federated, interactive, deliberative 
polyarchy would seem to offer a solution to the problem of individualised transnational 
domination, it is nonetheless unable to secure global non-domination. This is because it would be 
infeasible to create democratic institutions capable of responding to continually fluctuating demoi 
and, even assuming we could create such democratic institutions, there seems to be no way to 
clearly define each demos’ scope, powers, and competencies in relation to other demoi. This 
suggests that each demos’ jurisdiction will be subject to contestation by other demoi and, in the 
absence of an overarching adjudicatory authority, there seems to be no clear means for 
determining which overlapping demos enjoys any degree of sovereignty in a given area. These 
issues suggest that it is highly unlikely that fluctuating demoi could ever secure the requisite 
degree of internal social and political justice, entailing domination.  
So, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Bohman is correct that the democratic 
minimum requires that individuals are free to choose who they interact with and how that 
interaction ought to be governed. This seems to suggest that the emergence of various demoi will 
occur in the same way that civil society groups emerge: individuals with similar interests, tastes, 
beliefs or political concerns will come together to decide how to regulate their common activities. 
Demoi, in Bohman’s account, will seemingly emerge through the voluntary association of 
individuals within and across borders. But, this kind of spontaneous, grass-roots style demos-
creation is exceptionally problematic from the perspective of creating and redefining democratic 
institutions since it suggests that demoi will emerge in response to specific issues and then 
dissolve as these issues are resolved. Problematically, it would likely be exceptionally difficult, 
costly, and time-consuming to continually create and redesign democratic institutions which 
could map onto the demoi which fluctuate in accordance with individuals’ vacillating concerns. 
As such, it is unlikely that any democratic system could ever be subject to its citizens’ influence 
and direction since those citizens and the democratic institutions will be continuously changing. 
It is possible to avoid this problem if we instead aim to create democratic publics over or 
across existing democratic publics. That is, individuals would retain membership in their existing 
demos, and they would obtain membership in new and emerging demoi. A citizen of, for example, 
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Germany would enjoy German and European citizenship, alongside membership within 
transnational and sub-state special interest publics. Such an approach would, presumably, give 
rise to the overlapping membership which he advocates. Nonetheless, this approach is also 
problematic as we face the issue of defining the powers, scope, competencies, and jurisdiction of 
these new demoi, and continuously reconstituting them as publics evolve and change.  
Indeed, we can imagine a situation in which a cross-border public emerged to address the 
migrant crisis facing the European Union, encompassing individuals in Europe, the Middle East, 
and North Africa. In this case, it is entirely unclear exactly who would comprise the public which 
would have jurisdiction and be able to resolve the issue. Indeed, it seems likely that each of these 
publics would have different views on the issue: the cross border public may advocate the opening 
of borders to migrants; the EU might advocate a quota system for allowing entry; and the states 
immediately affected, including Greece and Italy, may prefer no migration. Bohman’s account 
does not specify how such issues might be resolved since it is unclear which public has 
jurisdiction in this area. In such a case, where competing publics claim sovereignty, we would 
need to develop a means for adjudicating between competing claims and yet Bohman advocates 
the denationalisation and deterritorialisation of authority and sovereignty across a ‘horizontal’ set 
of overlapping demoi. Such an approach would seemingly preclude the creation of any kind of 
‘higher’ or hierarchical system of democratic governance which would be able to adjudicate on 
the kinds of problems identified. Absent an overarching authority capable of resolving such 
disputes, the demoi themselves would be required to adjudicate on which public enjoys 
jurisdiction in any instance, possibly giving rise to conflicting policies within the same area, 
conflict between competing demoi, and global anarchy in which no polity has any security in its 
scope or powers. 
Since individuals’ right to initiate and decide the terms of their common associations 
entails that the global democratic system must always be open to revision, we face the fact that 
all demoi will be subject to continuous reconstitution and redefinition, with democratic 
institutions somehow attempting to respond to such changes and ensure that they remain subject 
to their fluctuating citizens’ influence and direction. This aim is likely to be unrealisable since 
fluctuating demoi will be unable to identify all of those who comprise the demos, and will 
therefore be unable to ensure that all relevant individuals are able to take part in the formulation 
of the polity’s norms and democratic processes. Additionally, with new demoi emerging across 
and within borders, we will find that democratic governments will come into competition and 
conflict with one another over which demos has jurisdiction in any given case. As such, it seems 
exceptionally unlikely that democratic governments will ever be able to act in accordance with 
their citizens’ common good: their powers and jurisdiction will be apt to vacillate as their own 
demos and other demoi expand or contract. In such a system, democratic legitimacy could never 
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be secured, governments would most likely be unable to secure the basic liberties, and 
international anarchy would be likely. 
It seems, then, that Bohman’s attempt to address the problem of individualised 
transnational domination has led him to advocate an account of global governance which could 
never ensure that those affected by a policy issue would actually be able to exert influence and 
direction over that issue. Though Bohman is correct to highlight that myriad transnational 
decisions control spatially-dispersed individuals, and that addressing this requires a 
reconfiguration of democratic politics, his solution simply exacerbates the problem of securing 
global non-domination. This is because, in decoupling democratic decision-making from fixed 
territories and defending individuals’ right to reconstitute themselves in whatever cross-border 
demoi they deem appropriate, Bohman advocates a deliberative polyarchy in which even the most 
basic issues cannot be properly addressed: if a demos doesn’t have jurisdiction over a given 
territory, it would seem to be extremely difficult for its government to secure the basic liberties, 
utilise common or natural resources, or ensure that all of those subject to control are able to exert 
influence and direction over governance. His account of democracy across borders will therefore 
be unable to secure global non-domination and it is unlikely that citizens anywhere would enjoy 
social, political, or international justice.  
 
Conclusion - Towards Global Non-Domination 
 
We now have a clear account of the problem of transnational domination and the ways in which 
two prominent neo-republicans have sought to address this problem. Pettit has shown us that 
transnational domination can arise when democratically legitimate polities, which secure social 
and political justice for their citizens, are subject to external interference or the threat of 
interference by other transnational agents. We have also seen that transnational agents can bypass 
the state and exert control over spatially dispersed individuals. Addressing the problem of 
transnational domination therefore requires that we acknowledge and respond to each of these 
problems simultaneously. We concluded that the two most prominent accounts of global 
republicanism, Pettit’s Just Freedom and Bohman’s Democracy across Borders seem unable to 
realise their aim of offering a model of global non-domination.  
Pettit’s account may achieve non-interference but will fail to secure non-domination. This 
is because states are required to support and uphold the multilateral global order and we have 
good reasons to suppose that they will be disinclined to do so. In the absence of external 
constraints on states’ actions, the option to interfere is not removed from their choice-sets, and 
therefore interference remains a possibility. This being the case, it seems unlikely that 
multinational corporations and international institutions will be prevented from exerting 
domination either. Additionally, Pettit’s account fails to acknowledge the problem of 
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individualised transnational domination. This is because he believes that securing the external 
non-domination of peoples is sufficient for securing the freedom of all individuals within the state 
irrespective of the fact that decisions can have a coercive impact across borders. Although Pettit’s 
account is problematic, it does nonetheless provide us with an insight into how we might address 
the problem of transnational domination by highlighting the importance of avoiding a state-
centric/liberal internationalist approach to securing global non-domination. This is because such 
an approach would only secure non-interference and not non-domination because states are not 
subject to external constraints which would put the option of interference off the menu. This 
suggests that we need to look to create an independent transnational political order which would 
perform a role analogous to the state in constraining all transnational agents and preventing them 
from interfering arbitrarily with one another.  
Bohman’s account, on the other hand, takes individualised transnational domination 
seriously but offers us an account of global deliberative polyarchy which would fail to secure 
global non-domination. This is because individuals would never be able to exert influence and 
direction over governance because all demoi are in a state of continuous flux, have an undefined 
jurisdiction (since democratic decision-making is decoupled from national communities and 
deterritorialised), and there is seemingly no overarching authority capable of adjudicating on the 
appropriate competencies and powers of the competing demoi. As such, his account fails to 
address the first form of transnational domination because states are not secured against external 
domination, and it is unlikely that any demos would be able to secure social and political justice 
within its fluctuating borders. Although problematic, Bohman’s work also offers us an insight 
into how we might secure global non-domination. Indeed, his approach shows us that we must 
take the problem of individualised transnational domination seriously, such that we acknowledge 
that control can diffuse across the globe, affecting many identifiable but unspecifiable individuals 
who must exert influence and direction over this control in order to render it non-dominating. 
With that said, his account also highlights that we cannot opt for a global deliberative polyarchy 
as it will give rise to a fluctuating transnational political system in which it is unlikely that 
communities could ever secure social and political justice. This suggests that we will need to 
address individualised transnational domination while also acknowledging the importance of 
defined democratic communities for securing social and political justice.  
The necessity of addressing the two forms of transnational domination, and avoiding the 
problems noted above, point us towards a need to reconsider our approach to securing global non-
domination. Importantly, I think that Pettit’s arguments in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom 
and Government provide us with the foundations for a solution. Indeed, in his earlier work, Pettit 
argued that we need to, ‘establish cultural, economic, and legal networks to the extent that such 
regional or global systems of relationships inevitably discipline members in the manner of 
constitutional commitments… [and] encourage different layers of multinational cooperative and 
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institutionalisation. The emergence of institutional order, regional and global, promises to serve 
the cause of defence more effectively than exclusive reliance on military capacity.’360 This would 
require that republican states seek to develop a regional and global institutional order, and create 
multinational bodies which would take control of some of states’ existing powers.361 This is 
because, ‘there is nothing sacred from the republican point of view about the state or about the 
state’s sovereignty. Given the existence of multinational bodies of various kinds, there are some 
domestic issues on which it may be better…to give over control to those bodies and restrict the 
local state.’362 Indeed, he suggests that it might be necessary for transnational institutions, ‘to 
expatriate domestic sovereignty,’363 on issues such as gay or women’s rights. He goes on to argue 
that the dispersion of power condition would require the decentralisation of power through 
federalism and the empowerment of transnational institutions.364 This, he suggests, might require 
conferring some degree of autonomous self-rule upon sub-state indigenous or religious groups 
such as the Amish.365 
This account of multi-level governance therefore seems to provide us with a foundation 
for pursuing the aim of addressing transnational domination. That is, we should start from the 
premise that states are prima facie the primary means by which social and political justice are 
secured, and they should therefore be granted protections against external domination. This 
suggests that we look to replicate the strategy of constitutional provision at a transnational level. 
Doing so will ensure that the option to interfere with socially and politically just states is removed 
from transnational agents’ choice-sets; and would secure an overarching political framework 
within which a set of regulations could be developed which would constrain private transnational 
associations, such as multinational corporations and churches, preventing them from exerting 
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it would be appropriate to further divest the state of its powers and competencies. It seems 
possible, then, to read Pettit’s earlier work as a defence of some form of republican 
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domination over peoples or individuals. Concurrently, we should also explore how powers might 
be devolved from the state to lower levels of decision-making and expatriated to transnational 
levels of governance, so that we can develop a means for ensuring that all forms of political 
control are rendered democratically legitimate and non-dominating. Finally, while exploring these 
interlinked issues, we should also aim to ensure that securing global non-domination does not 
give rise to new and more pervasive forms of domination. The task of the next chapter is to explore 
how such a system of global governance might be developed.    
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Chapter Four - A Framework for Transnational Republican Governance 
 
Introduction  
 
Our analysis so far has shown that protecting individuals from domination requires that political 
communities secure both internal and external non-domination. Indeed, we saw in the first and 
second chapters that it is necessary for states to secure social and political justice within their 
borders through the following practices: protecting and resourcing the basic liberties; guarding 
against adaptive preferences; and ensuring that their political institutions remain subject to 
individuals’ influence and direction. Importantly, we have also seen that these efforts alone will 
not secure non-domination because it is possible for individuals within socially and politically 
just states to be subject to interference or the threat of interference by external agents. Indeed, we 
saw in the preceding chapter that such transnational domination can occur in two distinct ways. 
Transnational agents can exert domination over states, and they can dominate individuals within 
those states without directly interfering with the state itself. Securing non-domination, I have 
argued, therefore requires that we look at how we might provide states with protections against 
external domination and thereby safeguard their capacity to secure internal social and political 
justice. This, I have suggested, can be achieved through replicating the strategy of constitutional 
provision at a transnational level and creating an independent political system which is able to 
constrain transnational agents. Concurrently, we need to explore how decisions, which affect 
spatially dispersed individuals, can be rendered democratically legitimate and non-dominating. I 
have suggested that this can be achieved through the devolution and expatriation of states’ powers 
to sub-state and transnational levels of decision-making so that individuals are able to influence 
and direct the decisions which they’re subject to. This will ensure, at the transnational level, that 
there are authorities capable of regulating the activities of transnational agents, including 
multinational corporations and regulatory institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and 
World Bank, whose actions affect the lives of myriad individuals. Finally, I have argued that it is 
imperative that each level of governance is subject to individuals’ influence and direction in order 
to ensure that new levels of governance are democratically legitimate and prevented from 
becoming sources of domination. 
 The task of this chapter is to explore how we might develop a transnational political 
system capable of realising these aims, and thereby provide an alternative framework within 
which individuals can enjoy social, political, and international justice. Indeed, doing so, I will 
argue, requires us to first consider ‘the boundary problem’. This foundational issue in democratic 
theory is concerned with determining who should be deemed to be a member of a given demos, 
and therefore who can be deemed to be entitled to participate in democratic decision-making 
within a given polity. Formulating an answer to this issue ought to be a central concern for neo-
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republicans because, as we saw in the second chapter, securing democratic legitimacy requires 
that political control is ‘forced to track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the 
interference (my emphasis).’366 Importantly, as we saw in the preceding chapter, control can be 
exerted across borders, in the form of individualised transnational domination, seemingly 
extending the boundaries of existing demoi and necessitating a reconsideration of how we draw 
democratic boundaries in order to ensure that all of those subject to control are able to influence 
and direct it, and thereby render it non-dominating. I will argue, here, that demoi must be 
constituted on the basis of who can be deemed to be possibly affected by a given issue, while 
taking into account real world constraints and thereby acting in accordance with a principle of 
subsidiarity. After outlining this approach to constituting demoi, we will turn to a consideration 
of how we might develop a democratic framework within which we can realise these principles 
of affectedness and subsidiarity alongside the three aims of neo-republican governance noted 
above. My aim, here, will be to argue that Held’s cosmopolitan democracy can be harnessed to 
republican ends as it provides us with the means to secure social, political, and international 
justice and would, if suitably refined, secure individuals against domination. 
 To that end, this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section will outline what neo-
republicanism requires of a transnational political system and then explore the issue of how to 
specify the respective demoi which would comprise the various levels of the system of multi-
level governance. It argues that such specification should be carried out in accordance with Robert 
Goodin’s recommendation, via the principle of affectedness. The second section will then focus 
on an issue which Goodin dismisses: that the principle of affectedness can be ‘overinclusive’.  
This is problematic as including too many individuals within the demoi will prevent those who 
are actually subject to an instance of control from determining the outcome. That is, in allowing 
unaffected individuals to determine outcomes, those who are subject to the control will not be 
able to exert the requisite degree of influence and direction over the ways in which they’re 
controlled. As such, I will argue that the principle of ‘all possible affected interests’ must be 
supplemented by a principle of subsidiarity which would aim to mitigate against excessive 
overinclusion. The third section then looks at two possible means by which these principles may 
be realised within a system of transnational democracy: Sabel’s account of experimentalist 
governance and Gould’s transnational interactive democracy. The section argues that both models 
would be unable to secure the requisite degree of influence and direction over governance, and 
that we should instead embrace cosmopolitan democracy as a framework within which neo-
republican principles can be realised. The fourth section then outlines David Held’s global social 
democracy as an account of how neo-republicanism’s principles can be realised, while the fifth 
section will outline why I think that Pettit’s account of the basic liberties and resourcing against 
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dependence ought to be conceptualised as an account of human rights which require global 
entrenchment and enforcement. The sixth section will then consider and refine Held’s suggestion 
that we develop a boundary court to ensure that decisions are taken at the correct level of 
governance. The final section will conclude.  
 
Specifying the Demos 
 
As noted in the introduction, our first aim is to explore the boundary problem. In brief, this 
problem concerns how we determine who can be deemed to be a member of a given polity, and 
therefore specify who is entitled to participate in democratic decision-making. This is an 
important issue within democratic theory, and one which neo-republicans in particular ought to 
be concerned with. This is because, as we saw in the second chapter, securing democratic 
legitimacy requires that political control is ‘forced to track the interests and ideas of the person 
suffering the interference (my emphasis),’367 and yet, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
individualised transnational domination is exerted across borders, implicating individuals within 
transnational demoi in which they’re unable to exert influence and direction. The problem, then, 
is that Pettit’s account of democratic legitimacy presupposes the existence of self-contained 
demoi within which citizens can influence and direct governance, and yet the previous chapter’s 
discussion of individualised transnational domination suggests that demoi are not isolated in this 
way. As such, we need to consider exactly how to draw democratic boundaries in a way which 
would enable all of those suffering interference or the threat of interference to exert influence and 
direction over that interference. Once we have an account of exactly how democratic boundaries 
ought to be drawn, we can then precede to a consideration of how states’ existing powers might 
be devolved and expatriated to these different demoi so that the problem of individualised 
transnational domination can be addressed.  
In his discussion of the boundary problem, Robert Goodin argues that it does not matter 
how we initially constitute a demos, as long as we look to reconstitute that demos according to 
democratic principles. This is because he argues that there is no way to democratically constitute 
a demos (at least initially), as it would be, ‘incoherent to constitute the electorate through a vote 
among voters who would be entitled to vote only by virtue of the outcome of that very vote.’368 
As a result of this incoherence, Goodin argues that we ought to focus our attention on the more 
fundamental issue of deciding what principles ought to guide the ways in which we reconstitute 
demoi.  
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It would seem, on the face of it, that the principle of subjectedness would be the most 
appropriate means for determining the demos within neo-republican political theory. This is 
because there are obvious parallels between the principle of subjectedness, which claims that, ‘all 
those who will be bound by a rule should have a say in making the rule (my emphasis),’369 and 
the focus on how coercion ‘binds’ individuals, and domination and the focus on how control 
interacts with individuals’ choices. As formulated by theorists such as Jurgen Habermas,370 Arash 
Abizadeh,371 Claudio Lopez-Guerra,372 and Robert Dahl,373 the principle of subjectedness 
stipulates that it is those whose actions are governed by specific laws who can be said to be subject 
to them and, being subject to them, should have a say in their formulation.374 Nonetheless, the 
problem is that this principle would seem to misidentify those who comprise the relevant demos: 
this is because, as we saw in the second chapter, control must track the interests of all of those 
suffering interference or the threat of interference and yet it is possible for individuals not 
governed by a specific decision to nonetheless be interfered with by it.  
To illustrate, Goodin asks us to imagine a law being passed in Germany which would 
require factories which produce pollution to build tall chimneys, with the aim of ensuring that 
emissions are directed towards Scandinavia. In this situation, the law is made by the German 
people and obviously coerces German manufacturers, but will also affect Scandinavians’ lives as 
well.375 Goodin goes on to argue that the problem with the principle of subjectedness is that while 
the ‘bound’ individuals, the Germans, would have a say in the formulation of this decision, and 
would therefore exert the appropriate influence and direction, those who are also affected by the 
decision, the Scandinavians, would have no say.376  
I think that it is possible to view this situation as one in which both transnational and 
individualised transnational domination might occur. That is, if the decision to pollute in 
Scandinavia has an effect upon Scandinavians as a collective agent, perhaps by rendering their 
option to live in a pollution-free country unrealisable or forcing them to develop ways to combat 
such pollution, then it will be an instance of the kind of transnational domination that Pettit is 
concerned with. If, however, the pollution has a disparate effect, perhaps aggravating specific 
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individuals’ health problems or causing damage to farmers’ land, then we should construe this 
example as one of individualised transnational domination. Nonetheless, irrespective of which 
form of domination Germany’s decision takes, we must nonetheless construe it as an instance in 
which political control interferes in individuals’ lives: as such, it is necessary to ensure that the 
interests of those suffering the interference are able to exert influence and direction over the 
determination of that decision.  
The problem, in the Germany-Scandinavia example, is that while the German decision 
officially ‘binds’ German manufacturers, it may nonetheless control Scandinavians in a myriad 
ways (through, for example, rendering their option to live in a pollution-free country unrealisable 
or causing damage to farmers’ land). As such, the principle of subjectedness, with its focus on 
drawing boundaries around individuals ‘bound’ by a decision, seems to be too narrow and 
underinclusive for our purposes because it ignores the fact that unbound individuals can be 
controlled and dominated by decisions taken within that community.  
 As an alternative, we might take a statist approach to this issue, such as that taken by 
Pettit, and claim that all of those living in a particular state are those who can be deemed to be 
subject to coercion and who must therefore exert influence and direction over governance. 
Nonetheless, this doesn’t quite seem quite right either as decisions taken by national governments 
can, as in the above example, exert individualised transnational domination over individuals not 
living within that territory. Indeed, Pettit seems to acknowledge that borders, for example, will 
affect those outside of a given state, but argues that this will, ‘be a by-product of an independently 
necessitated, otherwise unobjectionable policy: a restriction on your freedom of movement, to be 
sure, but one that vitiates that freedom rather than invades it.’377 While therefore acknowledging 
that individuals outside of a state can be coerced by decisions taken within that state, Pettit 
nonetheless opts for his statist account of democratic legitimacy, and excludes non-citizens from 
inclusion within the demos.  
Although both the subjectedness and statist responses to the affectedness problem are 
problematic, they nonetheless seem to suggest a way forward. Indeed, Goodin goes on to argue 
that those who claim that democracies are constituted by a shared territory, history, or national 
identity, usually do so because, ‘the interests of individuals within those groups are affected by 
the actions and choices of others in that group.’378 Constituting a democracy on the basis of a 
shared territory, history, or nationality is therefore only an approximation to what really matters, 
which is that these individuals usually share a set of intertwined interests.379 So, when it is argued 
that some people’s interests are inappropriately included or excluded from consideration in the 
determination of a decision, Goodin argues that theorists are usually employing the more 
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fundamental claim that those who are affected by a decision ought to have a say in its 
formulation.380 This principle, the principle of affectedness, requires that all of those affected by 
a given decision have a say in its formulation. 
The principle of affectedness seems to be a more promising guide to determining 
democratic boundaries because it acknowledges that control can be exerted across borders, 
constraining the options available to spatially dispersed individuals. As such, it seems to be a 
better mechanism for determining who is subject to individualised transnational domination than 
Pettit’s statism or the principle of subjectedness, and appears better able to identify which 
individuals need to exert influence and direction over political decisions in order to render those 
decisions democratically legitimate. Nonetheless, while the principle of affectedness avoids being 
underinclusive, it remains significantly underspecified and can be conceptualised in a variety of 
ways.  
To that end, Goodin starts by outlining the ‘all actually affected interests’ principle. This 
principle entails that, ‘the decision-making body should include all interests that are actually 
affected by the actual decision.’381 As examples of this principle of affectedness, we find Thomas 
Pogge defending the ‘all legitimately affected interests’ principle,382 David Held outlining a 
principle of ‘all significantly affected interests’,383 and Gould defending a principle of ‘all 
importantly affected interests.’384 Interestingly, Gould notes, after outlining her own specification 
of the principle of affectedness, that, ‘Paramount among the difficulties [with specifying the 
principle of affectedness] is the impossibility of specifying all who would be affected, since 
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decisions obviously have unintended consequences and their reach is potentially unending.’385 
She further acknowledges that, ‘people are most often differentially affected [by political 
decisions]. In addition, the principle is difficult to apply concretely because it cannot always be 
known in advance who is going to be affected.’386  
This acknowledgement highlights a foundational issue with specifying the principle of 
affectedness, and it is one which Goodin has outlined.387 This is that, irrespective of how we 
define what being significantly/legitimately/importantly affected entails, we cannot know who 
will actually be affected until a decision has been made. That is, ‘which interests are “actually 
affected” depends on who gets to vote. Hence it is incoherent to try to determine who should get 
to vote by asking whose interests are actually affected by the course of action actually decided 
upon.’388 Fundamentally, the problem with focusing on those actually affected by a decision is 
that those who are actually affected by any decision will depend on what the actual decision turns 
out to be which, in turn, depends on those who actually get to make the decision.389  
 In order to avoid the incoherence associated with defining who is actually affected by a 
decision, Goodin suggests three further ways in which we might specify the principle of 
affectedness. These are the ‘all possibly affected interests’, ‘all and only affected interests’, and 
‘all probably affected interests’ principles. The ‘all possibly affected interests’ principle 
acknowledges that individuals are not only affected by whatever decision is reached, but are also 
affected by whatever decision could have possibly been reached. Understood in this way, the 
principle, taken to its logical conclusion, requires that we, ‘give a say to anyone who might 
possibly be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible agenda.’390 This principle 
avoids the incoherence of the ‘all actually affected interests’ principle by acknowledging that, at 
least in principle, anyone could be affected by any decision. Nonetheless, as Goodin 
acknowledges, this principle runs the risk of being too overinclusive since it would seem to permit 
those who will never actually be affected by a given decision to have a say in the formulation of 
that decision (we’ll return to this point in the next section).  
As a way of avoiding this potentially overinclusive outcome, the ‘all and only affected 
interests’ principle would attempt to limit the expanding demos by acknowledging that the 
outcome of a specific decision could never really affect certain individuals. Although this 
principle seems initially to be plausible, Goodin argues that it is problematic as it would give rise 
to continually shifting demoi which change with each issue. This is because we would need to 
determine who is going to be affected by a decision and then give only these people a voice. Since 
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different people will be affected by different issues, it follows that the demos for each decision 
will be different. This principle therefore entails the same incoherence as the ‘all actually affected 
interests’ principle (since we cannot know who will actually be affected until an actual decision 
has been made) and would be infeasible as it would likely give rise to a demos of fluctuating 
demoi as I have argued would occur with Bohman’s account. 
The final substantive principle of affectedness outlined by Goodin, the ‘all probably 
affected interests’ principle would attempt to draw a democratic boundary around those who 
would probably, rather than merely possibly, be affected by a decision. This principle is also 
problematic, however, because those who will probably be affected by a decision will again 
depend on who gets to formulate the decision.391 This principle, as with the ‘all actually affected 
interests’ and ‘all and only affected interests’ principles, cannot tell us who the relevant demos is 
until after the decision has been made. 
Goodin’s work therefore shows that the actual specification of ‘affectedness’ is ancillary 
to the issue of actual or possible affectedness. That is, irrespective of whether we define 
affectedness in terms of being legitimately, significantly, or importantly affected by a policy issue, 
our more fundamental concern is the issue of whether to define affectedness in terms of who is 
actually, possibly, or probably affected by a given issue. I think that Goodin has shown that we 
cannot define affectedness in terms of being actually affected since this would commit us to the 
absurdity of attempting to constitute a demos after a decision has been reached. Nor can we 
attempt to define demoi on the basis of who will probably be affected since, as noted above, those 
probably affected will depend upon who gets to make the decision. It therefore seems that we 
must adopt the principle of ‘all possibly affected interests’ as it is the only way of ensuring that 
that all genuinely affected individuals have their interests tracked: by tracking all interests we can 
be assured that the correct ones are definitely tracked, and it would avoid the incoherence of the 
other substantive principles of affectedness since we can specify the demos prior to the making 
of a decision.  
 
The Overinclusive Demos 
 
Goodin goes on to argue that, if the ‘all possibly affected interests’ principle is the best 
interpretation of the principle of affectedness, ‘then it does indeed provide good grounds for 
thinking that (at least in principle) we should give virtually everyone a vote on virtually everything 
virtually everywhere in the world.’392 Acknowledging that attempting to realise such a principle 
in the real world would be wildly impractical, he goes on to argue that we need to think about 
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which arrangements would be feasible in practice, and explore how we might supplement the 
existing state system (which he has defended elsewhere as an administrative mechanism for 
ensuring that universal duties are effectively discharged)393 to ensure that all of those possibly 
affected have their interests tracked in the formulation of decisions.  
 To that end, he goes on to suggest two possible ‘overlays’ which would leave the existing 
state system intact. The first proposal would be to, ‘put a layer of “world government” over the 
top of them, giving people a right to appeal over the heads of territorial states if their interests 
were affected by actions of territorial states in which they have no say.’394 The aim with this 
approach would be to ensure that states take responsibility for issues which do not affect other 
peoples or generate externalities, with a ‘higher’ level of governance tasked with adjudicating on 
complaints from people and peoples whose interests are affected by other polities. While noting 
that he is unsure how such a system might operate in practice, Goodin does suggest that a world 
government could be constituted as a court of appeal which would adjudicate upon those ‘rare 
cases’ where decisions spill across national boundaries. On this view, we would find that states 
are responsible for the vast majority of decisions, with an overarching ‘court’ responsible for 
internalising the externalities generated by states and, ‘making those agents who cause the effects 
somehow responsible for the consequences of their actions.’395  
 The second option would be to, ‘put a layer of “international law” over the top of 
territorial states, imposing an obligation on territorial states to honor claims for compensation 
from people and peoples whose interests have been affected by actions of territorial states in 
which they have no vote.” 396 The aim, again, would be to internalise externalities, ensuring that 
those states which produce external costs compensate those who must bear them. For example, if 
Germany were to pollute in Scandinavia, the aim would be to ensure that Germany adequately 
compensates the Scandinavians for its actions. With that said, Goodin notes that the compensatory 
strategy is the third best option available (the best being giving virtually everyone everywhere a 
vote on virtually everything, and the second best being the creation of a ‘federal’ system of global 
governance where states discharge their duties and the global government ensures that they bear 
the costs of their actions) because determining what counts as adequate compensation is a tricky 
issue. That is, sometimes compensation might require financial remuneration, but at other times 
it will be difficult to determine what can be deemed adequate compensation in kind, particularly 
if the wrong committed is the wrongful exclusion from the demos which made a decision on a 
particular issue.397  
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 Goodin therefore offers us three approaches for reconstituting global governance to 
ensure that decisions are made in accordance with the principle of ‘all possibly affected interests’. 
While each of these suggestions would seem to ensure that individuals are either included in the 
making of decisions which may affect them or compensated in some way if excluded, I think that 
only one of these approaches is compatible with the requirements of neo-republican governance. 
To see why, it is useful to consider each approach in turn. 
Starting with the suggestion of enfranchising all possibly affected individuals, Goodin 
effectively dismisses the problem of overinclusion, noting in his discussion of constituting the 
demos on the basis of shared territory, history, or nationality, that, ‘Sometimes the approximation 
is overinclusive, including in the demos someone whose interests are not affected by the decision 
of the demos (either in the case of this particular decision, or in general). Sometimes the 
approximation is underinclusive, excluding from the demos someone whose interests are affected 
by the decision of the demos.’398 As we’ve already seen, Goodin goes on to explore how we ought 
to reconstitute the demos in accordance with the principle of affectedness, such that we can ensure 
that all of those who are possibly affected by a decision have a say in its formulation. In this way, 
he effectively dismisses the problem of including myriad individuals who could never plausibly 
be affected by a political decision, focusing instead on ensuring that we avoid underinclusion. In 
doing so, he advocates a best-case solution which would entail that a significant number of 
unaffected individuals will have their interests tracked in the formulation of decisions that will 
never plausibly affect them, undermining the requirement, explored in earlier chapters, that those 
interfered with are able to exert influence and direction over that control.  
For example, we will find in the Germany-Scandinavia example that unaffected 
individuals will determine Germany’s polluting decision. Indeed, if we enfranchised everyone in 
the making of this decision, then the interests of every living person would be tracked in the 
formulation of this decision. The problem here is that while it is logically possible that Germany’s 
decision could affect everyone, real world constraints on where Germany can pollute mean that 
it is radically unlikely that Germany’s decision could ever realistically affect the vast majority of 
individuals whose interests are included within the decision-making process. In this way, the 
individuals who are likely to be affected by whatever decision is reached by Germany 
(presumably including all of those within polluting distance of Germany) will find that they are 
unable to influence and direct the decision in the requisite way because the interests of individuals 
who will never plausibly be affected will determine the outcome of the decision.  
This ought to be a significant concern for neo-republicans because, as we saw in the 
second chapter, rendering an act non-arbitrary requires that any act of interference is, ‘forced to 
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track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference (my emphasis).’399 That is, it 
is only those subject to a specific instance of interference or threat of interference who must exert 
influence and direction over the making of that decision. But, in the case of Germany-Scandinavia 
and a decision being referred to a global demos, it is clear that those suffering the interference 
will not exert influence or direction over the decision: instead, it will be billions of other interests 
which determine the outcome of the decision. 
The third-best solution that Goodin advocates, compensating those who are affected by 
the externalities generated by national decisions, ought to be just as problematic for neo-
republicans. Indeed, this approach would seem to suggest that constraints on freedom can be 
adequately compensated and mitigated against through financial recompense, and states would 
be permitted to act with impunity as long as they compensated those that they have dominated. 
This would create a licence for interference, enabling states such as Germany to emit their 
pollution where they will as long as they have the resources necessary to compensate those that 
they have interfered with. Even more problematically, this approach would seem to create the 
conditions in which powerful and wealthy states would have a wider area of freedom in which to 
act. That is, if they are sufficiently wealthy, states could interfere with others and then simply 
recompense them for their transgressions; poorer states would have no such freedom since they 
would lack the resources necessary to compensate others for the externalities generated by their 
decisions. This approach would therefore fail to provide an adequate blueprint for transnational 
governance since it would not resolve the problem of externalities; it would simply make it easier 
for powerful states to act with impunity and subject weaker states to the depredations of the 
powerful. 
To my mind, Goodin’s second-best solution, that states form the primary demoi with an 
overarching global high court tasked with redressing the externalities generated by states’ 
decisions, seems to be the most promising suggestion for resolving the affectedness problem as it 
strives to avoid overinclusion by allowing some issues to be decided by states, while avoiding 
underinclusion by ensuring that decisions which generate externalities can be addressed by a 
global demos or its representatives. Nonetheless, this solution does not go far enough in balancing 
between over- and underinclusion. For example, there are myriad issues which, if decided at a 
state level, would result in excessive overinclusion, and likewise many which would entail 
overinclusion if referred immediately to a global layer of governance. For example, if the U.K. 
government were tasked with making all decisions for each of the constituent countries, it is likely 
that the Welsh, Scottish, and Northern Irish would find that the control that is exercised over them 
is subject to others’ influence and direction. That is, we would find that the national demos, 
comprised of roughly 55 million English individuals, 5 million Scots, 3 million Welsh, and 2 
                                                          
399 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 55. 
147 
 
million Northern Irish, would be dominated by the English, whose influence and direction would 
determine the ways in which others are controlled. Similarly, if all supra-national decisions were 
immediately referred to a global demos or high court, then we would find that, again, those 
actually subject to a decision do not get to influence or direct it. Indeed, we’ve already seen that 
referring the Germany-Scandinavia issue to a global demos will likely result in a decision which 
does not reflect the interests of those who will be affected by the outcome.  
The problem, here, is that Goodin only recognises the necessity of two levels of decision-
making, at national and global levels. And yet there are decisions which would be better made at 
sub-state and supra-national levels, and which would enable us to better avoid both excessive over 
and underinclusion. For example, in the Germany-Scandinavia example, we would better avoid 
excessive overinclusion if the decision were referred to a European level of governance rather 
than a global one; in the U.K. example, we would better avoid overinclusion if we referred the 
decision to a sub-state level of decision-making.  
This suggests that it will be necessary to complement or qualify the principle of ‘all 
possibly affected interests’ with a more fully elaborated principle of subsidiarity. That is, the aim 
would be to ensure that decisions are taken in a way which ensures that all of those possibly 
affected by a decision are able to influence and direct the making of that decision, while also 
striving to avoid taking the decision at a level of governance which includes myriad individuals 
who will never plausibly be affected because of real world constraints (such as Germany’s 
geographic location, or the fact that English children are unlikely to be educated in Scotland).  
Our aim, then, is to mitigate against the problem of underinclusion by delegating 
decisions upwards in accordance with the principle of ‘all possibly affected interests’, thereby 
striving to ensure that all of those affected by a decision are able to influence and direct it. 
Simultaneously, the principle of subsidiarity will aim to mitigate against the problem of 
overinclusion by delegating decisions downwards, such that real world constraints are taken into 
account and decisions are taken at a level which excludes those who cannot realistically be 
affected by a given decision. To that end, the aim of the next section is to explore how we might 
develop a transnational democratic framework premised upon these principles of affectedness and 
subsidiarity. While doing so, it is imperative that we also retain a focus on the need to safeguard 
states’ capacity to secure social and political justice, and ensure that democratic governance is 
subject to individuals’ influence and direction. 
 
Transnational Frameworks  
 
Addressing the problem of individualised transnational domination, while simultaneously 
protecting states’ capacity to secure social and political justice, therefore seems to require a multi-
level, transnational political system premised upon the principles of affectedness and subsidiarity. 
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My aim in this section is to explore two different suggestions from the literature on transnational 
governance, experimentalist governance and Gould’s interactive democracy. However, in the end, 
both are found wanting in terms of securing non-domination. The next section will then go on to 
explore and endorse a transnational framework inspired by Held’s cosmopolitan democracy as 
the most suitable system for securing non-domination.   
The first approach to transnational governance which we need to consider is what Charles 
Sabel, Robert Keohane, Jonathan Zeitlin and others call ‘Experimentalist Governance’ or 
‘democratic deliberative polyarchy.’ Indeed, De Burca, Keohane, and Sabel argue that 
experimentalist governance, or GXG, is, ‘an institutionalised process of participatory and 
multilevel collective problem solving, in which the problems (and the means of addressing them) 
are framed in an open-ended way, and subjected to periodic revision by various forms of peer 
review in light of locally generated knowledge.’400 They argue that this form of governance is 
normatively justified because of the deliberative and inclusive approach taken to redefining goals 
and preferences and, in its ideal form, would entail five key ‘deliberation-fostering steps.’401 
These steps are as follows: there will be reflection and discussion amongst stakeholders who share 
a broadly similar perception of a common problem; resulting in the development of a framework 
for addressing this problem through the articulation of open-ended goals; with responsibility for 
implementing solutions allocated to lower-level, contextually-situated actors; who would 
continuously feedback to higher-level actors, enabling reporting and monitoring across a range of 
contexts, with outcomes subject to peer-review; and with goals and practices being routinely 
reviewed and re-evaluated and, where appropriate, being revised in light of the outcomes of the 
process of peer review.402 
 Elsewhere, Sabel and Zeitlin discuss the use of experimentalist governance within the 
context of the EU. They argue that the EU is now, ‘a functioning novel polity without a state,’403 
because decision-making is a deliberative process which socialises participants (including civil 
servants, scientists, and interest-group representatives) into epistemic communities through their 
participation in ‘comitological’ committees which are comprised of such experts and member 
states’ representatives.404 Such a process is deemed to link national administrations with each 
other and EU institutions, in the manner of a multi-level system of governance, without 
establishing a hierarchy. This is because, as noted above, decisions taken at lower levels of 
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decision-making can influence decision-making across the network. They argue that networked 
governance in this form therefore blurs the distinction between centralised and decentralised 
decision-making through the continuous process of review, evaluation, and revision across the 
network and in light of units’ findings.  
 It is useful to quote Sabel and Zeitlin at length as they provide a concise discussion of 
how such a system would operate, arguing that: 
 
In this design, first, framework goals (such as ‘good water status’, safe food, non-
discrimination, and a unified energy grid) and measures for gauging their achievement 
are established by joint action of the Member States and EU institutions. Lower-level 
units (such as national ministries or regulatory authorities and the actors with whom they 
collaborate) are, second, given the freedom to advance these ends as they see fit. 
Subsidiarity in this architecture implies that the lower-level units have sufficient 
autonomy in implementing framework rules to propose changes to them. But in return 
for this autonomy, they must, third, report regularly on performance, especially as 
measured by the agreed indicators, and participate in a peer review in which their own 
results are compared with those pursuing other means to the same general ends. Fourth, 
and finally, the framework goals, metrics, and procedures themselves are periodically 
revised by the actors who initially established them, augmented by such new participants 
whose views come to be seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation.405  
 
 Importantly, the lower levels of decision-making are not required to reach a consensus 
on how to proceed with the implementation of overarching aims as they would in other 
deliberative processes, but are instead required to be responsive to one another and the discoveries 
made by other units. The aim would be for the overarching level of governance, the EU, to set 
framework goals in discussion with Member States, and for lower levels to adapt and implement 
these frameworks within their respective contexts and report on their experiences, producing an 
experimental system of governance in which all units learn from others. They go on to argue that 
this experimentalist form of governance is an instance of directly deliberative polyarchy because 
it, ‘uses argument to disentrench settled practices,’406 and, ‘uses the concrete experience of actors’ 
differing reactions to current problems to generate novel possibilities for consideration.’407 
Importantly, ‘It is polyarchic because it is a system in which the local units learn from, discipline, 
and set goals for each other…In this sense, deliberative polyarchy is a machine for learning from 
diversity, thereby transforming an obstacle to closer integration into an asset for achieving it.’408  
 Importantly, Sabel and Zeitlin do acknowledge that a governance process whereby 
technical experts and elites make decisions is a significant departure from established norms of 
representative democracy, wherein laws are deemed legitimate only when they are produced by 
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the sovereign people through their representatives, and, ‘naturally looks suspicious from this point 
of view.’409 This is because it seems to undermine the requirement that, ‘not only [must] citizens 
be equally subject to the law, but also that they be jointly and equally its authors.’410 Importantly, 
in addition to not enjoying traditional democratic validation by representatives, this governance 
process appears, ‘to deliver decision-making into the hands of a technocratic elite, whose 
potentially self-interested manipulations are cloaked in the robes of dispassionate deliberation.’411 
Leaving aside the former issue, which the authors argue would require recourse to an independent 
account of democratic justification, they focus on arguing that not only is a concern with 
technocratic governance unfounded, but that technocracy in the envisioned form can have a 
democratising effect. This is because experimentalist governance has a destabilising effect upon 
entrenched forms of authority.412 
 This account of governance would seemingly enable us to achieve the twin aims of 
avoiding excessive over and underinclusion and protecting states’ capacity to secure social and 
political justice. Indeed, states seemingly retain their existing responsibilities and ‘pool’ their 
decision-making and problem-solving capacities to address common problems. The fact that this 
system is multi-level and polyarchic would seem to ensure that democratic boundaries are drawn 
in a way which coheres with the principles of affectedness and subsidiarity. That is, individuals, 
as members of the European demos, would seemingly have their interests represented in the 
determination of common problems and goals and, as members of the national demos, would have 
their interests represented in the formulation of national solutions. Nonetheless, the problem with 
this approach to global governance, as should be clear from the acknowledgement that it appears 
to deliver decision-making into the hands of unelected technocrats, is that it seems unlikely that 
control would be properly constrained to track the interests of those suffering from interference 
since decision-making powers will be handed to unelected technocrats. If these technocrats are 
not subject to democratic mechanisms, i.e. if they’re not elected, it seems unlikely that individuals 
would be able to adequately influence how they’re governed, and if the technocrats are not 
constrained by the norms produced by public deliberation and contestation, the direction pursued 
is unlikely to be one which is equally acceptable to all individuals. In this way, this approach 
would give rise to imperium.  
Now, it is important to acknowledge that Pettit does defend a range of constitutional and 
quasi-constitutional mechanisms as a supplement to democratic mechanisms and, on the face of 
it, technocratic decision-making may comprise one justified component of a democratic 
constitutionalism. Nonetheless, we must be concerned that this process seems to entirely confer 
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decision-making powers upon a range of experts who will be able to determine overarching goals, 
implement them within lower units, assess performance through peer review, and revise these 
procedures in light of emerging results. Indeed, if we were to look to implement such an approach 
globally, we might find that global experts come to exert a significant and potentially tyrannical 
level of control over lower units of decision-making, and we may see the rise of a technocratic 
global Leviathan setting goals, invigilating implementation, and revising aims and ends for all 
polities. The obvious response to this concern would be to argue that as long the technocrats are 
appointed by officials who have been elected, and are subject to governmental and non-
governmental oversight, then the technocrats would fulfil a function somewhat analogous to that 
of senior civil servants and judges in the U.K. political system, wherein significant powers are 
exercised by unelected officials within the confines of an overarching democratic framework 
without giving rise to tyrannical governance.  
Nonetheless, I do not think that this response is adequate because the powers and 
responsibilities which technocrats would be granted would be more significant and far-reaching 
than those enjoyed by other unelected officials. Indeed these powers would permit these officials 
to set, implement, and revise their own policies, seemingly unconstrained by the usual separation 
of powers which occurs within democratic systems. That is, while judges apply the law, they do 
not formulate it, and while civil servants enact policy, they do not determine it. These technocrats, 
however, would be able to formulate, implement, oversee, and revise their policies without being 
subject to the same constraints that other government functionaries are subject to. Such an 
approach would therefore fail to adequately realise the dispersion-of-power condition noted 
earlier, and would permit an unelected body of officials to exercise extensive, unconstrained 
decision-making powers, likely giving rise to domination. Finally, in such a situation, it seems 
clear that individuals are unlikely to be able to exert the requisite degree of influence over the 
ways in which they’re controlled, and it seems unlikely that individuals’ shared interests or 
common good would ever enjoy the directive effect required by Pettit’s account of democratic 
legitimacy.   
 Since the experimentalist account of transnational governance is insufficient for our 
purposes, it is necessary to consider an alternative approach offered by Carol Gould. It is 
important to begin by noting that Gould’s account of transnational democracy is comprised of 
two distinct principles. The first principle, the principle of ‘common activities’, entails that, ‘rights 
of democratic participation arise from rights to self-determination in the context of common or 
joint activities,’413 because, ‘when such common activities are institutionalised, they serve as 
arenas for democratic decision-making in a formal sense.’414 This principle therefore requires that 
                                                          
413 Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, p. 175. 
414 Carol C. Gould, Interactive Democracy: The Social Roots of Global Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 88. 
152 
 
when individuals are engaged in an ongoing scheme of cooperation, they are able to exercise full 
and equal rights in co-determining their common lives. As layers of institutionalisation emerge 
above the state, individuals will correlatively acquire full democratic rights of participation in 
these schemes of cooperation and as cross-border networks of individuals emerge to address 
specific challenges they will need to be fully democratised. But, beyond these ‘formal’ arenas of 
common activities, individuals’ rights to participation weaken: that is, if a decision is taken 
elsewhere in the world, and individuals are not members of whatever institution makes such 
decisions, individuals will acquire a right to have an ‘input’ into the making of the decision, 
irrespective of the extent to which they’re affected. It is here that Gould’s second principle, the 
principle of ‘all importantly affected interests’ becomes operative. This principle requires that 
individuals have an input into the making of a decision when it importantly affects them, where, 
‘a person is to be regarded as importantly affected if the decision in question impacts the basic 
freedom, needs, or central interests that are protected by human rights, or if the decision has 
significant effects on that person’s ability to realise these human rights.’415 Indeed, she claims that 
this latter principle, ‘calls for substantial input into the functioning of global governance 
institutions, when people are impacted in their human rights. This sort of input could partly 
proceed online, in terms of contributions to the deliberations over their policies.’416  
 Fundamentally, the aim of Gould’s approach is to develop a multidimensional and 
interactive global democratic framework with the principles of ‘common activities’ and ‘all 
importantly affected interests’ justifying differential democratic participation. She goes on to 
suggest a series of institutional proposals. These include: the requirement that international 
institutions and transnational corporations prepare human rights impact assessments when 
developing policies or rules; the construction of a series of human rights courts at regional and 
global levels; the pursuit of substantive deliberative democracy in delimited contexts where face-
to-face interaction is possible; the extension of democratic decision-making to firms and other 
economic institutions; the use of the internet to facilitate participation; the creation of regional 
decision-making bodies akin to the EU; the democratisation of NGOs and INGOs; the creation of 
a peoples’ assembly within the UN (although such an institution would need to be prevented from 
becoming tyrannical) and supplemented by regional associations which would better enable 
recognition of global diversity; the democratisation of the WTO and World Bank through 
including representatives of distant peoples; and a more general reform of existing governmental 
institutions.417 
Although an interesting account of transnational democracy, I think that it is nonetheless 
problematic for two interlinked reasons. The first concerns an incoherence in the distinction made 
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between the categories of ‘common activities’ and affectedness. The second is that the less 
stringent ‘input’ requirement will fail to secure the degree of influence and direction required by 
neo-republicanism’s account of democratic legitimacy. Starting with the former issue, Gould’s 
principle of ‘common activities’ seems to be premised upon the idea that, ‘the interests of 
individuals within those groups are affected by the actions and choices of others in that group.’418 
As we have already seen when considering Goodin’s discussion of affectedness, however, this is 
only an approximation to what really matters, which is that these individuals seem to share a set 
of intertwined interests and are affected by the decisions taken within the community.419 The 
argument that Gould advances therefore seems to be that individuals tend to be more affected by 
decisions taken within their community than they do by those decisions taken outside of their 
community, and it is the extent of affectedness which justifies differentiated participation in 
decision-making. It is this insight which seems to motivate the distinction between full rights of 
participation and input into decision-making. Nonetheless, as we’ve already seen, the issue is 
whether or not individuals are possibly affected by a given decision, not the extent of affectedness. 
Indeed, it is perfectly possible for decisions taken at a distance to have a huge and significant 
effect upon individuals’ lives and yet, in Gould’s account, such decisions would only require input 
from those affected rather than an equal say in the determination of the outcome. 
A brief example will make this point clearer. Let us imagine a community in which 
everyone has a right to equally participate in decision-making. This community, however, is 
heavily dependent upon a local manufacturing plant which is owned by a foreign company. 
Indeed, the vast majority of inhabitants are employed within this plant. Nonetheless, the foreign 
company decides that it should cease its local operations since it is not sufficiently productive or 
there are better opportunities available elsewhere. Gould wants us to believe that the company’s 
decisions only exert a modest impact upon the lives of the individuals who depend upon the plant 
for their livelihood, and as such these individuals do not need to have a full say in this decision 
and instead only need an input to the company’s decisions. This doesn’t seem right since the 
decision made by the foreign company will have a huge effect upon individuals’ lives, 
‘importantly’ affecting the realisation and enjoyment of their human rights.  
And even if this could be overcome, the requirement that individuals have an input into 
transnational decisions will fail to secure the requirement that individuals are able to influence 
and direct the ways in which they’re controlled. Indeed, we saw in the second chapter that 
rendering political control legitimate and non-arbitrary requires that it is subject to citizens’ 
influence (through representatives and constitutional/quasi-constitutional mechanisms) and 
direction, where direction is understood in terms of citizens’ shared interests or common good 
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exerting a directive effect over policy-making. Indeed, the problem, here, is that while both 
influence and direction might be secured within the communities premised upon the principle of 
‘common activities’, the less stringent principle of affectedness will give rise to a situation in 
which individuals can only, at best, have a say over rather than direct decisions taken at a distance. 
Indeed, there seems to be no requirement that decisions taken elsewhere in the world are truly 
responsive to citizens’ good and, in the above example, would likely entail that the company 
simply disregards the community’s needs.  
 We can see, then, that neither of these approaches would adequately ensure that 
governance remains subject to individuals’ influence and direction. That being the case, the final 
account of transnational governance that we need to consider is cosmopolitan democracy. Indeed, 
we find an array of theorists offering distinct accounts of transnational governance in which 
familiar mechanisms of democratic governance are transmuted from the state to higher and lower 
levels of governance, including, for example, Thomas Pogge’s account of ‘nested territorial units’ 
which apply at a series of levels of governance.420 Broadly, ‘Cosmopolitan democracy is an 
ambitious project whose aim is to achieve a world order based on the rule of law and 
democracy,’421 and cosmopolitan democrats favour, ‘an international system more densely 
populated by institutions that both secure order and are democratically accountable in a direct 
fashion…Institutions would exist at multiple levels…subordinate to a common legal 
framework.’422 It seems that, prima facie, cosmopolitan democracy, with its emphasis on 
combining democracy with constitutionalism and multi-level governance, seems to offer us a way 
to pursue the strategy of constitutional provision, protect states’ capacity to secure justice, develop 
a multi-level system of governance in which individualised transnational domination is addressed, 
and ensure that individuals are able to exert influence and direction over the ways in which they’re 
governed. Importantly, Held’s cosmopolitan democracy provides us with a blueprint for how we 
might achieve each of these aims and which, with slight amendment, could be harnessed to 
republican ends, providing us with a transnational framework in which non-domination can be 
secured. 
 
The Neo-Republican Global Covenant  
 
Held argues that, ‘the project of global social democracy can be conceived as a basis for 
promoting the rule of law at the international level; greater transparency, accountability and 
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democracy in global governance; a deeper commitment to social justice in the pursuit of a more 
equitable distribution of life chances; the protection and reinvention of community at diverse 
levels; and the regulation of the global economy through the public management of global trade 
and financial flows, and the engagement of leading stakeholders in corporate governance.’423 
Importantly, Held endorses something like Bohman’s ‘new circumstances of politics’, arguing 
that, ‘Political events in one part of the world can rapidly acquire worldwide ramifications. 
Spatially focused political activity…can become embedded in extensive networks of political 
interaction.’424  
 Contra Goodin, Held believes that states can no longer be considered discrete worlds 
because they’re, ‘enmeshed in complex structures of overlapping forces, relations and 
networks.’425 These processes, he argues, strain a world order which has been designed in 
accordance with the principle of state sovereignty which extends over a delimited territory.426 
Importantly, he argues that we face a paradox in that governance is becoming increasingly 
multilevel and spatially dispersed, while representation, loyalty, and identity remain rooted in 
traditional ethnic, regional or national communities (an issue which we will consider in the next 
chapter).427 Indeed, individuals are stakeholders in myriad transnational political problems but do 
not have a say in the resolution of these problems.  
 Addressing these myriad issues, Held argues, requires that we embrace the principle of 
significantly affected interests such that those who are significantly affected by a global good or 
ill (those whose life expectancy and life chances are significantly affected by processes or 
decisions) have a say in its provision or regulation either directly or indirectly through 
representatives. Additionally, he argues that, ‘Democracy is best located when it is closest to and 
involves those whose life expectancy and life chances are determined by powerful entities, 
bringing the circles of stakeholders and decision-makers closer together.’428 The aim would be to 
match stakeholders with decision-makers through embracing the principle of affectedness 
alongside principles of inclusivity and subsidiarity. He goes on to note that the principles of 
inclusivity and subsidiarity would simultaneously require the centralisation and decentralisation 
of political power. That is, if decisions are decentralised as much as possible, it increases the 
ability of those affected, ‘to influence the social conditions that shape his or her life.’429 
Nonetheless, if decisions are translocal, transnational, or transregional, then it will be necessary 
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to create institutions with wider scope and power – ‘In this context, the creation of diverse sites 
and levels of democratic fora may by unavoidable.’430 This is because such decisions do not 
clearly map onto demarcated territories, necessitating the expansion of the relevant public to 
ensure that those significantly affected have the chance to influence decisions. He concludes that, 
‘If diverse peoples beyond borders are effectively stakeholders in the operation of select regional 
and global forces, their de facto status as members of diverse communities would need to be 
matched by a de jure political status, if the mechanisms and institutions that govern these political 
spaces are to be brought under the rubric of the principle of inclusiveness and subsidiarity. 
Stakeholders in de facto communities and networks of local, national, regional and global 
processes will be politically empowered only if they achieve the necessary complementary de 
jure status.’431  
 Indeed, he argues that the world is comprised of, ‘overlapping communities of fate. 
Recognising the complex processes of an interconnected world, it ought to view certain issues – 
such as housing, education and policing – as appropriate for spatially delimited political spheres 
(the city, region or state), while seeing others – such as the environment, world health and global 
economic regulation – as requiring new, more extensive institutions to address them.’432 He goes 
on to note that decision-making centres beyond the state should only be utilised when they uphold 
the principles of affectedness, inclusivity, and subsidiarity: that is, transnational institutions would 
only be competent to make decisions when the demos whose life chances are affected by a 
decision cuts across national borders, and when lower levels of decision-making are unable to 
satisfactorily resolve these issues.433 This would require the establishment of a multi-level 
network of overlapping democratic public fora, ranging from cities to global centres of decision-
making. Importantly, it is likely that participatory forms of decision-making could be utilised at 
lower levels of governance, and higher levels of decision-making would establish a process for 
public deliberation, ensuring that a, ‘broad spectrum of views are considered, and collective 
judgements are arrived at, through deliberation – deliberation guided by the requirements of 
impartiality,’434 where being impartial requires that parties are open to, and argue from, all points 
of view.435  
 Held also offers us a series of concrete policy suggestions. These include: the formation 
of a global assembly of states and agencies tasked with addressing global problems and 
promulgating, implementing, and embedding global standards, laws, and democratic principles 
which would secure the minimum conditions for human agency to flourish; the creation of 
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regional parliaments and governance structures along the lines of the EU, with enhanced powers 
for regional regulation; the opening up of international governmental organisations (IGOs), such 
as the World Trade Organisation, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, to public 
scrutiny and agenda-setting, and making them accountable to regional and global assemblies; the 
creation and enhancement of IGOs to address social and environmental issues, offsetting and 
counterbalancing the influence and power of market-oriented organisations such as the WTO; 
enhancing the transparency and accountability of transnational civil society agencies, including 
non-governmental international organisations (NGOs), as well as ensuring that those in 
developing countries enjoy equal representation in such agencies; the increased use of cross-
border referenda at regional and global levels when aiming to address global concerns; and the 
development of an independent global law enforcement agency tasked with peacekeeping and 
peace-making.436 
Importantly, in contrast to Pettit, Held argues that there may be a need for the creation of 
a new transfer system within and across national communities to secure social justice.437 The aim 
would be to create a system in which resources are, ‘generated to alleviate the most pressing cases 
of avoidable economic suffering and harm.’438 Indeed, Held argues that just as national 
governments require taxation to secure the basic liberties and other public goods, so will similar 
fundraising and redistributive mechanisms be required at the global level in order to address the 
plight of the least well-off. Such mechanisms might include consumption taxes on energy usage, 
a tax on the extraction of national resources, or a tax on the GNP of countries above a specified 
level of development. Fundamentally, the aim would be to create independent, global funds which 
would be used to address severe poverty.439 
 It is also important to note that Held offers us an idea of how multinational corporations 
might be regulated within a transnational system of governance, arguing that, ‘if economic 
interaction is to be entrenched in a set of mechanisms and procedures that allow markets to 
flourish in the long run within the constraints of core labour, social and environmental standards, 
the rules of the game will have to be transformed systematically, at regional and global 
levels…While corporations are already embedded in complex-rule systems, these will have to be 
reconfigured so that companies are required to meet new standards.’440 The aim would be to 
provide the framework within which those powers which compromise, disrupt, or undermine the 
fair and sustainable conditions for economic cooperation and competition, to be reformed and 
regulated. This would, ‘involve the entrenchment of revised codes, rules and procedures – 
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concerning health, child labour, trade union activity, environmental protection, stakeholder 
consultation and corporate governance, among other matters – in the articles of association and 
terms of reference of economic organisations and trading agencies,’441 and that, ‘governments 
should aim to create a legally binding international protocol…to govern the production, trade and 
consumption of all resources,’442 as well as, ‘extend the principles of anti-monopoly legislation 
found within national borders to the wider economic community.’443 The suggestion, here, seems 
to be that the regional and global levels of governance would take steps to ensure that 
multinational corporations would sign up to a set of rules which specify how they may behave, 
thereby securing, ‘an enduring settlement [is] created between business interests, regulatory 
capacity and cosmopolitan concerns.’444 
 While Held also has much to say about global economic regulation, human rights, and 
transnational legislation, we need not consider these arguments here since they’re beyond the 
focus of this thesis. What is crucial is that Held offers us an example of a framework in which we 
would be able to pursue the strategy of constitutional provision at a transnational level, enabling 
us to develop a set of external constraints which would remove the option of interference from 
transnational agents’ choice-sets, thereby protecting states’ capacity to secure social and political 
justice and preventing multinational corporations from acting with impunity. It would also enable 
us to develop a multi-level system of governance in which individuals are able to exert influence 
and direction over the ways in which they’re governed, thereby securing democratic legitimacy. 
Indeed, Held notes that, ‘Globalisation does not lead to the end of state choice or the end of 
national political strategies…but the regulative capacity of states increasingly has to be matched 
to the development of collaborative mechanisms of governance at supranational, regional and 
global levels.’445 That is, states would still be able to secure social and political justice for their 
citizens within a hierarchical system of overlapping demoi. Importantly, if the transfer system 
enabled failing or developing states to adequately provide for their citizens, this would be a 
significant improvement on Pettit’s account, and would be better able to ensure that states can 
secure internal social and political justice. Such an approach would also potentially provide a 
further check on multinational corporations’ power: if all states have access to adequate levels of 
wealth and resources, they will be less likely to engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ on labour and 
environmental regulations or corporation taxes in order to attract wealthy corporations to their 
shores.   
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 In addition, the fact that such a system of governance is premised upon principles of 
affectedness, inclusivity, and subsidiarity will ensure that those coerced by transnational decisions 
will be able to direct and influence them. Indeed, even though I have already argued that Held’s 
specific principle of affectedness, the ‘all significantly affected interests’ principle, is incoherent 
(since we cannot know who is significantly affected until a decision has been made), Held’s multi-
level system of governance could be premised upon the principles affectedness and subsidiarity 
outlined above. That is, within this multi-level system of governance, where the aim is to ensure 
that those affected by political decisions have a say in their formation, we could embed the 
subsidiarity-qualified principle of ‘all possibly affected interests’, such that decisions would be 
taken at the level which ensures that all of those possibly affected by a decision have a say in its 
formation, without including those who are unlikely to be affected. For example, if the issue under 
consideration is education in Scotland, the decision could be taken by a Scottish government 
rather than an overarching U.K. government. Likewise, if the issue is the development of 
European infrastructure, the decision could be taken at a regional level without it being referred 
to a global demos.   
 Finally, it is important to note that such a system could be rendered non-arbitrary if we 
replicate Pettit’s democratically shaped constitutional mechanisms at each level of governance, 
ensuring that individuals have the requisite degree of influence and direction over all levels of 
decision-making. Securing such influence suggests that we would need democratic mechanisms 
for selecting representatives, as well as constitutional and quasi-constitutional mechanisms which 
would constrain decision-makers, including ombudsmen, statisticians, auditors, central bankers, 
pressure groups, interest groups and judges and perhaps a written constitution specifying the 
rights and powers held by the respective demoi.446 Securing direction suggests that we would need 
to develop mechanisms for deriving deliberative norms or a common good for each demoi (a 
point which we’ll return to in the next chapter) and suggests a need to secure deliberative 
mechanisms at each level of governance. Importantly, if we replicated the deliberative institution, 
outlined in the second chapter, at each level of governance, we would make it easier for the 
common good to emerge in each demos, as well as facilitating the transformation of adaptive 
preferences and securing individuals’ capacity to keep tabs on the different levels of governance. 
Indeed, as argued in the second chapter, such a deliberative institution will better ensure that 
citizens retain a vigilant oversight of their governments. If each demoi, from the local to the 
global, could be constituted along similar lines to the domestic state, with citizens electing 
representatives who make decisions in accordance with their common good, and supported and 
regulated by a range of constitutional and quasi-constitutional agents, it seems possible to ensure 
that an increased array of governance structures do not become a new source of domination.  
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Importantly, this is not to suggest that each level of governance or each demoi needs to 
necessarily adopt the same political institutions and laws. Indeed, the requirements of securing 
influence and direction are sufficiently broad as to permit a wide variety of political systems and 
institutions. For example, at local levels of governance, democracy may take the form of town-
hall meetings or public fora while the global level of decision-making may call for a global 
parliament, populated by states’ representatives who are elected directly by national citizens. The 
actual form taken of any level of governance need not be determined in advance. Instead, the sole 
imperatives are to ensure that states’ capacity to secure and political justice are protected; that 
decisions are taken at the level that ensures that all of those possibly affected by a decision have 
a say in its formation (in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity); and that those who 
comprise each level of governance are able to influence and direct the decisions taken at that level 
of governance. This suggests that there will be significant scope for institutional variation and 
experimentation.  
What we will find in such a system of governance is that individuals will be members of 
a series of overlapping demoi, with each demos responsible for specific issues and accountable 
to their respective demos. Individuals would be able to influence and direct the ways that they’re 
controlled at all levels, and ensure that all political control is non-arbitrary. Global redistribution 
would better ensure that states are able to secure the basic liberties, and multinational corporations 
would be subject to genuine constraints: their economic leverage would be mitigated through 
states being lifted out of poverty and the creation of a series of international regulations which 
specify the ways in which they may and may not act.  
With that said, such an account poses two important challenges. Firstly, we need to 
consider how we might entrench the basic liberties and secure the resourcing of individual choice, 
in order to guard against vitiation and dependence, within this transnational framework. Secondly, 
we have to explore how we might resolve jurisdictional disputes when it is unclear exactly which 
level of governance ought to be tasked with making a decision. The next two sections will seek 
to address these issues. 
 
Human Rights: Protecting and Resourcing Individual Choice 
 
In order to explore how we might securely entrench the basic liberties and the resourcing of 
personal choice within this transnational framework, it is necessary to briefly reiterate Pettit’s 
account of social justice, and then consider his comments on the role played by human rights 
within his account of international justice. Doing so is necessary because Pettit’s comments in 
Just Freedom suggest that it is possible to cast the minimal requirements of securing personal 
independence as a set of human rights which ought to enjoy transnational and global entrenchment 
and enforcement.    
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 To that end, I outlined, in the first chapter, that the basic liberties are those choices that 
are capable of being co-exercised and co-satisfied, and acknowledged that Pettit claims that those 
choices which meet these criteria will vary across societies. Importantly, the choices which meet 
the criteria for qualifying as a basic liberties will be those which are general and distal; that is, 
they will be liberties which secure further liberties (as when, for example, freedom of speech will 
secure the freedom to speak at political meetings). Importantly, Pettit further outlines a set of 
general distal choices which would likely secure individuals against dominium, including: 
freedom of thought; freedom of expression; freedom of religion; freedom of association; property 
rights and freedom to trade and exchange; employment rights, including the right to change 
occupation; and freedom of travel within the community.447 We saw that Pettit also argues that 
guarding against vitiation will require the provision of a range of resources which would secure 
individuals from dependency, and would presumably include the provision of resources to meet 
individuals’ basic needs (including access to shelter, clean water, food, education, adequate 
healthcare etc.).448 I also noted that Pettit argues that, ‘Culturally diverse societies may call for 
the entrenchment of divergent sets of basic liberties,’449 and that, ‘there is no reason to think that 
only a single candidate will be right from the point of view of freedom as non-domination.’450 We 
also saw that the eyeball test represents the yardstick for measuring the extent to which the basic 
liberties are entrenched: once individuals can walk tall and look others in the eye, free from 
dependence upon their goodwill, they can be deemed to be protected against dominium.  
 Interestingly, however, we also saw that Pettit argues that it is justifiable for 
representative states to interfere in the affairs of failing or oppressive states. Indeed, I noted that 
Pettit specifically argues that he is concerned with developing an account of international justice 
which secures the external non-domination of peoples rather than states, as doing so allows us to 
retain a focus on the possibility of a state failing to secure social or political justice. As such, Pettit 
acknowledges that state sovereignty does not take precedence over the necessity of securing non-
domination for citizens, and oppressive regimes do not enjoy external protections against 
interference. He goes on to argue that, ‘a state counts as oppressive just to the extent that it offends 
against those human rights of its subjects.’451 Importantly, he acknowledges that there are 
contested accounts of exactly what counts as a human right, but goes on to suggest that there is 
nonetheless, ‘broad agreement that many rights count as human rights in the relevant sense.’452 
 There seems, then, to be something of a contradiction in Pettit’s arguments. He seemingly 
adopts a somewhat ambivalent, relativist account of the basic liberties, such that the basic liberties 
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will differ across societies, while a set of objective, though unspecified, human rights will be 
globally entrenched and used to justify the global community’s interference into oppressive 
regimes. I think that this tension can be reconciled if we understand Pettit to be arguing that the 
most general, distal basic liberties, and the resources required for personal independence, are 
those items which would form a set of human rights, with the further liberties which the 
fundamental basic liberties generate, as well as the actual specification of the liberties, diverging 
across societies. Indeed, he notes that the basic liberties are not, ‘natural liberties that are set in 
stone, but rather as liberties that are universally applicable across societies, though open to 
variations of interpretation in each.’453 As such, it seems that the fundamental basic liberties and 
rights which secure personal independence (including rights to food, clean water, shelter, 
education, healthcare etc.), can be cast as a set of human rights, contravention of which justifies 
multilateral intervention by the international community.  
 Indeed, I think that it is necessary to conceptualise these items as human rights as it would 
be hard to imagine how anyone could be deemed to enjoy non-domination if they lacked access 
to the resources necessary to lead a life of their own choosing, and were thereby forced into 
dependency upon others, or if they were denied freedom of expression or thought, or prevented 
from practicing their religion or associating with others of their choosing. These items should 
therefore be viewed as human rights precisely because they secure the minimum protections 
necessary for individuals everywhere to plan and lead a life of their own choosing, free from 
interference by others. These items, which are necessary components of mitigating against 
dominium and securing social justice, therefore should be seen to enjoy universal applicability 
across all states, with scope for differential implementation in different communities.  
Within the context of my own account of international justice, which emphasises the 
project of cosmopolitan democracy and the creation of transnational institutions, such rights 
would acquire global recognition and entrenchment: that is, the fundamental basic liberties and 
welfare rights would be cast as a set of human rights which all states would be required to 
safeguard. Responsibility for ensuring that these rights are upheld would be primarily entrusted 
to states, with the transnational and global demoi of which states are constituent members 
overseeing and regulating their proper enforcement.  
 Importantly, Pettit’s and my own approach to safeguarding human rights mirrors that of 
Rawls and Raz with human rights functioning as a constraint or limit on state sovereignty and 
pluralism. Indeed, Rawls, in The Law of Peoples, has argued that:   
     
Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: 
they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a 
regime's internal autonomy.... Human rights set a necessary, though not sufficient, 
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standard for the decency of domestic political and social institutions. In doing so they 
limit admissible domestic law of societies in good standing in a reasonably just Society 
of Peoples. Hence the special class of human rights has these three roles: 
 
1. Their fulfilment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society's political 
institutions and of its legal order. 
2. Their fulfilment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other 
peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by 
military force. 
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among peoples.454 
 
Similarly, Raz has argued that, following Rawls, he understands, ‘human rights to be 
rights which set limits to the sovereignty of states, in that their actual or anticipated violation is a 
(defeasible) reason for taking action against the violator in the international arena,’ and goes on 
to argue that, ‘such measures set limits to state sovereignty for when states act within their 
sovereignty they can, even when acting wrongly, rebuff interference, invoking their 
sovereignty…Violation of human rights disables this response, which is available to states 
regarding other misdeeds.’455 We can see, then, that Pettit, Rawls, and Raz all conceive of human 
rights in the same way: they act as constraints on state sovereignty and trigger international 
intervention, though this may not necessarily entail military intervention.456  
My approach follows this conception of human rights, with states enjoying internal 
sovereignty within an overlapping network of demoi. Where it differs from these other theorists’ 
approaches is in more fully entrenching and regulating the protection of these rights: that is, there 
will be continuous oversight by transnational and global demoi. Indeed, states’ fulfilment of their 
obligations would be overseen by global and transnational constitutional and quasi-constitutional 
institutions and agents, including NGOs, international organisations, as well as the overlapping 
democratic communities. My approach therefore furthers and more fully entrenches Pettit’s 
account of human rights at all levels of governance and would, hopefully, ensure that all 
individuals enjoy the basic liberties and material resources necessary to lead lives of their own 
choosing and, if not, ensure that they have recourse to transnational institutions and agents. 
Additionally, in embedding human rights within a cosmopolitan democratic framework, the need 
for military intervention to secure human rights is less likely to be necessary. This is because 
violations would be quickly identified by international organisations and transnational demoi, and 
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could be remedied through diplomatic or economic pressure exerted across states and by the 
transnational and global communities. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that human rights 
will, in setting limits to the internal autonomy of states, make certain conceptions of the good 
unrealisable, or otherwise come into conflict with individuals’ ethical commitments. We will 
consider this issue in the next chapter when we explore the conflicts engendered by providing a 
republican education which is incompatible with some ethical traditions.  
 
Boundary Courts 
 
The final task of this chapter is to look at how jurisdictional disputes might be resolved within the 
transnational framework being developed. Indeed, this is necessary because I haven’t specified 
exactly what decisions would be taken at each level of governance, or indicated what the 
competencies of the respective demoi would be. This is because the appropriate location for 
decision-making would be determined in accordance with the principles of ‘all possibly affected 
interests’ and subsidiarity, and it will be difficult to specify in advance exactly what decisions 
will affect who. For example, we can imagine a situation in which a sub-state nation, such as the 
Catalans or Scots, wish to become an independent state. It is unclear, here, exactly where a 
decision should be made. Indeed, the outcome will affect those living in the sub-state nation which 
seeks independence, will have an effect upon the overarching state of which they’re a constitute 
member, and will presumably have an effect upon the regional blocs of which they’re members 
(for example, Scotland’s request to retain membership of the EU if it gains independence has been 
blocked by the Spanish government which is concerned that a worrying precedent would be set 
for its Catalan and Basque populations). In such a case, it is therefore unclear exactly where a 
decision should be made in accordance with the principles of affectedness and subsidiarity.  
Indeed, Held acknowledges this problem, noting that, ‘the boundaries demarcating 
different levels of governance will always be contested…Disputes about the appropriate 
jurisdiction for handling particular public issues will be complex and intensive; but better complex 
and intensive in a clear public framework than simply left to powerful geopolitical interests 
(dominant states) or market-based organisations to resolve them alone.’457 While he doesn’t offer 
a solution to this problem in Global Covenant, he does offer a suggestion for resolving 
jurisdictional disputes in a footnote in his earlier work, arguing that: 
 
The principle that decisions about public affairs should rest with those significantly 
affected by them, or their representatives, will, of course, not always lead to clear 
demarcations among the appropriate levels of decision-making, even with the aid of the 
proposed filter principles and tests. Disputes about the appropriate jurisdiction of 
particular communities will in all likelihood be complex and intensive (as they are in the 
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EU). Accordingly, ‘issue-boundary’ forums or courts will have to be created to hear cases 
concerning where and how a ‘significant interest’ in a public question should be explored 
and resolved.458 
 
 Since Held does not specify how such boundary courts would operate, it is important for 
this thesis to briefly indicate how such a system might resolve disputes about affectedness in a 
way which does not entail domination. As we’ve seen above, we’re also concerned with whether 
someone is possibly affected by an issue rather than whether or not they’re significantly affected. 
The aim of such a court, then, would be to resolve jurisdictional issues when it is unclear who 
will be possibly affected by an issue. For example, in the German-Scandinavia case, it is unclear 
whether the appropriate level for decision-making would be at the state, regional, or global level 
since, as we’ve seen above, the decision will have a differential impact depending upon who gets 
to make the decision. That is, if just Germans get to choose, the outcome will affect 
Scandinavians; if Scandinavians are included, then the decision may well affect another group.  
Importantly, I have already argued that while this example seems to make the case for 
including everyone everywhere in determining where Germany can pollute, real world constraints 
will nonetheless prevent Germany from affecting individuals in, for example, the Far East, the 
Americas, or Africa. Indeed, the logistical constraints on Germany manufacturers’ chimneys 
mean that the only individuals with any real prospect of being affected are those within a 
determinable distance from Germany. In making a decision, the court would need to take such 
evidence into account and hear deputations from the relevant parties (including those who think 
they might be affected by the decision). The court would be required to aim to strive to strike a 
balance between the Scylla of overinclusion (raising the possibility of unaffected interests 
determining the outcome for those who will be affected), and the Charybdis of underinclusion 
(and the possibility of individuals being affected by a decision and not having a say in its making) 
through pursuing the principles of affectedness and subsidiarity in conjunction.  
In such a case, the court would likely rule that the decision ought not to be made at a 
global level, since this would allow myriad unaffected individuals or their representatives to 
determine the outcome. The court would then need to look at whether the decision ought to be 
taken at a state or regional level. In this case, where Germany’s intention is to pollute their 
neighbours, it seems clear that the decision would be a regional one since, even if Germany 
decided against polluting in Scandinavia, it would be able to pollute in a number of neighbouring 
states. The court would therefore be likely to rule that the decision ought to be made at the regional 
level of governance. This would ensure that those possibly affected, including Germans, 
Scandinavians, Danes, French, and Italians, all get to have a say in the outcome. There will be 
some overinclusion since not all Europeans will be affected by whatever decision is reached. 
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Though there will be some overinclusion, such an approach would nonetheless be a significant 
improvement upon existing arrangements in which states unilaterally take decisions which have 
a huge effect upon others’ lives, and Goodin’s suggestions for enfranchising all possibly affected 
interests or overlaying states with a layer of world government, each of which would allow 
billions of unaffected individuals to determine outcomes.  
While the court would have a straightforward role in addressing such transnational 
decisions where it is clear that decisions will affect others beyond the state, we must nonetheless 
consider whether the court ought to be able to adjudicate on sub-state jurisdictional disputes as 
well. That is, we have to decide whether the court ought to allow states to rule on all issues within 
their borders, as Goodin suggests, or whether the court ought to also ensure that the principles of 
‘all possibly affected interests’ and subsidiarity are properly upheld at a sub-state level. There are 
two primary concerns that we must consider, here. On the one hand, if the court were tasked with 
adjudicating upon sub-state disputes, it would likely be inundated with cases and be required to 
rule on a huge number of decisions every day. This would seem to be wildly inefficient and 
potentially infeasible. On the other hand, if sub-state disputes were left for states to resolve, this 
would seem to permit states to be judges in their own cause and allow them to ignore the principles 
of affectedness and subsidiarity. Indeed, the Spanish government’s refusal to countenance a 
Catalonian independence referendum offers us an example of this kind of issue, with the higher 
level of governance routinely disregarding and overruling the concerns of constituent demoi. 
The first issue, then, concerns whether a boundary court could ever achieve its aims if it 
were required to adjudicate on all jurisdictional disputes at sub-state and transnational levels. 
Indeed, it is likely that if the court were required to rule on all such issues, it would be inundated 
with disputes: it would have to rule on whether sub-state regions ought to have fiscal autonomy, 
where local authority’s jurisdictions extend to and what issues they can competently resolve, 
whether supra-national institutions can impose tax-raising measures within their regions or 
whether taxation remains a national concern, as well as a whole host of other problems. I think 
that it is fairly clear that a global court would be unable to adequately discharge its duties, 
collecting evidence, hearing deputations, and ruling on disputes, if it were required to resolve a 
significant number of these issues on a daily basis. This seems to suggest that such disputes would 
either go unresolved for long periods of time (presumably well beyond he deadlines in which 
they’d need to be resolved), or that the boundary court would come to represent a Leviathan-like 
bureaucratic entity, with a huge degree of power over the workings of the global political system. 
Indeed, this raises the spectre of totalitarianism as, if the court were to be captured by special 
interests or pursue an ideological approach towards resolving such disputes (perhaps always 
favouring global decisions, for example) it would be incompatible with the aims of neo-
republicanism.  
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To avoid such problems, it might be prudent to adopt an amended version of Goodin’s 
approach and require the court to simply resolve transnational jurisdictional disputes. If we 
adopted such an approach, states would fulfil a role much closer to that which they undertake 
now, with national governments setting polices as they see fit. This would ensure that the 
boundary court’s remit is more heavily circumscribed, seemingly preventing it from becoming a 
global Leviathan or a cumbersome bureaucratic entity which is unable to quickly and accurately 
resolve jurisdictional disputes. Nonetheless, this approach is problematic because it seemingly 
permits states far too much discretion within their own borders. For example, we might find the 
U.K. government determining education and healthcare policies in Scotland or Wales; the Spanish 
government might completely remove the fiscal autonomy of the Autonomous Communities or 
legislate against the language rights of the Catalans or Basques; or the U.S. federal government 
might undertake to usurp states’ traditional rights and implement a uniform system of governance, 
expanding its own jurisdiction at the expense of states. Such an approach would, as we’ve seen 
above, be problematic from a neo-republican perspective as it would permit those unaffected by 
an issue to determine the outcome of that issue, giving rise to arbitrary governance.  
We are faced, then, with a choice between equally unattractive options. We can either 
advocate a court which may be unable to adequately discharge its duties, or one which permits 
domination at sub-state levels. Since the latter option is the more obviously problematic from a 
neo-republican perspective, since it would allow national majorities to determine decisions over 
all sub-state groups irrespective of whether or not they’re affected by the decisions reached (as 
would be the case, for example, if the government in Madrid denied the Catalans the option to 
conduct their local government in Catalan rather than Castilian Spanish), it seems appropriate to 
embrace the former option and aim to refine the court in such a way that we can avoid the 
problems noted above. That is, we should aim to develop a court which rules on sub-state 
jurisdictional issues, and thereby upholds and enforces the principles of affectedness and 
subsidiarity, but which is designed so that it can respond to millions of different disputes without 
becoming a global Leviathan. 
To that end, I think that the most appropriate form for the boundary court to take would 
be a hierarchical system of courts, each tasked with resolving jurisdictional disputes at a specific 
level of governance. In order to develop such a system, it would be necessary to start by convening 
an initial worldwide constitutional convention, comprised of representatives of all peoples, with 
the aim of specifying the broad competencies of each level of governance. We might find, for 
example, that responding to global ills such as climate change, poverty, or terrorism, would be a 
responsibility of the global level of decision-making, whereas the provision of the basic liberties 
would be entrusted to states. Once such a convention had specified a rough outline of the powers 
of each level of governance, courts would be assembled at each level of governance to adjudicate 
on disputes. For example, we might have a state-level court which resolves sub-state disputes 
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(between, for example, cities, boroughs, and counties or their equivalents), a state level court 
which resolves disputes, where applicable, between states and their constituent nations (for 
example, this court would adjudicate on jurisdictional disputes between the U.K. and Scotland, 
Ireland, and Wales, or between Spain and the Basque Country and Catalonia). We would then 
have supranational courts, resolving issues between states and regional governance institutions 
(for example, between Germany or France and the European Union) and courts resolving disputes 
between regions (for example, between the European Union and an African or Asian equivalent). 
At the pinnacle of the system, we would have a global boundary court, regulating the lower courts, 
and ensuring that issues which require a global decision are taken at a global level of governance 
(for example, on issues of global poverty, and addressing global ills such as AIDs, terrorism, or 
economic practices).  
While a full analysis of how such courts might be constituted and operated is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it is necessary to note a few qualifications. The first is that it would be 
necessary to ensure that those tasked with resolving jurisdictional disputes do not have a stake in 
their outcome. That is, for the court adjudicating upon disputes between the U.K. and the 
constituent nations, it would be necessary to draw the courts’ members from outside of the U.K. 
to ensure that the decisions reached are as impartial as possible. Secondly, it would be necessary 
to develop mechanisms for ensuring that decisions are made in a timely manner. This will be 
necessary when an immediate decision must be made but there is a disagreement over who gets 
to make that decisions. For example, we can imagine a situation in which there is an outbreak of 
a new disease which is able to spread rapidly. It may be the case that it is momentarily confined 
to a state or region such as the EU and a decision must be reached about how it ought to be 
addressed and prevented from spreading. In such a situation, it will be necessary for an immediate 
decision about whether the EU ought to resolve the issue or whether the global government should 
step in. This suggests that there would be a need to develop mechanisms and processes for 
distinguishing between non-urgent disputes (perhaps over education policy), and crises, such that 
a specific dispute can be rapidly referred to the appropriate court. This also suggests that it would 
be appropriate to develop a pre-screening system, as operates in existing courts, wherein the 
disputants submit their cases for an initial assessment so that it can be appropriately prioritised. 
Finally, it is important to note that each of these courts would need to be subject to oversight by 
non-governmental organisations and interest groups, who would aim to ensure that the courts’ 
activities are transparent, and would need to be held accountable by governance institutions. 
Exactly what balance would need to be struck is unclear, but we can tentatively suggest that there 
would need to be a means for the peoples of the respective demoi to sanction the courts if they 
fail to adequately discharge their duties. This might require some form of impeachment process 
for the judiciary which can be enacted by the peoples’ representatives, and undertaken by other 
judges. 
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It is clear that this process will be far from perfect: it may be a cumbersome way to resolve 
jurisdictional disputes, it may still result in over or underinclusion in the making of political 
decisions, and it may permit boundary judges too much power within political decision making. 
Nonetheless, it would be a vast improvement on our current system of governance in which geo-
political interests determine a great many issues, and in which powerful states make unilateral 
decisions or influence international bodies to pursue their goals. Moreover, if the boundary courts 
could select the most appropriate level for decision-making, in accordance with the principles of 
‘all possibly affected interests’ and subsidiarity, and decision-makers at each level of governance 
were subject to their demos’ influence and direction, we would seemingly be able to render the 
majority of decisions legitimate and non-dominating.  
Although I have only presented this account of transnational governance in very broad 
terms, it seems that such a system would be preferable to those advocated by Pettit and Bohman 
as it would seemingly better enable us to realise the aims of neo-republican governance. That is, 
states would be able to discharge their duties within an overarching framework which would be 
able discipline states and other transnational agents in a manner analogous to the state’s 
disciplining of individuals. If democratically shaped constitutional mechanisms were developed 
at all levels of governance, as well as the development of a means for determining each demos’ 
shared interests, then we could be assured that individuals would be able to exercise the requisite 
degree of influence and direction over the ways in which they’re controlled, securing democratic 
legitimacy. Finally, boundary courts would, if suitably designed, be able to uphold the principles 
of affectedness and subsidiarity and ensure that individuals are able to influence and direct the 
political coercion that they’re subject to, thereby addressing the problem of individualised 
transnational domination. 
With that said, these comments do indicate a serious issue which we must address if we 
would develop such an overarching system of governance. This is that, as noted by Jurgen 
Habermas, attempting to develop a supranational democracy runs into the ‘no-demos thesis’:459 
that is, beyond the nation-state, there is little evidence of the mutual trust, or civic and cultural 
foundations necessary for individuals to see themselves as co-members of demoi. Indeed, the 
problem that we must face is that it may not be possible or desirable to extend democracy and 
democratic institutions beyond the state to groups of individuals who may be subject to deeply 
irreconcilable differences, or who lack the civic or cultural foundations which support national 
democracy. The task of the next chapter is to explore a series of objections to cosmopolitan 
democracy in order to argue that it is possible to support the emergence of supranational demoi 
through a combination of transnational deliberation, civic education, and ‘trans-nationalism’. 
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Conclusion  
 
The task of this chapter has been to explore how we might develop a transnational political system 
capable of providing the framework within which individuals can enjoy social, political, and 
international justice. In order to do so, I firstly explored ‘the boundary problem.’ This has been 
central to the development of this chapter, and the overall aims of this thesis, because securing 
non-domination requires that political control is forced to track the interests and ideas of the 
person suffering the interference and, as we saw in the third chapter, the problem of individualised 
transnational domination shows that control is not territorially-confined. As such, it has been 
necessary to consider how we might redraw democratic boundaries in order to ensure that all of 
those subject to control are able to influence and direct it, and thereby render it non-dominating. 
I have argued that demoi must be constituted on the basis of who can be deemed to be possibly 
affected by a given issue, while taking into account real world constraints and thereby 
supplementing the principle of affectedness with a principle of subsidiarity. After outlining this 
approach to constituting demoi, I have argued that Held’s cosmopolitan democracy provides us 
with the means to secure social, political, and international justice and would, if suitably refined, 
secure individuals against domination. 
 To that end, the first section focused upon briefly outlining that we need to offer a solution 
to the boundary problem. This is because we have seen that securing democratic legitimacy 
requires that all of those suffering interference must exert influence and direction over that 
interference, and yet the problem of individualised transnational domination has shown that 
interference is not confined to self-contained territorial units. These issues necessitate a 
reconsideration of how we draw democratic boundaries. I have argued, here, that the foundational 
issue in specifying demoi is over whether we focus on those actually affected or those who are 
possibly affected, agreeing with Goodin that we must focus on drawing democratic boundaries 
around those who are possibly affected by a given decision. With that said, I have then argued, in 
the second section, that Goodin’s approach dismisses a problem with which neo-republicans 
ought to be concerned. This problem is that if we adopt an overinclusive approach to constituting 
demoi, we will be unable to realise the neo-republican aim of ensuring that control is forced to 
track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference. Acknowledging that we’re 
faced with the equally unattractive options of drawing boundaries in an under- or overinclusive 
way, I have argued that we should attempt to develop a transnational system of governance 
premised upon Goodin’s principle of ‘all possibly affected interests’ but qualified and 
supplemented by a principle of subsidiarity which would aim to mitigate against excessive 
overinclusion. 
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 I then, in the third section, considered two accounts of transnational governance as 
possible means for implementing these principles and pursuing the aims of neo-republican 
governance. We have seen that both approaches would fail to secure the influence and direction 
required to render political processes democratically legitimate: the former because too much 
power is handed to unelected technocrats; the latter because it only advocates a lesser ‘input’ right 
to those affected by decisions taken at a distance. This then led into a discussion of cosmopolitan 
democracy, and an extended analysis of Held’s global social democracy. Here, I argued that 
Held’s approach would enable us to realise each of the requirements of neo-republican 
governance, as well as balance between excessive over and underinclusion.  
In the fifth section I argued that we ought to conceive of the fundamental basic liberties, 
those that are general and distal, and rights to food, clean water, education, healthcare, and shelter, 
as a set of human rights. Indeed, I argued that this is necessary as these items are the minimum 
conditions necessary for individuals to lead lives of their own choosing and, as such, should enjoy 
global entrenchment and protection. I claimed, following Pettit, Rawls, and Raz, that we should 
see the contravention of these human rights as a trigger for international interference with the 
internal autonomy of political communities (though such intervention will likely stop short of 
being military interference since communities will be embedded within overarching transnational 
and global demoi, thus enabling us to identify infringements early and bring diplomatic and 
economic sanctions to bear). Responsibility for ensuring the provision of these goods will rest 
primarily with states, and will be overseen by transnational and global demoi which will be 
supplemented by a range of constitutional and quasi-constitutional agents who can monitor the 
actions of states. 
I then, in the sixth section, acknowledged that we need to develop a means for ensuring 
that the principles of affectedness and subsidiarity are properly upheld within the transnational 
political system. Noting that Held has tentatively suggested that it would be possible to create 
boundary courts as a means for resolving jurisdictional disputes, I attempted to explicate just such 
a model, arguing that it is important to ensure that the principles of affectedness and subsidiarity 
are upheld within states as well as at a transnational level. I have therefore argued for the creation 
of a system of courts at each level of governance which would resolve such disputes.  
 I finally noted a significant problem which this thesis must confront, and this is that it 
may be infeasible or undesirable to create demoi beyond the nation-state because there are deeply 
irreconcilable differences between peoples who lack a shared culture, language, or history. This 
problem, which Habermas refers to as the ‘no demos thesis’ must be addressed if we are going to 
be able to derive a common good at each level of governance, and thereby ensure that individuals 
are able to direct the ways in which they’re controlled. Outlining, analysing, and responding to 
this problem is the task of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five – Securing the Conditions for Transnational Republicanism 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter argued that securing non-domination requires the creation of a multi-level 
system of cosmopolitan governance. Such a framework offers a number of advantages: states 
would be able to secure social and political justice; transnational agents, including multinational 
corporations, would be subject to constitutional constraints; and individuals would be able to 
influence and direct the governance that they’re subject to. I concluded, however, by noting that 
we must confront a serious problem if such a system of governance is to be feasible. This issue is 
that beyond the nation-state, there is little evidence of the mutual trust, shared understanding, or 
linguistic commonalities necessary for individuals to see themselves as co-members of 
democratic communities. If we cannot surmount these issues, it seems unlikely that we would 
ever be able to develop functioning transnational republics, and would therefore fail in our attempt 
to address the problem of transnational domination. Indeed, this is because, as we saw in the 
second chapter, in order to render political control non-dominating and democratically legitimate, 
it is necessary to ensure that citizens are able to exert influence and direction over the ways in 
which they’re controlled, and that that securing direction requires that governance is determined 
in accordance with citizens’ shared interests or common good. Our problem, then, is that if trust, 
understanding, and the capacity to engage in deliberation are absent beyond the state, we would 
be unable to derive sets of transnational or global shared interests capable of rendering political 
control democratically legitimate, and we would therefore fail to secure transnational non-
domination. 
 The task of this chapter is to address these problems. Indeed, my aim is to consider three 
broad critiques which would apply to the multi-level system of governance outlined in the 
previous chapter, and outline how we might surmount these various challenges. These critiques 
are as follows: that transnational demoi are unnecessary since states already fulfil the requisite 
political functions; that transnational demoi could never function properly because they would 
lack the shared history and identity necessary for mutual trust and understanding to emerge 
between individuals and which provides the foundations for social justice and legitimate 
governance; and that a lack of a shared language will prevent us from deriving a common good 
capable of directing governance. Although unlikely to be achieved in the short term, I aim to show 
that we can create the conditions for the emergence of transnational civic solidarity through the 
promotion of a transnational nationalism or ‘trans-nationalism’, the use of a civic education, and 
the opening up of national public spheres to one another, such that their interaction creates a 
transnational public sphere. In this way, I hope to show that it may be possible in the near future 
to create functioning transnational republics and thereby secure non-domination. 
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 To that end, this chapter will proceed as follows. The first section will outline Goodin’s 
concern that that cosmopolitan democracy may be unnecessary or may entail a co-ordination 
problem, and discuss why I think this concern is surmountable. The second section will then 
explore the ‘no-demos’ thesis and David Miller’s liberal nationalism in detail, outlining the 
concern that the necessary pre-conditions for social justice and democratic legitimacy are missing 
beyond the state. The third section will then outline a response to this problem, arguing that we 
should aim to promote a ‘thinner’ trans-nationalism which would seek to promote a shared 
identity and history. The fourth section will then outline the importance of a civic education to 
the task of creating transnational demoi, as well as indicating that such an education should aim 
to create citizens who embrace reasonable pluralism and are capable of deliberating with one 
another in order to derive a common good capable of directing governance. The fifth section will 
then explore the claim that the crafting citizens in this way might be construed to be a form of 
cultural imperialism, and then argue that this is but one example of a more general problem: 
namely that the rights outlined in the previous chapter are likely to come into conflict with some 
ethical doctrines. After responding to this concern, the sixth section will then focus on Will 
Kymlicka’s claim that cosmopolitan democracy is infeasible because politics is conducted in the 
vernacular and that individuals do not see themselves as members of supranational demoi. I will 
outline that this problem can be surmounted if we follow Jurgen Habermas and John Dryzek’s 
suggestions of opening national public spheres to one another in order to create a transnational 
public sphere, one in which national publics engage in deliberative interaction with one another. 
If realisable, this would enable us to further entrench trans-nationalism and derive a transnational 
common good to direct governance, thereby securing democratically legitimate transnational 
governance and addressing the problem of transnational domination. The final section will 
conclude.   
 
Duties to Compatriots 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that Goodin, while advocating an approach to affectedness which 
would, ideally, require enfranchising everyone everywhere in every decision, nonetheless 
acknowledges that this is impractical and suggests a second approach which would see national 
decision-making supplemented by a global government. It is important to explore this claim at 
some length as Goodin, in ‘What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?’, defends the 
ongoing importance of states as a mechanism for ensuring that universal duties are effectively 
discharged. If he is correct, this would seem to count against the prospects of developing a multi-
level system of governance along the lines of outlined by Held because it would seem to show 
that transnational and global governance are unnecessary or likely to complicate states’ capacity 
to function properly. 
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 Goodin starts by outlining the distinction between general and special duties, with the 
former being concerned with what we owe to people by virtue of their humanity, and the latter 
being focused on the ‘especially good treatment,’460 that we owe to individuals with whom we 
stand in a special relationship.461 Noting that duties to compatriots fall in the latter category, he 
goes on to contend that we are required to be more scrupulous in our treatment of non-nationals 
and that, ‘some of our general duties to those beyond our borders are at least sometimes more 
compelling, morally speaking, than at least some of our special duties to our fellow citizens.’462 
As examples, he suggests that that it is permissible for the government to appropriate citizens’ 
property, providing they’re properly compensated, but that such an act is impermissible with non-
nationals; that fellow citizens can be conscripted but foreign nationals cannot be; that fellow 
citizens can be taxed, even if abroad, whereas foreigners living abroad cannot be taxed; that a 
government can dam or divert the flow of a river within its territory, disadvantaging citizens, but 
cannot similarly dam or divert a river that travels across national boundaries to the disadvantage 
of non-citizens; that we can allow factories to emit noxious fumes within our own territory, to the 
detriment of citizens, but cannot similarly allow it to disadvantage those in neighbouring 
countries; and the government must treat non-citizens in accordance with established international 
rules and laws, whereas citizens may be treated with some discretion.463 Goodin argues that these 
examples show that, ‘Sometimes we are indeed permitted (sometimes even required) to treat our 
fellow citizens better than we treat those who do not share that status with us. Other times, 
however, we are required to treat noncitizens better than we need to treat our own fellow 
citizens.’464 
 Goodin goes on to argue against the magnifier, multiplier, and mutual-benefit 
explanations for special duties, and outlines his own preferred explanation which he calls the 
assigned responsibility model. In Goodin’s view, we have special duties towards compatriots 
because our general duties need to be distributed to specific agents to ensure that they’re properly 
discharged. He offers us an example to illustrate why we should consider special duties to be 
largely derived from general duties, and outline why states’ ongoing existence can be justified by 
reference to our general duties. He suggests that we imagine that we live under a general 
injunction to save someone from drowning if you, and you alone, can do so. If by happenstance 
you are one day in a position where someone is drowning, that general duty becomes a compelling 
commandment to save someone. But, if it were the case that many people were watching a 
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swimmer drown, the injunction to save him may descend into a melee, with those seeking to save 
the drowning swimmer impeding one another’s progress. To avoid this problem, one individual, 
the lifeguard, is duly appointed as the one to discharge the general injunction as a special duty.465 
 This example, Goodin argues, seems to provide a good model for many of our special 
duties and, ‘A great many general duties point to tasks that, for one reason or another, are pursued 
more effectively if they are subdivided and particular people are assigned special responsibility 
for particular portions of the task.’466 He goes on to argue that national boundaries perform this 
function: ‘National boundaries simply visit upon those particular state agents special 
responsibility for discharging those general obligations vis-à-vis those individuals who happen to 
be their own citizens.’467 Importantly, Goodin argues that this justifies states in pressing the claims 
of their own citizens as, given the state system, everyone will have an advocate or protector, 
leading, ‘to maximal fulfilment of everyone’s general duties toward everyone else worldwide.’468  
 Goodin therefore seems to make two points which might be employed against the 
argument of the previous chapter. Firstly, he seems to be arguing that cosmopolitan democracy is 
unnecessary because states, however imperfectly, already discharge the duties required of a 
political system.469 Secondly, he seems to suggest that cosmopolitanism might actually undermine 
states’ capacities to secure the basic liberties by replicating the swimmer problem. That is, if 
individuals were deemed to be citizens of various overlapping demoi, and therefore had numerous 
‘advocates/protectors’ seeking to discharge general moral duties, then it is possible that none of 
them would do so adequately, much as would occur if many individuals sought to save a drowning 
individual and accidentally hindered one another’s ability to do so. Within the context of my own 
account of multi-level governance, this would seem to suggest that sub-state, national, 
transnational, and global decision-making units might compete for jurisdiction in certain cases, 
thereby failing to discharge their duties effectively.  
 Neither of these problems is insurmountable. Indeed, in response to the first point, that 
states already adequately discharge general duties, it is important to note that Goodin himself 
claims that, ‘Special responsibilities are, on my account, assigned merely as an administrative 
device for discharging our general duties more efficiently. If that is the aim, then they should be 
assigned to agents capable of discharging them effectively,’470 and that, ‘Citizenship is merely a 
device for fixing special responsibility in some agent for discharging our general duties vis-à-vis 
each particular person.’471 That is, states are seemingly not morally significant, and are simply the 
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most appropriate units for discharging these duties (it is interesting to note that this view of states 
conforms to Pettit’s own earlier view of states as discussed in the third chapter). Therefore, if it 
could be shown that states were unable to discharge their general duties, it would be appropriate 
to look to other units capable of doing so.  
And indeed, this is precisely the argument that I have advanced: states’ capacity to secure 
social and political justice requires an overarching framework which protects states; and the 
problem of individualised transnational domination can only be addressed if those subject to such 
control are able to influence and direct its formulation. Indeed, we saw that states are unable to 
discharge the general duty to secure non-domination without the support of additional levels of 
governance and law. It seems, then, that Goodin is ambivalent towards the importance of states: 
states are only relevant, and duties to compatriots are only special, because states seem to be the 
most appropriate means to ensure that general duties are discharged. Since states cannot discharge 
these duties adequately in an increasingly globalised world, I think that Goodin would be inclined 
to support the dispersal of these special duties across administrative units capable of discharging 
them: that is, if states are unable to address global ills such as poverty or disease, then it would 
be incumbent upon us to create administrative units which can discharge these duties.  
Indeed, this leads into my response to the co-ordination problem which, as noted above, 
arises when too many agents seek to discharge a duty. Centrally, I think that this problem is 
unlikely to arise in a cosmopolitan framework as long as the powers, responsibilities and duties 
of each level of governance are defined, as I’ve suggested they would be at a constitutional 
convention prior to the creation of the boundary courts, such that each unit of governance is tasked 
with discharging specific duties. Again, this is precisely what I have argued: states would still be 
tasked with securing social and political justice within their borders, but they would devolve and 
expatriate some powers to other levels of governance. Indeed, unlike in Bohman’s deliberative 
polyarchy (in which this co-ordination problem would be unresolvable) the different levels of 
governance within a cosmopolitan framework would be responsible for discharging specific 
duties over specified people. For example, a Scottish government could discharge a general duty 
to provide education in accordance with the shared interests of Scots and a U.K. government could 
ensure that U.K. citizens are able to realise their basic liberties.  
It seems, then, that Goodin’s ambivalence towards the ongoing importance of states 
actually supports my own argument: if we’re inclined to believe that states can no longer 
adequately discharge their duties because globalisation has undermined their capacity to do so, 
then we have a prima facie obligation to create democratic communities capable of discharging 
these general duties. Furthermore, as long as these communities are responsible for distinct duties 
and peoples, the co-ordination problem can be avoided. Far from undermining my claims, 
Goodin’s argument therefore supports the move towards embedding states within an overarching 
cosmopolitan framework so that general duties can be properly discharged by agents capable of 
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doing so in a globalised world; and states’ capacity to discharge their duty to secure social and 
political justice is also assured and strengthened.  
 
Demoi without a Demos 
 
Nonetheless, a bigger, and potentially more damning, problem with cosmopolitan democracy 
remains. This is that transplanting national democracy to higher levels of governance, without 
also somehow transplanting the pre-conditions for democracy, will give rise to a poorly 
functioning, if not outright antagonistic, system of decision-making. This objection to 
cosmopolitanism, the ‘no-demos’ thesis, aims to show that cosmopolitans wrongly assume that 
the benefits of liberal democracy can be simply replicated at supranational levels of governance.  
According to Habermas, in his discussion of European transnational democracy, ‘there is 
a lack of mutual trust that citizens of different nations would have to show each other as a 
precondition for their willingness to adopt a common perspective when making political decisions 
on shared federal issues.’472 Habermas’ concern, which is especially salient within the context of 
my own argument, is that while we tend to find a degree of mutual trust between co-nationals, 
thereby enabling them to see one another as participants in a cooperative endeavour, such trust is 
lacking beyond the nation-state. Indeed, even within the EU there are deep divides between the 
citizens of the Member States, suggesting that within my own account of multi-level governance, 
there is unlikely to be sufficient levels of trust between those individuals included within the 
regional and global levels of governance.  
Problematically, these deep divides are likely to make decision-making beyond the nation 
exceptionally difficult. For example, suppose that in the Germany-Scandinavia example, a 
decision must be reached at a regional level about where Germany directs its pollution, but there 
is an insufficient degree of trust between European citizens. In this case, it is possible, if not likely, 
that the individuals of each state would simply look to their own best interests in an attempt to 
secure the best outcome for themselves, irrespective of how this impacts upon other European 
citizens. In such a case, regional geo-political issues are likely to be exacerbated by antagonistic 
decision-making between peoples who are forced to cooperate with others. Indeed, the problem, 
here, is that unlike within national communities, disagreement will not be seen as principled but 
instead an instance of geo-political realpolitik.  
Importantly, Habermas is not the only theorist concerned with the ‘no-demos’ thesis. 
Indeed, Adam Lupel, in his discussion of securing democratic legitimacy beyond the nation-state, 
argues that cosmopolitanism, ‘is charged with misunderstanding the importance of identity to the 
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foundations of political obligation and solidarity,’473 and Held himself acknowledges that, ‘There 
is no common global pool of memories; no common global way of thinking; and no ‘universal 
history’ in and through which people can unite.’474 The issue, then, is that the cosmopolitan project 
may flounder on the rocks of nationalism: that is, beyond the nation-state there is an obvious lack 
of a shared language, heritage, or culture, suggesting that the mutual trust and shared identity 
which underpin national democracies will be missing and the pre-requisites for a well-functioning 
democracy will be absent. Indeed, decision-making would likely be characterised by mutual 
antagonism and distrust and, as such, the decisions reached at the supranational and global levels 
are likely to be ones which few can accept. Even more problematically, if we cannot address these 
concerns it seems unlikely that we would ever be able to derive a ‘common good’ within 
transnational demoi. As such, individuals would not be able to direct governance at regional or 
global levels, and would only be able to influence it through democratic mechanisms, entailing 
domination.  
Since David Miller has explored this issue at length, it is useful to consider his arguments 
for why cosmopolitan democracy will flounder on the rocks of nationalism. To that end, Miller 
starts by outlining five features of nations which serve to distinguish them from other forms of 
collective identity: they are constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment; they are 
extended in history; active in character; they are connected to a delimited territory; and are marked 
off from other nationalities by its distinct public culture.475 Importantly, Miller then turns to the 
issue of whether unchosen membership in an historic community is a defensible component of 
personal identity. He argues, here, that underlying this question is the assumption that, ‘a person’s 
identity should be something that he works out for himself, reflecting his choices as to what is 
really valuable to him,’476 and the concern that, ‘The trouble with nationality, however, is 
precisely that it is something for the most part unchosen and unreflectively acquired.’477 In 
response to this concern, Miller argues that this ‘radical chooser view’ misunderstands the process 
whereby individuals choose their identities. Indeed, he argues that this model of identity-
formation would require that individuals engage in abstract reasoning to determine what values 
are most important to them, and to then find groups which embody these values. Miller, however, 
argues that, ‘A more reasonable picture recognizes that we always begin from values that have 
been inculcated in us by the communities and institutions to which we belong…As we come to 
reflect on these values, we find we can no longer adhere to some, we find tensions and 
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contradictions between others, and so forth.’478 Through this process of reflection and re-
evaluation, individuals come to form their personal identities, of which nationality is often an 
integral, and defensible, component.479  
From here, Miller goes on to argue that there are ethical reasons for aiming to ensure that, 
where possible, the boundaries of the political community or state coincide with the boundaries 
of nationality. Indeed, Miller claims that, ‘The potency of nationality as a source of personal 
identity means that its obligations are strongly felt and may extend very far – people are willing 
to sacrifice themselves for their country in a way that they are not for other groups and 
associations,’480 and that, ‘these obligations are somewhat indeterminate and likely to be the 
subject of political debate; in the best case, they will flow from a shared public culture which 
results from rational deliberation over time about what it means to belong to the nation in 
question.’481 Fundamentally, Miller’s argument amounts to a defence of ethical particularism, and 
the claim that individuals give particular weight to their particular commitments and relationships. 
Indeed, just as individuals have greater obligations to their family, friends, or local community, 
Miller argues that they have greater obligations towards their co-nationals than they do to 
outsiders.482  
Miller then turns to the issue of national self-determination, arguing that, ‘national 
communities have a good claim to be politically self-determining…each nation should have its 
own set of political institutions which allow it to decide collectively those matters that are the 
primary concern of its members.’483 He argues that national self-determination is an expression 
of collective autonomy and, noting that this proposition is controversial because it supposes that 
individuals have an interest in shaping the world with others with whom they identify, that, ‘what 
the state does should correspond to what we might call the popular will.’484 Importantly, pursuing 
the popular will requires the voluntary co-operation of citizens who must trust one another and 
the state entrusted to pursue their good.  
It is at this point that Miller’s objections to cosmopolitan democracy emerge as he argues 
that the mutual trust and shared identity which underpins collective autonomy and national self-
determination is present within groups but absent across groups.485 That is, he believes that mutual 
trust is integral to the creation and maintenance of states committed to social justice and the 
provision of welfare (arguing that Rawls’ work presupposes this mutual trust in the requirement 
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that members acknowledge ties of solidarity);486 and that democracy itself can only function well 
when these conditions obtain. Indeed, he argues that if a community is to be guided by the ideal 
of deliberative democracy it must aim to ensure that decisions are reached through an open and 
uncoerced discussion. Doing so requires that participants offer consistent and sincerely held 
reasons for their views, and that they should be willing to moderate their claims in order to find a 
common ground on which all participants can agree.487 Miller’s central claim, here, is that 
nationality provides a shared identity and encourages mutual trust between individuals with 
disparate views, thereby securing social justice and deliberative democracy. Since a shared 
nationality does not exist beyond the nation-state, the obvious conclusion to be drawn is that 
democracy and social justice will remain unrealisable: without mutual trust, individuals will be 
less inclined to support redistributive measures, and will be less likely to aim to reach a consensus 
when making decisions together, making decision-making more conflictual.  
Acknowledging that this conception of national self-determination is an ideal which 
many states fall short of, Miller goes on to argue that it may be necessary for states to transfer 
some of their powers to overarching confederal bodies but, importantly, that doing so must be 
regarded as provisional: that is, states can enter binding agreements with others to regulate their 
common defence or address economic issues but must retain the capacity to exit when they wish 
to.488 This leads him to outline his own account of international justice which, in many ways, 
parallels that outlined by Pettit in Just Freedom. Components of this account of international 
justice include: an obligation to respect the territorial integrity of other states; a duty not to exploit 
vulnerable states through threats; a duty for nations to comply with whatever international 
agreements they have entered into; obligations of reciprocity, such that nations are informally 
required to come to the aid of other states when in need (for example, if they’re dealing with a 
famine or drought); and, more controversially, an obligation to ensure a fairer distribution of 
resources through international redistributive mechanisms, such that each state can, ‘reach a 
threshold of viability, giving it an economic base from which national self-determination can 
meaningfully be exercised.’489 
Miller then turns to the effects of globalisation on nationality, and the issue of whether 
we can expect to see an emergence of supra-national nationalities which overlay existing national 
identities. On this issue, he notes that Europe would be the most promising site for the emergence 
of a new ‘higher-level identification’ beyond the state because European nations are already 
integrated into the European Union. Problematically, he notes that, ‘Despite attempts by Euro-
ideologists to create a European national identity, drawing upon the common cultural background 
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of the European states, very few Europeans actually acknowledge this in preference to their 
traditional national identities. They support membership of the EU on practical grounds, but their 
emotional loyalty (feelings of national pride, etc.) continues to be directed towards their country 
of origin;’490 and that there has been no observable convergence of national beliefs and values at 
the European level.491 Indeed, he claims that, ‘Since the EU is currently the strongest of the supra-
national organizations, its failure to displace inherited national allegiances is surely of some 
significance. If no trans-European national identity has yet emerged, the prospects for a North 
American identity, a pan-Arab identity, or an East Asian identity…must remain extremely 
dim.’492 Miller concludes that attempts to displace nationality with international humanism is 
misguided because, ‘the majority of people are too deeply attached to their inherited national 
identities…[and] it provides the wherewithal for a common culture against whose background 
people can make more individual decisions about how to lead their lives; it provides the setting 
in which ideas of social justice can be pursued…; and it helps to foster the mutual understanding 
and trust that makes democratic citizenship possible.’493 
In summation, Miller’s concerns would seem to render the arguments of the preceding 
chapter untenable and show that the project of cosmopolitan republicanism is entirely misguided 
because, beyond the nation-state, there is paucity of trust and understanding (owing to a lack of a 
shared nationality), and this will undermine attempts to secure transnational democracy.  
Indeed, this conclusion is particularly problematic for this thesis because it would seem 
to suggest that we could never secure influence and direction beyond the nation-state. That is, 
without mutual trust or understanding between participants, deliberation (if it could be achieved), 
would likely be antagonistic and directed towards factional interests. Indeed, it is likely that the 
various nationalities partaking in deliberation would seek to realise their own ends at the expense 
of the overarching demos. This would seem to suggest that the deliberation which precedes 
democratic decision-making would either be unrealisable or would descend into factional disputes 
and thereby undermine the legitimacy of democratic outcomes. 
Even more problematic is the fact that in such circumstances, in which participants are 
unable to view themselves as a demos with common interests, we would likely be unable to derive 
a common good capable of directing governance. Indeed, Pettit’s account of democratic 
legitimacy, as discussed at length in the second chapter, seems to presuppose the existence of a 
common political culture in which mutual trust already pertains between citizens. As such, 
deriving a common good is simply a matter of deliberation between individuals who already see 
themselves as members of an ongoing cooperative venture which they want to succeed: the pre-
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conditions for reciprocal deliberation thus already exist within the nation-state and it would 
seemingly be a straightforward matter to explore what shared interests individuals converge upon 
and then ensure that these direct governance. But, at a supranational level, such a shared public 
culture of understanding would be entirely absent, and therefore the conditions for deriving a 
common good would be non-existent.    
This conclusion, however, would be premature.  For in fact, Miller’s own discussion of 
nationality provides us with the means to respond to these charges. Indeed, Miller notes the 
importance of, ‘a revived project of nation-building,’494 to combat the withering away of the 
nation-state under globalisation, and the centrality of a civic education, ‘as a means for 
transmitting the redefined and constitutionally embodied national identity to the incoming 
generation.’495 The aim of such an education, he argues, would be to ensure that that disparate 
groups which comprise the nation are exposed to a core curriculum which is inclusive of 
minorities in order to enable them to, ‘participate in the continuous redefinition of national 
identity.’496 While Miller is obviously concerned with revitalising the nation-state, I think that his 
suggestions of reviving the process of nation-building, utilising a civic education, and 
encouraging public deliberation can help to create the conditions in which supranational demoi 
can emerge over time, thereby enabling us to aim towards a neo-republican cosmopolitan future.  
 
Mythologizing and Excavating a Shared History: Crafting a Trans-nationalism  
 
It is important to note that while Miller is extremely sceptical of the prospects of replicating 
national democracy beyond the nation-state, he does nonetheless acknowledge that a nation’s, 
‘existence depends on a shared belief that its members belong together,’497 and that it, ‘is an 
identity that embodies historical continuity.’498 Importantly, he further acknowledges that, 
‘national identities typically contain a considerable element of myth. The nation is conceived as 
a community extended in history and with a distinct character that is natural to members…It is 
also likely to reveal that many things now regarded as primordial features of the nation in question 
are in fact artificial inventions – indeed, very often deliberate inventions made to serve a political 
purpose.’499 If he is correct, and a shared identity is constituted through individuals’ beliefs and 
political myth-making, then it may be possible to replicate these processes beyond the nation. 
 Noting that sceptics might construe this to mean that nations are spurious inventions 
which are intellectually suspect, he goes on to argue that such mythologizing is integral to 
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building and sustaining nations and national-identity. Indeed, he argues that these processes have 
two benefits: they provide members with reassurance that the national community is solidly based 
in history and represents a continuity between generations of which current members are 
participants; and they perform a moralising role by holding up the virtues of past members and 
encouraging us to live up to their standard. In this way, myths help to create the political 
community, ensuring that, ‘People’s sense of solidarity with and obligation to their compatriots 
will be increased.’500 He goes on to approvingly cite the ‘Dunkirk Spirit’ as an example of myth-
making which supports national solidarity and performs a moralising function. Indeed, he argues 
that it reveals to us that our ancestors came together to address a national crisis and did so 
instinctively rather than being ordered to. Importantly, Miller argues that this myth was used by 
later politicians, such as Harold Wilson, to mobilise the British people in an attempt to ward off 
the sterling crisis.501 
 Miller therefore explicitly acknowledges that national identity is constituted by 
participants’ shared beliefs, and is subject to creation and reinterpretation. This seems to suggest 
that if we could replicate such a process beyond the nation-state, emphasising shared myths and 
ideals which pertain within supranational communities, then we might be able to provide the 
foundation of mutual trust and shared understanding necessary for a well-functioning democracy. 
Indeed, Jurgen Habermas defends precisely this process within the context of the EU, arguing that 
it is necessary to craft a trans-European civic solidarity in order to surmount the, ‘long shadow 
cast by nationalism.’502 
 In a similar analysis to Miller, Habermas argues that, ‘In European states that emerged 
from national unification movements, a national consciousness was fostered, indeed produced, 
by schools, the military, national historiography and the press.’503 Indeed, he claims that national 
communities did not develop spontaneously, but were instead deliberately constructed. That is, 
unlike the solidarity between neighbours which emerged organically and which rests on existing 
forms of social integration, national consciousness, ‘is the result of an organised form of political 
integration…the mass of the population was mobilised over the course of the nineteenth century 
and was included step by step in political will-formation.’504  
Importantly, Habermas believes that the distrust between European peoples is not a 
product of xenophobic self-isolation, but is instead a patriotic response to the achievements of 
their respective nations: citizens believe that they owe their well-being to their nation’s 
achievements. As such, the European peoples have an interest in their nations remaining the 
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guarantors of these achievements and therefore enjoy civic solidarity with their compatriots but 
not with other European peoples whose identities remain tied to their nation’s historic 
achievements. The response to this insularity amongst peoples is to aim to extend an abstract civic 
solidarity across the European peoples,505 opening up national public spheres to one another, so 
that European citizens can communicate with one another and begin to see each other as co-
participants in a new kind of community. It would be necessary to encourage national media to 
also report on the discussions being had elsewhere within the Union about issues of common 
concern. The aim of opening up national public spheres to one another would be to translate the 
trust which exists within national communities into a more abstract form of trust which would 
encompass European citizens within an abstract transnational civic solidarity.506   
 I think that Miller and Habermas’ comments point us towards a partial solution to the 
problem of creating transnational demoi. That is, if a shared nationality, history, and identity 
provide the foundations of mutual trust and understanding necessary to secure social justice and 
democratic deliberation within nations, then a shared transnational ‘nationalism’ might provide a 
similar foundation for securing trust and understanding in transnational demoi. Importantly, if 
Miller and Habermas are correct that nationality has been developed through political direction 
and mythologizing, then it should be possible to replicate this process beyond the nation-state by 
using similar mechanisms. The aim, then, would be to excavate an underlying trans-nationalism 
which would bind national peoples together in mutual trust and understanding. Indeed, a brief 
analysis of how a European trans-nationalism might be cultivated provides us with a blueprint for 
how this process might be replicated within other trans-national demoi and at a global level. 
 To see why, let us start by supposing that the European national media could be induced 
to widen the scope of their reporting, opening up each nation’s public sphere to others. In doing 
so, we would create the conditions in which transnational public debate and deliberation can begin 
to take root. Now, I think it likely that trans-European debate and deliberation would, as noted by 
Miller, be conducted in a nationalistic or jingoistic manner, with participants deliberating from a 
national perspective. Nonetheless, I think that it would be possible, over time, to craft a European 
‘nationalism’ or civic solidarity through mythologizing and emphasising shared European 
achievements and history.  
This might include, for example, emphasising the Reformation and the gradual 
emergence of religious freedom; the Treaty of Westphalia and the move towards recognising 
national sovereignty; and emphasising the Enlightenment and the emergence of universalistic 
norms. It might, more controversially, emphasise European solidarity in combatting the various 
despotisms which have emerged across the continent, including the alliances to halt the 
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Napoleonic Wars, the resistance movements which fought Hitler and the Nazis, and the attempts 
to free peoples from Communism. It would be possible to draw national heroes into a pantheon 
of Europeans who could serve as moralising examples. Such figures, though controversial, might 
include historic thinkers who have contributed to European thought and civilisation (including, 
perhaps, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, etc.) or those who provide an example 
of resistance to tyranny (including Joan of Arc, the French Resistance, Winston Churchill), or 
those whose achievements are world-renowned (perhaps including Einstein, Beethoven, Darwin 
etc.). Similarly, we might strive to emphasise European peoples’ shared Judaeo-Christian roots, 
or shared values regarding democracy, the rule of law, and secularism.  
While specifying exactly what form this mythologizing might take is beyond the scope 
of our analysis, it is important to note that the aim would be to emphasise a shared history and 
commonalities - a trans-nationalism - which could be endorsed and engaged with from a variety 
of national perspectives. Indeed, this pan-European identity need not be so abstract that it can be 
fully endorsed from all perspectives (as is required by the common good), as we do not need to 
have a universally acceptable transnational identity; instead, it would need to be capable of 
engaging the European peoples in a process of critical discussion, contestation and self-definition. 
Indeed, it is through this process of collective mythologizing and self-definition that a trans-
nationalism might emerge, in parallel to the way in which nationalism is reproduced over 
generations. For example, in the U.K., Winston Churchill might be interpreted as a chauvinist, as 
the architect of the Gallipoli disaster, or as a heroic leader who saved the country from Nazism 
and ensured that European civilisation could eventually be saved from Hitler. Likewise, the First 
World War might be interpreted as a defence of national sovereignty, a war between collapsing 
colonial and imperial powers, or a British involvement in continental politics which need not have 
occurred. The point, here, is that nationalism is not an objective phenomena which all individuals 
uncritically endorse: instead it is produced and altered over time through individuals’ critical 
discussion and contestation over their shared history. In this way, all national myths and history 
are subject to contestation, reformation and redefinition and it is to be expected that the same 
process will occur at a transnational level. Indeed, I think that such contestation would be a sign 
that the process of transnational nation-building is working: Europeans would be engaged in a 
process of self-definition and deliberation which, over time, might facilitate the emergence of a 
transnational civic solidarity.  
Importantly, as noted by Habermas, such a transnational civic solidarity would be 
‘thinner’ than national solidarity. The reason for this is obvious: individuals do, and we can 
suppose will continue to, often identify with their nation state and it is likely that their identity 
will remain rooted within the nation. Nonetheless, I do not think this is a problem because 
European nationalisms are rooted within a shared European history, one which encompasses each 
nation’s history. That is, we cannot understand the idea of British exceptionalism without 
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reference to wider European history: the invasions by Romans, Angles, Jutes, Vikings, and 
Normans; the split with the Catholic Church which helped to define Anglicanism; or the centuries 
dedicated to maintaining a European balance of power. It is Britain’s place within Europe which 
helps to define British national identity. Similarly, German nationalism cannot be understood 
without reference to European history: the collapse of the Roman Empire; Charlemagne; the rise 
of the Holy Roman Empire; the Habsburg dynasty; Germany’s geographic position in the centre 
of the continent; the rise of Protestantism and the Treaty of Westphalia; Germany’s subjection to 
Napoleonic rule; its eventual unification following the Franco-Prussian wars; the rise of Prussia 
as the most powerful of German states; the two world wars; the Holocaust; and German 
reunification.  
We can therefore see that both British and German nationalism are inextricably 
intertwined with European history and neither nationalism can be understood without reference 
to a wider European history. Importantly, this suggests that Britons and Germans, while primarily 
identifying as members of their respective nations, may also come to identify as Europeans. 
Indeed, this European identity clearly distinguishes Europeans from other peoples, and suggests 
that the seeds of a transnational identity are latent in the concept of nationalism: that is, Europeans 
are likely to understand themselves as constituting a distinct ‘people’ in opposition to Arabs, 
Africans, and Asians. It seems plausible to suppose, then, that a European trans-nationalism forms 
a latent component of Europeans’ identity: it defines Europeans in opposition to other peoples. 
As such, there is a shared European history which we can draw upon to provide a foundation for 
‘nation-building’ beyond the nation-state.  
 Indeed, it is important to note that this argument would also apply to the emergence of 
other transnational nationalisms. That is, just as there are commonalities and a shared history 
within Europe, there will be similar foundations to create other regional trans-nationalisms. For 
example, in different regions we would emphasise a shared Asian, African, or Arabian history, 
with a view to utilising this shared history and mythologizing to provide a foundation of mutual 
trust and shared understanding upon which the transnational demos can be built.  
Importantly, such arguments would also apply to the creation and cultivation of an even 
‘thinner’ global nationalism, one which emphasises a common anthropological history, a 
pantheon of global heroes, and a set of common values. Indeed, drawing upon the intersection of 
national and transnational identities, we might emphasis the shared evolutionary and biological 
history of the human race; or emphasise the ways in which competing values and worldviews 
have contributed to emergence of global human rights. The aim, here, would be to facilitate the 
emergence of a global cosmopolitan identity in which individuals across the globe are encouraged 
to see each other as compatriots rather than antagonists. Indeed, just as opening up national public 
spheres to one another may facilitate the emergence of a transnational identity, so too can we hope 
that opening up transnational communities to one another might facilitate the gradual emergence 
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of such a global identity. That is, if national and transnational media could be encouraged to report 
events elsewhere in a neutral or sympathetic manner, we may be able to create the conditions in 
which cross-border communication becomes commonplace, and in which individuals are able to 
surmount their particular identities and see themselves as members of a global community. While 
an analysis of exactly what would need to be emphasised at each level in order to promote trans-
nationalism is beyond the scope of this thesis, it does seem to be at least logically possible to 
replicate the processes of nation-building and mythologizing beyond the nation-state, creating the 
underlying conditions in which mutual trust and shared understanding can flourish.  
Although brief, I think that these comments suggest that it might be possible to create a 
thinner trans-nationalism to provide the foundations necessary for transnational democracy by 
securing trust and understanding across peoples. With that said, such a process would, as noted 
by Miller in his discussion of the emergence of nationalism, require the existence of a common 
education. Indeed, historically a common education was used to propagate and facilitate the 
emergence of a national identity, emphasising a shared history and pantheon of national heroes 
and myths. If suitably designed, a civic education would be able to similarly facilitate the 
emergence of transnational identities and civic solidarity.  
 
A Republican Civic Education 
 
As noted above, Miller explicitly argues that reviving the project of nation-building requires the 
promotion of an education, ‘as a means for transmitting the redefined and constitutionally 
embodied national identity to the incoming generation,’507 and that a core curriculum ought to be 
developed which would enable minorities to, ‘participate in the continuous redefinition of 
national identity.’508 Miller therefore sees education as a means for ensuring that citizens are 
capable of discharging the basic duties of citizenship, and as a mechanism for securing the 
foundation upon which a political edifice can be built in which social justice and legitimate 
political outcomes can be generated.  
 A civic education is no less integral to the aims of neo-republicanism, and particularly to 
the project of securing democratic legitimacy beyond the nation-state. Indeed, we saw in the first 
chapter that Pettit notes that national infrastructure will have to, ‘provide for the education, 
training, and information available to citizens,’509 such that individuals are able to enjoy the basic 
liberties; and we saw in the second chapter that Pettit argues, following Barry, that in order to 
secure democratic legitimacy, governance must track citizens’ community-oriented ‘political’ 
interests, which arise from membership in a community which they want to see progress and 
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flourish.510 Securing democratic legitimacy therefore seems to require that citizens are concerned 
for the well-being of their community, and are able to abstract from their particular concerns and 
engage with the community’s good: neo-republicanism seems to require virtuous citizens. 
While this aim might be readily achieved in a cohesive national community, we face the 
further issue of ensuring that individuals are not only able to abstract from their particular ends in 
order to pursue their community’s good, but that they’re also able to see beyond their national 
community’s self-interest in order to derive a common good for supranational communities. 
Indeed, assuming it is possible to induce individuals to derive their nation’s good solely from 
public-oriented interests rather than their private interests, it would then be necessary to repeat 
this process at a transnational level, necessitating that citizens are able to abstract from both their 
private and national ends in order to derive a transnational common good. For example, 
addressing global ills such as AIDs or climate change would require that individuals, when 
determining their global shared interests, do not seek to secure a good outcome for themselves or 
their nation at the expense of other communities. Instead, they would need to adopt a transnational 
or global perspective, conceiving of themselves as members of these broader communities, and 
determine deliberatively what the good consists of, irrespective of the costs to themselves or their 
nation. Indeed, this requirement is bound up with our previous discussion of encouraging the 
emergence of a trans-nationalism: for individuals to be able to derive a transnational or global 
good, they must see themselves as members of transnational and global demoi, each of which has 
different interests. For example, a British individual who owns an industrial company may have 
a private interest in reduced environmental regulations but, when it comes to deriving a British 
common good, would need to abstract from this perspective and strive to derive a set of shared 
interests in conjunction with other British citizens. But, more demandingly, this same individual, 
as a member of a transnational and global demoi, would also have to strive to derive a set of 
transnational and global shared interests which may impact upon either his particular or national 
ends: global regulations may require that Britain contributes a significant sum of money to 
addressing global pollution, or that the manufacturer complies with regulations that impact upon 
his personal ends.  
Importantly, however, we cannot just assume that citizens will behave in the requisite 
way and deliberate in accordance with the norm of norms at each level rather than pursuing 
personal, national, or sectarian interests. Instead, it is necessary to take steps to ensure that they 
can discharge the basic duties of citizenship as, ‘What we sometimes forget is that the vitality of 
the political order depends on an education that is dedicated to specific ideals of character.’511 As 
such, we need to consider how we might utilise a civic education to create virtuous citizens 
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capable of abstracting from their particular ends and identifying with their communities’ good, 
such that we can derive a set of shared interests capable of exerting direction over each level of 
governance.  
Problematically, however, pursuing such a civic education would seem to conflict with 
the requirements of non-domination. That is, creating ‘reasonable’ citizens would seem to require 
inculcating a worldview in children which is anathema to the vast majority of families who would 
prefer to bring their children up as they see fit without the state intervening to teach them contrary 
views. For example, atheist parents may prefer that their children are not taught the 
‘reasonableness’ of religious worldviews, and religious families may prefer that their children 
aren’t taught about other reasonable conceptions of the good. The problem, then, is that children 
would need to be taught, contrary to their parents’ beliefs, that their own comprehensive doctrines 
are but one conception of the good amongst many equally viable and acceptable conceptions; and 
that membership in political communities requires that they abstract from their particular ends 
and beliefs in order to derive a common good with their fellows. Parents would therefore seem to 
be denied the capacity to raise their children as they see fit, seemingly giving rise to an invasion 
of their choice-sets and entailing domination. 
Nonetheless, I do not think that this objection is insurmountable. Indeed, Callan, in his 
discussion of liberalism and civic education, has shown that a civic education, while subject to 
limits, can plausibly aim at crafting ‘reasonable’ citizens. Indeed, he claims that, ‘we cannot 
coherently reject the importance of liberal soulcraft.’512 Importantly, Stephen Macedo makes a 
similar point, arguing that, ‘Each of us can reasonably be asked to surrender some control over 
our own children for the sake of reasonable common efforts to insure that all future citizens learn 
the minimal prerequisites of citizenship. There is no right to be exempted from measures 
reasonably designed to help secure the freedom of all.’513 While Callan’s discussion is concerned 
with the limits of reasonable pluralism and political liberalism, he summarises our problem 
concisely as a dilemma in which, ‘The need to perpetuate fidelity to liberal democratic institutions 
and values from one generation to another suggests that there are some inescapably shared 
educational aims, even if the pursuit of these conflicts with the convictions of some citizens. Yet 
if repression is to be avoided, the state must give parents substantial latitude to instil in their 
children whatever religious faith or conception of the good they espouse.’514 He argues, through 
an analysis of Rawls’ accounts of reasonable pluralism, the political conception of individuals, 
and the burdens of judgement, that, ‘A political education that meets the challenge will teach the 
young the virtues and abilities they need in order to participate competently in reciprocity-
                                                          
512 Ibid., p. 5. 
513 Stephen Macedo, ‘Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God 
vs. John Rawls?’ Ethics 105 (1995), pp. 468-496 (pp. 485-486). 
514 Callan, Creating Citizens, p. 9. 
190 
 
governed political dialogue and to abide by the deliverances of such dialogue in their conduct as 
citizens.’515 Callan’s aims are therefore the same as our aims: utilising a civic education to ensure 
that citizens can undertake the basic duties of citizenship, including engaging in reasoned 
deliberation with others with a view to deriving a set of shared public interests, over and above 
their own good, which would direct governance and render it non-dominating. 
Callan argues that creating virtuous citizens requires that individuals are taught to accept 
the burdens of judgement.  That is, they must accept, amongst other issues, three things: that there 
may be complex and conflicting evidence when considering an issue; that individuals may 
disagree about the relative weight of evidence; and the way in which individuals assess and weigh 
evidence will depend upon their life experience.516 Callan, however, goes further than Rawls, 
arguing that a genuine acceptance of the burdens of judgement would entail that, ‘the relevant 
acceptance must be an active and taxing psychological disposition, pervasively colouring the 
beliefs we form and the choices we make.’517 Callan goes on to acknowledge that if children were 
taught to embrace the burdens of judgement, then this would likely come into conflict with family 
values because, ‘parents will naturally reason with the child inside the framework of the 
comprehensive doctrines they favour.’518 As such, Callan acknowledges that the family will be 
an inappropriate locus for securing future citizens’ capacity to engage in reasoned deliberation 
because the doctrines learned in the home may conflict with acceptance of reasonable pluralism. 
For example, families might privately endorse strong views on abortion or homosexuality which 
conflict with the requirements of reasonableness.519 Importantly, while he argues that, ‘To learn 
to accept the burdens of judgement is not to endorse secular humanism, blanket moral scepticism 
or any other anti-religious posture,’520 he acknowledges that: 
 
Future citizens must be taught to think in particular ways about doctrines…they must be 
critically attuned to the wide range of reasonable political disagreement within the society 
they inhabit and to the troubling gap between reasonable agreement and the whole moral 
truth. This will require serious imaginative engagement with rival views about good and 
evil, right and wrong, and this in turn means that these views must be confronted in their 
own terms, without the peremptory dismissal they might receive according to whatever 
doctrine a child learns in the family. The moral authority of the family and the various 
associations in which the child grows up must be questioned to the extent that society 
contains reasonable alternatives to whatever that authority prescribes.521 
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 Centrally, Callan acknowledges that this view of the aims of a civic education amounts 
to a recognisable conception of ethical autonomy and requires that children are prepared to engage 
in reasoned deliberation with other citizens over the nature of the good and the right in accordance 
with an acceptance of the burdens of judgement. This is a position which neo-republicans ought 
to endorse because securing individuals’ capacity to engage in reasoned deliberation and teaching 
them to accept the burdens of judgement will support neo-republican aims. Indeed, as we have 
already seen in the first chapter, underlying Pettit’s account of non-domination is a conception of 
orthonomy or autonomy which can be undermined when individuals are subject to adaptive 
preferences. Such an education would help to guard against adaptive preferences by enabling 
individuals to analyse and then deliberatively endorse or refute comprehensive doctrines. In 
addition, securing such an education would enable individuals to engage in the deliberation 
necessary to secure a communal conception of the good which would exert direction on 
governance and render it democratically legitimate.  
Importantly, Callan goes on to note that, ‘Induction into the role of citizen and the growth 
of affective attachment to fellow citizens are essentially tied to the particularity of the polity 
within which moral learning occurs,’522 and such induction is essential to the proper functioning 
of a demos. Indeed, he notes that if trust is weak, then individuals are more likely to interpret 
disagreement to be an instance of unreasonable pluralism or bad faith, blocking attempts to secure 
social justice and a well-functioning democracy. He goes on to argue that, ‘the reservoir of earned 
trust that a just society must rely on is necessarily the historical achievement of a particular polity; 
it cannot be a ready-made moral resource that inheres in the very idea of a liberal democratic 
constitution.’523 That is, if we do not ‘create’ citizens capable of accepting the burdens of 
judgement, and who are prepared to engage in reasoned, reciprocity-based deliberation, the result 
is likely to be civic decay. It is here that a civic education has the most important role: it becomes 
the foundation for mutual trust and enables individuals who endorse different comprehensive 
doctrines to come together in defence of the liberal polity which secures each individual’s 
capacity to lead their own life. In the absence of such an education, pluralism will likely entail 
tribalism and sectarianism; if a civic education is pursued properly, citizens will be able to lead 
their own lives while supporting the institutions and political framework which makes leading 
these lives possible.524 
This would require that we pursue a civic education that, ‘combines an exacting 
commitment to reason with a generous susceptibility to those public emotions that bind us to the 
body politics.’525 This seems to suggest that Callan’s civic education, intended to support the 
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liberal polity, would be comprised of two elements: the first would be the inculcation of a liberal 
patriotism premised upon an endorsement of the burdens of judgement and the capacity to engage 
in reasoned deliberation with others; and second, the promotion of a form of nationalism which 
emphasises a shared identity and history, and which would facilitate the shared understanding and 
trust required for individuals to live together. These elements would also be integral to the aim of 
securing democratic legitimacy beyond the nation-state. That is, we would need a civic education 
to promote the trans-nationalism outlined in the previous section in order to secure mutual trust 
and understanding; and we would need to promote the burdens of judgement and the importance 
of reasoned deliberation to secure democracy beyond the state. If an education could realise these 
aims, it would enable citizens of transnational polities to see one another as compatriots in an 
ongoing political project who can be trusted to seek the good of the demos over their other 
attachments and would create the conditions in which a transnational common good could be 
derived to exert direction over governance.526  
 
Cultural Imperialism: The Conflict between Human Rights and Ethical Commitments 
 
With that said, we do face the issue, noted by Callan, that, ‘efforts in schools or elsewhere to 
encourage the virtue of reasonableness…will predictably lead to conflict with those whose 
convictions or interests are thereby imperilled.’527 That is, we must acknowledge that such an 
education at both the national and transnational levels would likely come into conflict with the 
preferences and conceptions of the good of many citizens. Indeed, we might find that religious 
groups within a national setting believe that such an education would imperil their capacity to 
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bring their children up as they would like since children may be more critical of their parents’ 
comprehensive doctrines. Beyond the state, we would find similar problems. For example, we 
might find that staunch nationalists object to the promotion of a shared identity, or object to an 
endorsement of the burdens of judgement where children would be taught to believe that the 
preferences of other national communities within the transnational demos are the product of 
reasonable disagreement rather than an attempt to secure their own best interests.  
 Indeed, the concern here is that such an education may be experienced as a source of 
cultural imperialism by those who endorse different ethical, moral, or political traditions. For 
example, some British Pakistani families, some Christian evangelicals, some staunch Catholics, 
and so on may be reticent to allow their children to be educated in such a way since the aims of 
encouraging civic-minded deliberation, which requires that individuals endorse the burdens of 
judgement, abstract from their private ethical commitments, and engage in norm-governed public 
deliberation, may be seen to involve the deliberate manipulation of children’s views and the 
undermining of the community’s shared values. This may imperil the existence of such 
communities since children will be more likely to question their parents’ values and traditions, 
leading them to repudiate their families’ ethical traditions. 
It is important to acknowledge that such parents may be correct that this education will 
undermine their community’s capacity to secure its long-term existence. This is because if their 
children are taught that their parents’ ethical views are but one set amongst many, all of which 
are entitled to respect, it seems that previously insulated traditions will be subject to a greater 
degree of criticism than they had hitherto been subject to. Indeed, if children are properly 
equipped to understand the world around them, and are taught to deliberate with others, then it 
seems that children’s ethical independence will be secured when they become adults: the likely 
result of such a process is that a great many ethical traditions will be gradually marginalised as 
they’re subject to deliberative scrutiny rather than enjoying unthinking endorsement.  
Broadly, then, the concern is that such an education may make it very difficult for some 
communities to propagate themselves, and members of these communities may claim that 
Callan’s educational proposals are a form of insidious imperialism, designed to manipulate 
individuals’ behaviour and beliefs indirectly, resulting in the gradual marginalisation of a great 
many ethical traditions. In response to this charge, Callan argues that, ‘there can be no oppression 
in the moulding of a character that would refuse to resort to domination or manipulation in dealing 
with their fellow citizens.’528 That is, it is not dominating to aim to create citizens who embrace 
the burdens of judgement and reasonable pluralism, alongside a belief in a shared identity, if 
‘crafting’ citizens in this way ensures that they eschew oppressing their fellows by striving to 
enforce their own comprehensive doctrine over them. Additionally, he goes on to argue that, 
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‘Since children are numerically identical to the adults they will be when they grow up, securing 
the rights they will acquire as adults requires that we respect their claim to be treated in ways that 
safeguard the developmental preconditions of adult rights.’529 As such, it is necessary to ensure 
that children have a sympathetic understanding of ethical diversity and are protected from what 
Callan calls ethical servility. Ethical servility is a process whereby parents’ choices shape a child’s 
character in ways which substitutes the parents’ will for the child’s in later life. For example, if 
parents teach their children that homosexuality is sinful, this will exert an impact upon the child’s 
later actions: in this sense, ethical servility seems to be an instance of domination since it enables 
the parents to invigilate the child’s later choices.530 It is precisely this kind of servility that Callan’s 
civic education is intended to guard against, and requires, ‘a level of autonomous development 
above the mere condition of agency,’531 such that, ‘each of us must learn to ask the question of 
how we should live, and that how we answer it can be no servile echo of the answers others have 
given, even if our thoughts commonly turn out to be substantially the same as those that informed 
our parents’ lives.’532 It is important to also note, here, that Harry Brighouse and Matthew Clayton 
have advanced similar arguments, with the former defending an autonomy-facilitating education 
which would guard against ethical servility,533 and the latter emphasising the costs an individual 
must bear in revising a conception of the good thrust upon them by their parents.534 
While Callan has a convincing response to the concern that such an education might be 
experienced as a form of cultural imperialism, it is important to acknowledge that this is but one 
example of a wider concern with the conflict which may arise between individual rights and some 
cultural or ethical traditions. The concern is that the set of rights that Pettit has outlined as a 
necessary foundation for leading a life of one’s own, and which I have argued ought to be 
reconceptualised as a set of human rights which enjoy global entrenchment and protection, may 
come into conflict with many ethical traditions and be experienced as a western imposition.535 
Indeed, we might find that in relatively homogenous, religious societies, freedom of religion or 
freedom of thought and expression would come into conflict with individuals’ cultural traditions. 
For example, in some Islamic societies non-Muslims are subject to persecution or treated as 
second-class citizens, and apostasy and blasphemy laws operate to curtail religious criticism. The 
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concern, then, is that the rights that I have argued ought to enjoy global entrenchment and 
enforcement do not cohere with the views or beliefs of many cultural or ethical traditions. If these 
rights were enforced by transnational and global demoi, they would be experienced as a source 
of cultural imperialism by many communities: in this sense, ‘To pursue human rights…is to be 
intolerant of non-western practices and forms of life.’536 
The first response available to us is to follow Simon Caney in acknowledging that, ‘Those 
who criticise human rights by arguing that they are incompatible with some ethical traditions tend 
to operate with a dualistic framework, according to which a tradition either affirms a commitment 
to human rights or it does not and is, therefore, incompatible with human rights,’537 while 
maintaining that, ‘This binary approach is, however, too simplistic to be of much use.’538 After 
outlining a series of possible relations between human rights and ethical traditions, Caney argues 
that while there may be some divergence between non-western traditions and human rights, the 
claim that human rights are in conflict with non-western cultures is too simplistic and, 
‘unhelpfully obscure(s) points of agreement.’539 Indeed, focusing on the compatibility of 
Theravada Buddhism and human rights, Caney seeks to show that the Buddhist conception of 
well-being would lead this sect to embrace human rights, evidencing that it is possible to endorse 
human rights from a non-western perspective. After discussing the central tenets of this doctrine, 
Caney concludes that the Buddhist account of well-being provides, ‘a cogent non-western 
teleological or perfectionist vindication of human rights.’540  
While I have only outlined Caney’s argument in the briefest of terms, we can see that his 
central argument is two-fold: firstly, he argues that claims of incompatibility between human 
rights and non-western cultures are overstated; and secondly, he argues that it is possible for non-
western cultures to draw on their own traditions to arrive at an endorsement of human rights. 
Indeed, he acknowledges that ethical traditions are not monolithic blocs which can be deemed 
compatible or incompatible with human rights, but will be comprised of, ‘different elements, 
different strands of thought,’541 which can be drawn upon to endorse human rights (citing that 
while many maintain that Islam conflicts with liberal values, particularly with regard to apostasy 
and women, Islamic just-war theory corresponds with western accounts of just war).542 It is 
important to note that Amartya Sen has similarly argued that, ‘Not only are the differences on the 
subject of freedoms and rights that actually exist between different societies often much 
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exaggerated, but also there is, typically, little note taken of substantial variations within each local 
culture.’543 He goes on to suggest elsewhere that it might be possible to draw upon individuals’ 
ethical traditions to support the development of a theory of human rights through, ‘an interactive 
process, in particular by examining what would survive in public discussion, given a reasonably 
free flow of information and uncurbed opportunity to discuss differing points of view.’544 
Caney and Sen’s arguments therefore seem to show that it would be too simplistic to 
claim that rights and non-western cultures will come into conflict and, more importantly, that non-
western cultures can draw upon their own traditions to endorse many components of human rights 
doctrine and the liberal values which are enshrined in these rights. This seems to suggest that the 
concern noted above, that human rights might be experienced as a form of cultural imperialism, 
might be overstated. With that said, it is nonetheless possible to maintain that even if the majority 
of human rights doctrine can be endorsed by non-western cultures, it is patently clear that not all 
components of it are going to be compatible with all ethical traditions. For example, the right to 
religious freedom, which would include the capacity to leave one’s religion or convert to another, 
is prohibited in Islam and it seems unlikely that all Muslims will endorse such a right. As such, 
critics of human rights might maintain that human rights are, ‘an unduly arrogant and insensitive 
doctrine,’545 and one which, ‘pretends to be a doctrine unique in status and universal in reach, but, 
in reality, it is no more than local prejudice…a doctrine that is all the more insidious for the way 
in which it licences its own imposition upon the whole of humanity.’546  
In response to this concern, Peter Jones has argued that there are two strategies available 
for reconciling human rights with human diversity. These strategies he calls the continuous and 
discontinuous strategies. The former, which seems to be Caney’s preferred approach, emphasises 
the need to establish continuity between human rights and ethical traditions, such that individuals 
are able to draw on their own culture and traditions to endorse human rights. The latter, Jones’ 
preferred strategy, seeks to ground a theory of human rights independently of the doctrines which 
individuals endorse, and would see human rights operate as a framework within which individuals 
can lead their lives.547 Against the continuous strategy, which would seek to identify a set of 
common values within individuals’ diverse traditions to act as human rights, Jones argues that it 
is unlikely that there are any values which can be endorsed by everyone everywhere and, if we 
could identify a set of common values, these values would be so denuded of content as to be 
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unworthy of enjoying a privileged status as rights. He goes on to outline three further reasons why 
the continuous strategy would be inappropriate. These are that: a theory of human rights would 
be redundant if other ethical traditions already provide the values which comprise the doctrine; 
that such an approach would enable all ethical traditions to exercise a veto over the content of 
human rights doctrine (since if a value cannot be endorsed by all traditions, it cannot be granted 
a privileged status as a right on the consensual strategy); and, most importantly, he rightly points 
out that the consensual strategy does not address human diversity so much as avoid it by focusing 
only on common values.548   
As such, Jones argues that we shouldn’t aim to develop a continuous or consensual 
account of human rights, but should instead look to developing a theory of human rights as a way 
to determine, ‘how people ought to relate to one another as people with different beliefs.’549 He 
goes on to argue that human rights should not seek to compete with other doctrines on how 
individuals ought to lead their lives, but should instead seek to provide a theory of, ‘what people 
are owed merely in virtue of being human,’550 and develop an account of, ‘the rights that people 
should enjoy in the context of diversity independently of the doctrines that make up that 
diversity.’551 Such a theory of human rights would therefore not be comprehensively neutral 
between doctrines, since human rights will frustrate the pursuit of some goals or otherwise come 
into conflict with ethical traditions, but this is not to be lamented. Instead, Jones is clear that, 
‘human rights must enjoy a special status relative to other doctrines. It should have priority over 
other doctrines in that it should set the terms upon which people are to act on their beliefs.’552 In 
this way, human rights are placed, ‘outside and above some disputes and it enables human rights 
to respond to those disputes impartially.’553 
On Jones’ view, then, human rights form a second order doctrine which provides the 
framework within which individuals can lead their lives in accordance with their own substantive 
or comprehensive doctrines. That is, it provides individuals with the requisite resources and 
powers to lead a life that they have chosen, and enables them to revise their conception of the 
good if they so choose. Importantly, such an approach mirrors Martha Nussbaum’s conception of 
human rights and the role that they would play within her own theory. Indeed, she suggests that 
the capabilities that she defends, ‘are not just instrumental to further pursuits: they are held to 
have value in themselves, in making a life fully human.’554 This is because they, ‘support our 
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powers of practical reason and choice, and have a special importance in making any choice of a 
way of life possible.’555 She goes on to argue, following Robert Nozick, that human rights ought 
to function as a side constraint upon government activities: that is, we ought to allow governments 
to, ‘pursue the social good as they conceive it, so long as they do not violate the items on this 
list…that should be secured to people no matter what else we pursue.’556 
We have, then, two arguments available to us in response to seeming conflicts between 
human rights, including to the kind of education that Callan endorses, and cultural or ethical 
values. The first, following Caney and Sen, would be to argue that such conflicts are not as 
intractable as critics of human rights might argue, and that individuals can likely draw upon their 
ethical and cultural traditions to endorse most, if not all, human rights. For those hard cases where 
consensus is not forthcoming, as might be the case with religious freedom in some societies, we 
can turn to Jones and Nussbaum’s defence of human rights as a second-order framework. That is, 
even if there are intractable conflicts, and individuals perceive themselves to be subject to cultural 
imperialism, rights justifiably act as trumps over cultural or ethical doctrines. This is because 
human rights secure the basic freedoms, powers, and resources necessary for all individuals to 
lead lives of their own choosing and secure the pre-requisites of leading a free life.  
Callan is therefore right to privilege the right to education when it comes into conflict 
with individuals’ ethical traditions and cultural commitments, and we can see that a civic 
education along these lines will be integral to republican polities in four key ways. Firstly, through 
teaching children about the burdens of judgement and reasonable pluralism, it will secure the 
preconditions for reciprocal deliberation. That is, inculcating the virtue of reasonableness will 
enable individuals to deliberate in accordance with the norm of norms, abstracting from their own 
comprehensive conception of the good, with a view to deriving shared public interests which 
would secure a common good to exert direction over governance. Secondly, it will guard against 
the ethical servility that might arise if parents are able to enforce their comprehensive doctrines 
upon their children. Indeed, it will prevent parents from exerting an invigilating effect upon 
individuals’ lives as they grow up, such that individuals would be able to make decisions which 
are truly their own rather than those which have been invaded by the conception of the good thrust 
upon them by their parents. Thirdly, such an education will combat the problem of adaptive 
preferences by enabling individuals to assess and analyse the beliefs that they have. Indeed, it 
would enable them to engage in reasoned deliberation with others, helping them transform their 
raw preferences into informed preferences and thereby mitigating against the problem of adaptive 
preferences. Finally, such an education would inculcate the ties of solidarity between individuals, 
encouraging mutual trust and understanding through emphasising a shared history and 
                                                          
555 Ibid., p. 286. 
556 Ibid., p. 300. 
199 
 
commonalities. It would therefore help to provide the foundations on which transnational 
democracy might emerge by facilitating the emergence of trans- or global nationalisms. 
Importantly, while each of these benefits will accrue within national polities, they will 
also support the emergence of transnational demoi, enabling us to aim at the cosmopolitan 
framework outlined in the previous chapter. Indeed, such an education would enable us to 
encourage reasonable pluralism and transnational deliberation, as well as crafting the kind of 
trans-nationalism outlined above. It would ensure that the peoples which form the transnational 
demoi see one another as compatriots in a communal project in which each is committed to the 
good of that community, and would ensure that disagreements would be viewed as the product of 
the burdens of judgement rather than attempts to free ride or secure good outcomes for each 
peoples’ nation. For example, it would enable the peoples of Europe to see further integration as 
a communal project for the benefit of all, rather than one which seeks to secure German 
predominance or markets for its goods. A civic education could, then, provide the foundations for 
a well-functioning national republic, and for functioning transnational republics.  
With that said, however, there is one final issue to which we must turn in our analysis of 
creating transnational demoi, and that is the role of deliberation. Indeed, we’ve seen that 
deliberation is integral to deriving a conception of the common good in national and transnational 
communities, in encouraging the emergence of trans-nationalism, and in encouraging mutual trust 
and understanding between peoples. Problematically, however, securing transnational 
deliberation may be infeasible at present because, as argued by Kymlicka, ‘democratic politics is 
politics in the vernacular.’557 
 
Politics in the Vernacular and Deliberating across Deep Divides 
 
Kymlicka argues that Held’s cosmopolitanism, and therefore my own account of multi-level 
governance, is unduly optimistic about the prospects of transnational citizenship, and too 
pessimistic about the continuation of domestic citizenship.558 Indeed, he starts by acknowledging 
that, ‘It is certainly true that industrialised nation-states have less elbow room for managing 
macro-economic policy today than they did before,’559 but suggests that there are two possible 
explanations for this. The first, which Held endorses is, that this loss of control is an inherent and 
now-permanent feature of the globalised world, while the second explanation, which Kymlicka 
seems inclined to support, is that this loss of macro-economic control is a result of international 
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indebtedness and could, in theory be addressed by domestic decision-making.560 He goes on to 
argue against Held’s, and my own, view that capital mobility has given rise to a situation in which 
multinational corporations can impact upon state’s capacity to adopt more generous social 
insurance policies or trade regulation. Indeed, this is because, ‘The option of moving overseas is 
irrelevant for large sectors of the economy – health care, education and training, construction, 
most retail, most services, agriculture, and so on. The issue of capital mobility is most relevant 
for mid-to-large manufacturing companies employing low-skilled workers. This is not an 
insignificant portion of the economy, but it has been a declining percentage for a long time.’561  
 He suggests that these considerations point to the retention of considerable scope for 
national policy-making, and argues that countries continue to exercise their autonomy in ways 
which reflect their different political cultures. That is, even if globalisation is putting a strain on 
national self-determination, states need not, and do not, all respond to these pressures in the same 
way. As such, he argues that, ‘citizens often care deeply about maintaining these national 
differences in social policy, and they provide considerable motivation for political participation 
in domestic politics.’562 This fact, Kymlicka argues, suggests that Held has overstated the extent 
to which globalisation has undermined the sense that each nation forms a community of fate. 
Indeed, he argues that while it is true that forces cut across national borders, affecting the lives 
that individuals can lead, it is not the forces that a community are subject to which determine a 
community of fate, but how they respond to those forces. That is, ‘People belong to the same 
community of fate if they care about each other’s fate, and want to share each other’s 
fate…people belong to the same community of fate if they feel some sense of responsibility for 
one another’s fate, and so want to deliberate together about how to respond collectively to the 
challenges facing the community…globalization has not eroded the sense that nation-states form 
separate communities of fate in this sense.’563 
 As an example, he argues that as a result of the creation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans are now subject to similar economic 
forces and process. Nonetheless, ‘the sense of communal identity and solidarity remains 
profoundly different, as has the actual policy responses to these forces. Despite being subject to 
similar forces, citizens of Western democracies are able to respond to these forces in their own 
distinctive ways.’564 He argues that this shows that, ‘Nation-states still possess considerable 
autonomy; their citizens still exercise this autonomy in distinctive ways, reflective of their 
national political cultures; and citizens still want to confront the challenges of globalization as 
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national collectivities, reflective of their historic solidarities, and desire to share each other’s 
fate.’565 Centrally, he argues that whatever dissatisfaction citizens have with citizenship has little 
to do with globalisation, and in fact predates this phenomena; it is domestic politics which has 
driven disaffection in voters.566 He goes on to conclude that, ‘Globalization does constrain 
national legislatures, although the extent of this is often exaggerated. But globalization also 
enriches national political life, and provides new and valued options by which nations can 
collectively promote their interests and identities.’567 
 While defending the ongoing relevance and necessity of nations and national citizenship, 
Kymlicka also questions whether it would be possible to produce a transnational citizenship. 
Indeed, he argues that democracy is not simply a process of aggregating votes, but is instead a 
system of collective deliberation and legitimisation: echoing Pettit, he claims that, ‘The decisions 
which result from this deliberation are then legitimated on the grounds that they reflect the 
considered will and common good of the people as a whole, not just the self-interest or arbitrary 
whims of the majority.’568 Centrally, he argues that such a process of deliberation and 
legitimisation can only occur if the participants understand and trust one another, and mutual trust 
and understanding require some underlying commonalities or sense of shared identity, as well as 
a common language.569  
 Kymlicka argues that while deliberative democracies can function without a shared 
religion, conception of the good, political ideology, or racial/ethnic makeup, ‘we find that 
language is increasingly important in defining the boundaries of political communities, and the 
identities of political actors.’570 In the context of multilingual countries, he claims that language 
has become an increasingly important determinant of the boundaries of political communities 
(demarcating sub-state communities such as the Basque, Catalans, Quebecois, and Scots from the 
larger state), with these linguistic communities often describing themselves as nations and 
organising themselves along nationalistic lines.571 
 The reason for this, Kymlicka argues, is because, ‘democratic politics is politics in the 
vernacular. The average citizen only feels comfortable debating political issues in their own 
tongue…we can expect – as a general rule – that the more political debate is conducted in the 
vernacular, the more participatory it will be.’572 He goes on to argue that the evidence suggests 
that language is profoundly important in the construction of democratic communities, and that 
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language-demarcated political communities remain the primary forum for political participation. 
Indeed, he claims that even when nations are members of overlapping institutions such as the EU, 
debates about democracy are conducted within the nation. That is, if powers are expatriated to a 
higher level of governance, the legitimacy of such expatriation, ‘is generally seen as dependent 
on the (ongoing) consent of the national unit,’573 and, ‘Members of these national collectivities 
debate amongst themselves, in the vernacular, how much power they wish to devolve upwards or 
downwards, and periodically reassess, at the national level, whether they wish to reclaim some of 
these powers.’574 
 Kymlicka concludes that the sort of freedom and equality that individuals care about is 
freedom and equality within one’s own societal culture, and that people have a deep emotional 
attachment to the vernacular.575 As such, he does not think that Held’s cosmopolitan democracy 
is realistic. Indeed, he argues that the project of promoting cosmopolitan citizenship, and making 
transnational institutions such as the European Parliament directly accountable to citizens, is 
infeasible precisely because there is no European demos to deliberate and legitimise decisions: 
instead, he argues that such institutions should be rendered accountable to national governments, 
which are themselves held accountable by citizens deliberating in the vernacular.576  
Kymlicka’s arguments therefore seem to suggest two central issues for transnational 
democracy. Firstly, a lack of shared language will prevent the emergence of a trans-nationalism 
because individuals would be unable to discuss their shared identity and common values, 
mitigating against the emergence of the mutual trust and understanding required for a well-
functioning transnational democracy. Secondly, without a shared language, it is unlikely that we 
would be able to derive a transnational common good to exert direction over governance. As such, 
political decisions would not enjoy democratic legitimacy and individuals would be subject to 
imperium.  
Looking at the EU as a prospective transnational demos, we can see this problem clearly. 
The EU Commission recognises twenty-four official and working languages, and yet lacks one 
common language in which individuals can communicate. In the EU Parliament, English is the 
most commonly spoken language (at least prior to the Brexit vote), and yet any of the other 
twenty-three languages may be spoken, and language barriers are mitigated against by speeches 
being translated via headsets for MEP’s to listen to. Indeed, in 2012 this translation service cost 
around one billion Euros.577 While the EU institutions have the funds and resources necessary to 
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surmount such linguistic barriers (it also being more likely that office holders can speak additional 
languages), it is going to be impossible to replicate this process across a European demos given 
the sheer number of individuals involved and the myriad locations in which deliberation will 
occur. Indeed, the lack of a common language has been levelled as a serious objection against the 
prospects of cosmopolitanism and global democracy,578 and would therefore seemingly 
undermine my account’s attempt to realise non-domination. 
While this problem will not be resolved in the immediate future, there are reasons to think 
that it might be overstated. After all, it might be mitigated against by digitising deliberation and 
utilising translation software to translate other languages into individuals’ preferred language. 
With that said, even if digitising deliberation in this way is infeasible, the problem might be 
addressed in the long-term through the development of a universal political language, which 
individuals would be able to use to participate in democratic processes. Though difficult, 
developing a universal political language is far from the realms of fantasy. Indeed, Esperanto, 
devised in the late nineteenth century by L. L. Zamenhof, was created with the specific intention 
of fostering international understanding and harmony, and was designed to be easily-learned. 
Indeed, Zamenhof, in a letter to a colleague, claimed that ‘Russians, Poles, Germans and Jews; 
each of these spoke their own language and looked on all the others as enemies. In such a town a 
sensitive nature feels more acutely than elsewhere the misery caused by language division and 
sees at every step that the diversity of languages is the first, or at least the most influential, basis 
for the separation of the human family into groups of enemies.’579 Although Esperanto was, in 
2004, only spoken by around two million people,580 it does evidence that it would be possible to 
construct a politically neutral language which could be used to facilitate global democracy.  
Kymlicka, however, is sceptical about the prospects of developing a universal language. 
Indeed, he notes that many academics today underestimate, ‘the problems that many people have 
in learning a second language. Even when people understand a second language, they rarely 
acquire the same facility in it as in their mother-tongue.’581 Let us assume, then, that the prospects 
of promoting a universal second political language are, at best, unlikely to be realised in the 
immediate future. Nonetheless, I do not think that this renders transnational deliberation 
completely infeasible. Indeed, Habermas and John Dryzek provide us with an account of how 
deliberation can occur across national boundaries and linguistic communities. 
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Habermas argues, in the context of creating a European demos, that: 
 
Translingual citizenship uniting such a wide variety of different language communities is 
a novelty. For this, we need a European public sphere; however, that does not mean a 
new one. Rather, the already existing infrastructure of the existing national public spheres 
is sufficient for Europe-wide communication. National arenas only have to be opened up 
to each other. And the existing national media are sufficient, too, provided they perform 
a complex task of translation; they must learn to report also on the discussions being 
conducted in each other’s countries about the issues of common concern to all citizens of 
the Union. Then the trust among citizens that currently exists in the form of a nationally 
limited civic solidarity can develop into the even more abstract form of trust that reaches 
across national borders.582 
 
 We can see, here, that Habermas believes that the Member States’ national media can 
perform an invaluable task in reporting and translating the dispersed deliberation which occurs 
across the Union, leading to the emergence of the transnational trust and understanding. 
Importantly, this seems to somewhat mirror the deliberative process that Pettit envisions within 
nations and which we considered in the second chapter. That is, we saw that citizens do not come 
together to deliberatively determine the common good or decide on political policies in a plenary 
assembly:583 instead, deliberation is decentralised across a range of political and civic sites, 
including across the media, in the courts, and civil society, and it is the interaction between these 
various sites of deliberation which gradually produces a set of shared interests which can exert 
direction over governance. That being the case, this process could surely be replicated across a 
transnational demos if the media could be induced to report and translate other states’ 
deliberations impartially. 
 Indeed, Habermas’ comments seem to show that it is not necessary for individuals to 
directly deliberate with one another to achieve the twin aims of promoting a shared identity and 
culture and derive a set of shared transnational interests: instead, as happens in multilingual states, 
it would be possible for communities to deliberate in the vernacular, with these deliberations being 
reported across the wider demos, and then engaged with by each linguistic community in their 
own deliberations. With sufficient interaction and feedback between the various national 
communities of the Union, it would be possible for a shared identity to emerge, promoting 
transnational civic solidarity and understanding, and facilitating the emergence of a transnational 
common good. 
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 Importantly, this process seems to be one that Dryzek has in mind in his account of 
deliberative global politics. Indeed, he argues, contrary to Kymlicka, that public spheres can be 
international in scope, and linked to the idea of a transnational or global civil society.584 He goes 
on to argue that democracy does not need to be understood solely in terms of elections as, 
‘Democracy is about communication as well as voting, about social learning as well as decision-
making, and it is the communicative aspects that for the moment can most straightforwardly be 
pursued in the international system.’585 He goes on to distinguish between two kinds of 
deliberative global politics. The former is focused upon formal negotiations between actors. 
Importantly, he argues that while negotiations between international actors might be deliberative, 
they may not be especially democratic. This is because, ‘deliberation occurs whenever 
participants are amenable to changing their minds as a result of reflection induced by non-coercive 
communication. Deliberation only becomes deliberative democracy to the degree it provides 
opportunities for participation by all of those affected by a decision.’586 As a result, Dryzek 
focuses on the elaboration of a theory of transnational discursive democracy premised upon the 
influence that might be exerted over political decision-making by all of those affected by a given 
decision. Indeed, he argues that while, ‘deliberation across divided identities ought to be hard,’587 
discursive democracy can handle deep differences, including cultural differences, by, ‘partially 
decoupling the deliberation and decision aspects of democracy, locating deliberation in the 
engagement of discourses in the public sphere at a distance from any contest for sovereign 
authority. The public spheres in question can transcend national boundaries, and their 
transnational aspects can have an important moderating influence on the clash of identities.’588 In 
decoupling decision-making and deliberation, Dryzek suggests that, ‘transnational discursive 
democracy is a process of democratization,’589 which, ‘constructs or influences international 
outcomes.’590  
 Taken together, these comments point us towards a solution to the problem of linguistic 
barriers to transnational governance. That is, in opening up national public spheres to one another, 
we can create the conditions in which transnational deliberation can take root, with national media 
taking a lead role in reporting on the deliberations being undertaken elsewhere within 
transnational demoi. In decoupling such deliberation from decision-making, as occurs in Pettit’s 
theory when deliberation produces the common good independently of democratic processes, we 
could derive a transnational common good from the interaction between the deliberative public 
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spheres in each nation. As such cross-border deliberation proceeds, we can also hope that a shared 
identity will further reify (being simultaneously promoted through a civic education), further 
encouraging transnational deliberation. Indeed, we can imagine further conditions which might 
facilitate this process. For example, the creation of cross-border special interest groups are likely 
to encourage deliberation between like-minded individuals, and digitised deliberative fora on the 
internet, which utilise technology to translate translingual deliberation, could encourage further 
debate and discussion between members of the transnational or global demos. Finally, the gradual 
promotion of a lingua franca or increased emphasis on learning additional languages might lead 
to a situation in which transnational deliberation is as commonplace as national deliberation. 
 Importantly, as these process become further entrenched, we can see that it would be 
possible to replicate the republican system that Pettit defends in a national context at a 
transnational and global level. That is, a civic education, combined with the promotion of a trans-
nationalism, can provide the mutual trust and shared identity necessary for individuals to see 
themselves as co-members of political communities. In opening up national public spheres to one 
another, we can create a transnational public sphere in which national debates interact with one 
another. As such processes proceed, trans-nationalism would become further entrenched, and a 
set of transnational shared interests would emerge. These shared interests could then be utilised 
to exert direction over governance, while individuals directly aim to influence transnational 
institutions through elections. In this way, we could secure democratic legitimacy in transnational 
communities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued, contrary to a number of theorists, that transnational democracy is 
possible in the future, and that the cosmopolitan framework outlined in the previous chapter could 
secure non-domination if certain conditions are met. These conditions are: the promotion of a 
trans-nationalism; the propagation of a civic education which supports the promotion of trans-
nationalism and prepares citizens to exercise the basic duties of republican citizenship; and the 
opening up of national public spheres to one another in order to create a transnational public 
sphere in which deliberation can occur in the vernacular, across a range of sites, and which will 
gradually lead to the emergence of a transnational common good.  
 To that end, the first section outlined Goodin’s argument that states are necessary because 
they are the communities in which the general duties owed to all individuals are effectively 
discharged, suggesting that cosmopolitanism is either unnecessary or likely to result in a co-
ordination problem. In response, I argued that states’ capacity to discharge their duties has been 
undermined by individualised transnational domination, and that the different levels of 
governance within a cosmopolitan framework would be responsible for discharging specific 
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duties over specified people, thereby avoiding the co-ordination problem. I concluded that 
Goodin’s argument seems to support the move towards embedding states within an overarching 
cosmopolitan framework so that general duties can be properly discharged by agents capable of 
doing so in a globalised world.  
 The second section then outlined the ‘no-demos’ thesis which claims that beyond the state 
there is no shared identity, mutual trust, or communal understanding sufficient to secure 
democratic governance. To that end, I focused on Miller’s liberal nationalism and his claim that 
mutual trust and a shared identity are integral to the creation and maintenance of communities 
committed to social justice, and that democracy itself can only function well when these 
conditions obtain. This would seem to suggest that since a shared nationality is absent at the 
supranational level, the requisite degree of trust and understanding would be similarly absent. As 
such, we would be prevented from deriving a set of shared interests which would direct 
governance in transnational demoi. 
 This led me, in the third section, to defend the necessity of promoting trans-nationalism 
in transnational demoi. I argued, here, that since national identities are constituted by participants’ 
shared beliefs and are subject to creation and reinterpretation, we could surely replicate such 
processes within transnational communities, emphasising a shared history and ideals with a view 
to securing mutual trust and shared understanding. After outlining how this process might work 
within the context of a European transnational demos, I argued that if shared histories and 
narratives were properly cultivated through the opening up of national public spheres, we might 
be able to extend the ideal of civic solidarity beyond the nation-state.  
In the fourth section, I explored Miller’s suggestion of utilising a civic education as a 
mechanism for securing the underlying conditions for a functioning democratic society. To that 
end, I argued that a civic education ought to aim to create virtuous citizens capable of abstracting 
from their particular ends and identifying with their communities’ good, such that we can derive 
a set of shared interests capable of exerting direction over each level of governance. After 
acknowledging that this might conflict with the requirements of securing non-domination, I 
explored Callan’s discussion of creating virtuous citizens, arguing that a civic education would 
secure the preconditions for reciprocal deliberation, enabling polities to derive a common good 
to exert direction over governance; help to secure citizens against ethical servility; combat the 
problem of adaptive preferences by enabling individuals to assess and analyse the beliefs that they 
have; and inculcate the ties of solidarity between individuals, encouraging mutual trust and 
understanding through emphasising a shared history and commonalities.  
In the fifth section I outlined the objection that Callan’s education might be construed as 
a form of cultural imperialism, illiberally manipulating the worldview of children and 
undermining the integrity of some ethical doctrines. After outlining Callan’s response to this 
objection, that it is not dominating to aim to create citizens capable of leading lives of their own 
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choosing and who will abstain from oppressing their fellows, I argued that this is but one example 
of a more general problem. This problem is that the human rights outlined in the previous chapter 
are likely to come into conflict with some cultural or ethical traditions. In response to this concern, 
I have discussed Caney and Sen’s suggestions that human rights may find support in a range of 
non-western traditions, and argued that even if some rights do not find such support, Jones and 
Nussbaum are correct to point out that rights secure the basic freedoms, powers, and resources 
necessary for all individuals to lead lives of their own choosing and can justifiably ‘trump’ the 
claims of cultural or ethical doctrines. 
 The final section outlined Kymlicka’s concern that cosmopolitan democracy will be 
unrealisable because individuals would be unable or disinclined to deliberate with others. After 
outlining his arguments at some length, I argued that Habermas and Dryzek suggest a means to 
surmount this objection. That is, through opening up national public spheres to one another, with 
the media reporting on the deliberations occurring across the transnational demos, we can secure 
something akin to the dispersed deliberation which Pettit believes occurs within national 
communities. This will hopefully lead to an interactive transnational public sphere in which a set 
of shared interests will gradually emerge from the interaction between national communities 
deliberating about the discussions being undertaken elsewhere in the transnational community, 
and securing a transnational common good to exert direction over governance.   
 It therefore seems to be at least theoretically possible that we could create the conditions 
in which transnational democracy might become a feasible option in the future. Indeed, through 
utilising a civic education, promoting a global or trans-nationalism, and opening up national and 
transnational public spheres to one another, we can provide a foundation on which to pursue 
transnational democracy. If such suggestions could be realised, and we could secure mutual trust 
and shared understanding across peoples, we would be able to create a multi-level system of 
democratically shaped constitutional republics in which individuals enjoy non-domination.  
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Conclusion 
 
Overview of the Thesis 
 
My arguments have been developed across six chapters. The introductory chapter focused on 
outlining the background to this research, the intended impact and rationale for this project, the 
scope and the methodology, and a statement of the objectives of each chapter, as well as a general 
guide to how my arguments would be developed across the thesis.  
The first chapter, Domination and Republican Social Justice, focused upon providing a 
thorough overview of Pettit’s account of individual liberty, thereby providing the foundations for 
my own suggestions for addressing transnational domination and securing non-domination in 
later chapters. This chapter started by outlining the historical roots of the concept of non-
domination, discussed its gradual eclipse by the non-interference conception of liberty and then 
outlined Berlin’s analysis of the concepts of positive and negative liberty. I then explored the non-
frustration and non-interference accounts of liberty, arguing, following Pettit, that both are flawed 
and that freedom requires that individuals are free from frustration, interference, and domination. 
This chapter then evidenced that the non-interference account of liberty cannot accommodate the 
concept of domination, and outlined that being a free person requires that individuals have the 
room and resources required to pursue their preferred option from a choice-set, regardless of their 
own or anyone else’s preferences over how they choose. I also argued that underlying this account 
of political liberty is an ideal of personal liberty which sees individuals as capable of engaging in 
self-rule. I argued that a theory of republican social justice requires that dominating agents are 
subject to external constraint and that the basic liberties are protected and resourced to the point 
where individuals can satisfy the eyeball test. After doing so, I outlined and responded to the 
‘critical’ challenge to Pettit’s republicanism, arguing that domination is a phenomenon that occurs 
between agents, not agents and background structures, and that Pettit’s account can accommodate 
these concerns. That is, to the extent that racial stigma, prejudice, and bigotry give rise to an 
invasion or vitiation of choice, domination occurs and would be addressed through protecting and 
resourcing individual choice. I also outlined that background structures may give rise to the 
problem of adaptive preferences which can be addressed through deliberation. Finally, I outlined 
that while structures do not dominate individuals, some corporate entities can. After outlining 
Pettit’s suggestions for guarding against corporate domination, I have argued that these 
mechanisms will not address the dominating potential of multinational corporate agents which 
may be able to easily evade attempts to constrain them by national governments.  
The second chapter, Securing Democratically Legitimate Governance, outlined Pettit’s 
account of democratic legitimacy in detail in order to show that it is possible to secure political 
control without giving rise to imperium, while also arguing that Pettit’s account requires a minor 
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amendment to address the problem of adaptive preferences. To that end, I outlined Pettit’s account 
of democratic legitimacy, in which legitimacy is secured when citizens exercise influence and 
direction over governance, and Pettit’s argument that citizens’ influence over government is 
secured through an electoral democracy supplemented by constitutional and quasi-constitutional 
mechanisms. I also focused on discussing Pettit’s accounts of the cooperatively-admissible 
considerations and norm of norms as mechanisms for deriving the common good which would 
act as a constraint on government action and secure an equally acceptable direction on 
governance. I then considered two counter-arguments to Pettit’s account of democratic 
legitimacy, and turned to the issue of how we might specify the common good. I considered 
Elster’s arguments against tracking individuals’ expressed preferences at length, and endorsed his 
and Pettit’s suggestion that we determine the common good deliberatively. I have outlined Pettit’s 
account of deriving a set of shared interests which cohere with the norm of norms from dispersed 
deliberative interactions between citizens at a range of political and civil sites. I then outlined a 
digital deliberative assembly as a supplement to Pettit’s account of the state which would serve 
as a means for addressing the problem of adaptive preferences through enabling citizens to 
transform their raw preferences into informed preferences. Finally, I argued that even if a society 
secured the basic liberties and met the requirements for democratic legitimacy, thereby securing 
social and political justice, its citizens might still be subject to domination. This is because 
external agents, such as multinational corporations, other nations, and supranational institutions 
may be able to interfere with just states. 
The third chapter, The Problem of Transnational Domination, then turned to an analysis 
of the twin problems of transnational domination and individualised transnational domination, 
and an examination of Pettit and Bohman’s suggestions for addressing these problems. My aim, 
here, was to highlight that while neither theorist’s account is able to secure international justice, 
their conceptions of transnational domination are equally problematic and must be addressed 
simultaneously. To that end, I started by outlining Pettit’s account of transnational domination 
which sees transnational domination as a problem in which states are subject to interference (or 
the threat of interference) by other transnational agents, and the problem of individualised 
transnational domination, in which control bypasses the state and interferes in the lives of 
individuals. I then turned to an analysis of Pettit’s accounts of global non-domination in A 
Republican Law of Peoples and Just Freedom. I argued, here, that both of Pettit’s accounts are 
problematic because they represent strategies that Pettit himself rejects: the former, which 
emphasises states combining into blocs to combat others’ power, amounts to a defence of the 
strategy of reciprocal power which will undermine the range of unvitiated choice available to 
agents; and the latter, premised upon multilateralism and state-centred governance, is problematic 
because it relies on all states acting virtuously and does not secure the external constraints 
necessary to remove the option of interference from agents’ choice-sets. I then outlined Bohman’s 
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suggestions for addressing the problem of individualised transnational domination, arguing that 
it would be infeasible to create democratic institutions capable of responding to continually 
fluctuating demoi and that there would seem to be no way to clearly define each demos’ scope, 
powers, and competencies in relation to other demoi. I finally argued that in order to develop an 
account of international justice, it will be necessary to acknowledge that control can be exerted 
across borders, affecting many identifiable but unspecifiable individuals, while retaining a focus 
on the necessity of securing states’ capacity to secure social and political justice, as well as 
securing democratic legitimacy beyond the state. This insight, I argued, should lead us to pursue 
Pettit’s earlier suggestions of replicating the strategy of constitutional provision at a global level.  
The fourth chapter, A Framework for Transnational Republican Governance, aimed to 
offer a solution to the twin forms of transnational domination by outlining a framework within 
which individuals can enjoy social, political, and international justice. To that end, I started by 
outlining the ‘the boundary problem,’ arguing that it is necessary to redraw democratic boundaries 
in order to ensure that all of those subject to control are able to influence and direct it, and thereby 
render it non-dominating. As such, I argued that demoi must be constituted on the basis of who 
can be deemed to be possibly affected by a given issue, while taking into account real world 
constraints and thereby supplementing the principle of affectedness with a principle of 
subsidiarity. After outlining this approach to constituting demoi, I considered two accounts of 
transnational governance as possible means for pursuing the aims of neo-republican governance. 
After outlining and rejecting experimentalist governance and Gould’s interactive democracy as 
suitable accounts of transnational governance, I offered an extended analysis of Held’s global 
social democracy and argued that his approach, with some elaboration and refinement, would 
enable us to realise each of the requirements of neo-republican governance. I then turned to an 
analysis of the role to be played by human rights within such a framework. Here, I argued that 
that Pettit’s fundamental basic liberties and welfare rights, which guard against dependence, 
should be seen to be a set of human rights which must be globally entrenched and enforced, the 
contravention of which would justify intervention by the transnational and global community. 
Finally, I turned to the issue of resolving jurisdictional disputes which might arise when 
attempting to determine the correct level for decision-making and, after indicating that Held has 
tentatively suggested that it would be possible to create boundary courts as a means for resolving 
such disputes, I outlined such a model. I argued that it is important to ensure that the principles 
of affectedness and subsidiarity are upheld within states as well as at a transnational level. I 
concluded by noting that, though seemingly capable of addressing the problem of transnational 
domination, it may be infeasible or undesirable to create demoi beyond the nation-state because 
there are deeply irreconcilable differences between peoples who lack a shared culture, language 
or history.  
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The fifth chapter, Securing the Conditions for Transnational Republicanism, argued that 
we could secure democracy beyond the nation-state, and therefore realise international justice, 
through the promotion of a trans-nationalism, the propagation of a civic education, and the 
opening up of national public spheres to one another in order to create transnational public 
spheres. To that end, I considered and responded to a series of objections to transnational 
democracy, starting with Goodin’s arguments to the effect that transnational democracy might be 
unnecessary because states are the communities in which the general duties owed to all 
individuals are effectively discharged. In response, I argued that states’ capacity to discharge their 
duties has been undermined by globalisation and individualised transnational domination, and 
that it is necessary to embed states within an overarching cosmopolitan framework so that general 
duties can be properly discharged by agents capable of doing so in a globalised world. I then 
considered Miller’s argument that mutual trust and a shared identity are integral to the creation 
and maintenance of communities committed to social justice and to securing a well-functioning 
democracy, and his claim that these conditions are absent beyond the state. If correct, Miller’s 
argument would seem to suggest that we would be unable to derive a set of shared interests which 
would direct governance in transnational demoi. In response, I argued that we could promote a 
‘thinner’ trans-nationalism, emphasising a shared history and ideals with a view to securing 
mutual trust and shared understanding in transnational demoi. I then turned to a discussion of 
Callan’s account of civic education, arguing that a civic education would support the aim of 
creating transnational demoi by encouraging reciprocal deliberation and encouraging mutual trust 
and understanding through emphasising a shared history and commonalities. I also acknowledged 
the objection that Callan’s education might be construed as a form of cultural imperialism and 
argued that this is but one example of a more general problem. This problem is that human rights 
may to come into conflict with some cultural or ethical traditions. In response, I noted that human 
rights may find support in a range of non-western traditions and argued that even if they do not, 
rights secure the basic freedoms, powers, and resources necessary for all individuals to lead lives 
of their own choosing and can justifiably ‘trump’ the claims of cultural or ethical doctrines. 
Finally, I considered Kymlicka’s argument that cosmopolitan democracy will be unrealisable 
because individuals would be unable or disinclined to deliberate with others. In response, I argued, 
following Habermas and Dryzek, that if we open up national public spheres to one another we 
can secure something akin to the dispersed deliberation which Pettit believes occurs within 
national communities. This would facilitate the emergence of an interactive transnational public 
sphere in which a set of shared interests will gradually emerge from dispersed deliberation across 
transnational demoi, securing a set of shared interests to direct governance.  
It seems possible, then, to secure social, political, and international justice within a 
cosmopolitan democratic framework in which states’ capacity to secure social and political justice 
is protected; transnational agents are subject to external constraints in the form of an independent, 
213 
 
overarching system of democratically shaped constitutionalism; and in which individuals are able 
to influence and direct the control that they’re subject to at each level of governance. In this way, 
we can address the twin forms of transnational domination and secure non-domination.  
 
Original Contributions of the Thesis 
 
This thesis has aimed to make two significant contributions to the literature. The first of these 
contributions has been to outline a coherent and defensible conception of transnational 
domination which combines Pettit and Bohman’s accounts of transnational domination. Indeed, I 
have argued that there are two forms of transnational domination which must be addressed 
simultaneously in order to secure international justice. The first form of transnational domination 
occurs when transnational agents interfere, or threaten to interfere, with states. This is because, 
as argued by Pettit, any restrictions at the level of the state will correlatively restrict the lives of 
individuals living within that community. The second form of transnational domination, what I 
have called individualised transnational domination, occurs when control bypasses the state and 
interferes in the lives of individuals. The second significant contribution has been to argue that 
addressing the two forms of transnational domination should lead us to seek to replicate the 
strategy of constitutional provision at a global level. Doing so, I argued, would require the creation 
of a multi-level system of governance within which: states would be able to secure social and 
political justice; transnational agents, including multinational corporations, would be subject to 
constitutional constraints; and individuals would be able to influence and direct the governance 
that they’re subject to.  
 In making these contributions, I have broadly endorsed Pettit’s accounts of social and 
political justice, with important amendments to his attempts to address the problems of dominium 
and imperium. As such, I have argued that adaptive preferences count as personal vitiating factors 
which ought to be mitigated against, and that guarding against them requires the creation of a 
formal deliberative institution which would support the transformation of raw preferences into 
informed preferences. In addition, I have argued that such an institution would support Pettit’s 
aims by making it easier to track changes in the common good; empowering citizens to fully 
participate in their society and contest their government if it fails to act in accordance with the 
common good; and secure citizens’ capacity to exercise eternal vigilance over their government 
and thereby safeguard their liberty.  
Despite endorsing Pettit’s accounts of social and political justice, I argued that his 
accounts of international justice do not realise their aims. To that end, I outlined that, in A 
Republican Law of Peoples, Pettit argues that it would be necessary to develop a set of global 
regulatory norms or rules, which would discipline international agents and constrain their actions, 
and that weaker states would need to coalesce into blocs to counterbalance the power of stronger 
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states. This strategy has been shown to be problematic and unable to secure non-domination 
because each state’s range of unvitiated freedom is reduced by the need to combat potential 
interference, and may entail a war of all against all since states would be continually seeking to 
bolster their position relative to other states. As such, this strategy may secure non-interference 
(if states are able to successfully project their power so that other states forgo attempts at interfere 
with them), but not non-domination since the option to interfere with others is not removed from 
states’ choice-sets. In addition, I have argued that the necessity of seeing off external threats will 
likely give rise to a correlative reduction of internal social and political justice since states may 
need to organise themselves as though in a state of permanent war.     
I have also shown that his most recent account of international justice, as outlined in Just 
Freedom, requires that states support and uphold the global infrastructure which would secure 
non-domination, and this is a strategy that Pettit has himself rejected. Indeed, I have shown that 
when considering how the problem of domination might be addressed between individuals, Pettit 
acknowledges that, ‘Even if I form the view that it is wrong to interfere with you, it remains the 
case that I may prefer to practice interference, whether out of weakness of will, out of malice, or 
out of a will for evil; the option continues to lie within my capacity,’591 and concludes that, ‘My 
power of interference in your choice, and my domination over you, can only be contained by 
external checks that remove or replace the interference option or put it cognitively off the 
menu.’592 I have argued that just as individuals cannot be relied upon to always forbear from 
interfering with others, and must therefore be subject to external constraints which would remove 
the option of interference from their grasp, states similarly cannot be relied upon to uphold an 
international order when it is not in their interests to do so, and will also need to be subject to 
external constraints which put the option of interference out of reach. As long as individuals or 
states retain the capacity to interfere with one another, all are dependent on others’ forbearance 
and goodwill and therefore subject to domination.  
While each of these accounts of international justice fail on their own terms to secure 
non-domination, the further issue is that Pettit does not address the problem of individualised 
transnational domination, wherein control bypasses the state and interferes in the lives of 
individuals. I have argued that the twin forms of transnational domination must therefore be 
addressed simultaneously, such that socially and politically just states are protected from external 
interference, and that individuals are able to influence and direct the control that they’re subject 
to by transnational institutions. Doing so, I have argued, warrants a return to Pettit’s suggestions 
in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government and the replication of the strategy of 
constitutional provision at a global level.  
                                                          
591 Pettit, On the People’s Terms, p. 63. 
592 Ibid., p. 63. 
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 In order to realise these aims, I considered the affectedness problem at length. This was 
necessary because securing democratic legitimacy requires that political control is ‘forced to track 
the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference (my emphasis),’593 and yet the 
discussion of individualised transnational domination suggested that political control is not 
territorially confined, necessitating a re-examination of democratic boundaries. To that end, I 
argued, following Goodin, that the principle of ‘all possibly affected interests’ is the most suitable 
way to determine the demos who ought to be able to determine political decisions, while also 
arguing that surmounting the problem of overinclusion requires that this principle be 
supplemented by a principle of subsidiarity. I then argued that Held’s framework of cosmopolitan 
democracy would be an appropriate means for realising our aims since it would secure states from 
external interference; enable us to replicate Pettit’s democratically shaped constitutionalism at 
each level of governance and ensure that individuals are able to influence and direct the decisions 
that they’re subject to; and ensure that transnational agents, such as multinational corporations, 
are subject to constraints which would mitigate against their capacity to interfere with states or 
individuals. I also argued that a series of boundary courts would be able to determine the most 
appropriate location for democratic decision-making, and that Pettit’s account of the fundamental 
basic liberties and welfare rights, which guard against dependence, ought to be reconceptualised 
as a set of human rights which would need to be globally entrenched and enforced. This is because 
these items secure the conditions in which individuals are able to plan and lead lives of their own 
choosing. Finally, I considered a series of objections to the multi-level system of governance, 
arguing that while the conditions for functioning democracies beyond the state are largely absent 
at present, it would be possible to create these conditions through the promotion of trans-
nationalisms, utilising a civic education, and opening up national public spheres to one another 
and thereby creating transnational and global public spheres. Doing so, I argued, would enable us 
to derive a common good in transnational demoi which would render transnational governance 
democratically legitimate.  
In addition to these two central contributions, I have made five further contributions. 
Firstly, I hope to have shown that the concerns of the ‘critical’ republicans, including Thompson, 
Coffee, and Krause, can be accommodated by Pettit’s theory, albeit in a slightly amended form. 
That is, while Pettit is right to insist that domination is a phenomenon that occurs between agents 
rather than between agents and structures, the deleterious effects of racial stigma, prejudice, and 
bigotry ought to be viewed as an invasion or vitiation of choice and should be addressed through 
the resourcing and protection of individuals’ choices. Importantly, I have further shown that while 
the background structures themselves do not dominate individuals, they can give rise to adaptive 
preferences which will undermine individuals’ freedom of opportunity.  
                                                          
593 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 55. 
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As such, and secondly, I have shown that Pettit’s theory can accommodate the problem 
of adaptive preferences without deviating from its essential principles. That is, Pettit’s account of 
democratic institutions could be expanded to include a formal deliberative institution which 
would facilitate the transformation of individuals’ raw preferences into informed preferences. In 
addition, such an institution would further support Pettit’s account of social and political justice 
by making it easier for democratic institutions to track any changes in citizens’ shared norms; and 
by enhancing citizens’ contestatory role, enabling them to keep tabs on their government and 
contest any decisions that they believe are incompatible with the common good.  
Thirdly, I hope to have shown that not only is neo-republicanism compatible with 
cosmopolitan democracy, but that securing non-domination requires that republics are embedded 
within an overarching framework of democratically shaped constitutionalism. Indeed, I hope to 
have evidenced that protecting states’ capacity to secure social and political justice requires the 
replication of the strategy of constitutional provision at a global level, such that the option of 
interference can be removed from transnational agents’ choice-sets in like-manner to the way in 
which states remove the option from individuals’ choice-sets. In addition, I hope to have 
convincingly shown that the problem of individualised transnational domination requires that we 
rethink the boundaries of democratic communities, such that individuals are able to influence and 
direct all of the decisions that they’re subject to.  
Fourthly, I hope to have offered a novel solution to the boundary problem, one which 
follows Goodin’s principle of ‘all possibly affected interests’, while also acknowledging the 
problem of overinclusion. Indeed, I argued that rendering control non-arbitrary requires that it is 
those individuals suffering interference who must direct and influence it, and that an overinclusive 
approach to specifying demoi will undermine this requirement by permitting myriad of 
individuals who are free from interference to determine control for others. As such, I hope to have 
shown that avoiding overinclusion ought to be of particular concern to neo-republicans, and that 
it can be addressed through embracing the principle of subsidiarity. I also hope to have shown 
that a system of boundary courts would be able to resolve jurisdictional disputes. 
Finally, I have shown that such a political framework and transnational democracy could 
be realisable in the future. Indeed, I have argued that it would be possible to promote a 
transnationalism which emphasises a shared history, a common identity, and set of shared values, 
each of which will contribute to the emergence of mutual trust and understanding in transnational 
demoi. Additionally, I have shown that a civic education can support this aim by creating 
‘virtuous’ citizens, and have argued that the cultural imperialism objection need not lead us to 
eschew educating citizens in the requisite way since such an education, as well as a range of other 
human rights, are necessary for securing individuals’ capacity to lead lives of their own. I have 
also shown that a central component of the emergence of transnational demoi will be the opening 
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up national public spheres in order to facilitate the emergence of a transnational public sphere out 
of which a transnational common good can materialise.  
 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 
With that said, there are also some limitations to this thesis which are suggestive of fruitful 
avenues for future research. Broadly, these limitations can be categorised into three groups. First, 
I have not considered what amendments would be need to be made to this ideal theory in order to 
render it applicable to the non-ideal world; second, I haven’t offered an in-depth analysis of 
institutional design or outlined fine-grained blueprints for the realisation of some components of 
this theory; and third, I have not extensively explored the possibility of responding to the problem 
of domination through civil society.  
As discussed in the introduction, this thesis has focused upon considering the concept of 
domination in an ideal context. As such, this theory has been built upon a number of assumptions, 
including, for example: that states can be organised such that social and political justice can be 
realised internally; that states have the capacity to provide the basic liberties and welfare rights to 
their citizens; that states could be induced to devolve and expatriate powers to sub-state and 
transnational levels of governance; and that states could provide the kind of civic education 
outlined by Callan even if this runs contrary to the interests of some of their citizens. While I have 
outlined and defended a series of considerations which justify the desirability of each of these 
measures, we must acknowledge that in the real world such requirements may be difficult to 
achieve or face serious opposition.  
I have not considered such issues since, as noted in the introduction, my aim has been to 
outline what securing non-domination would ideally require, with the aim of providing guidance 
to others who might be concerned with analysing how we might move towards a world in which 
domination is prevented or largely mitigated against. While my conclusions are therefore limited 
by focusing on the development of an ideal theory, I do not think that this is overly problematic. 
This is because in order to know what states of the world we actually want to aim at, it is necessary 
to firstly consider whether such states are desirable in and of themselves. I hope to have shown 
that it is desirable to develop a cosmopolitan democratic framework in which social, political, and 
international justice can be realised, and it is therefore the task of political scientists and non-ideal 
theorists to look to adapt this theory for application in the real world. As such, areas of focus for 
future research would include, but are not limited to, the following topics. Firstly, it would be 
necessary to explore how developing states might provide the requisite resources for their citizens 
to plan and lead lives of their own choosing and consider whether this would necessitate 
redistribution of resources and wealth across states. Secondly, it would be important to analyse 
what initial steps might need to be taken to facilitate the fusion of the existing state-system into a 
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multi-level system of governance. Thirdly, it would be imperative to consider how individuals’ 
objections to a civic education or other rights might be overcome in the real world, and look at 
what steps would need to be taken to mitigate against their objections. Indeed, while I have argued 
that rights can justifiably trump cultural or other ethical considerations, in the real world this issue 
would need to be treated with considerable delicacy and diplomacy. While these suggestions are 
only indicative of the kinds of issues which would need to be considered from a non-ideal 
perspective, they do highlight that it would be both useful and necessary for future research to 
consider exactly how this theory might be implemented in the real world.   
The second way in which this thesis is limited is by the decision not to engage in an in-
depth analysis of how we might design the various institutions, constitutional and quasi-
constitutional mechanisms, electoral systems, and educational proposals which would 
characterise the multi-level framework. While it would have been interesting to consider and 
develop such blueprints, doing so would have been to depart from the principal aims of this thesis. 
Indeed, I do not think the decision not to engage in such an analysis is overly problematic since 
my theory does not prescribe any one set of specific institutions and, indeed, would be compatible 
with a wide-range of proposals.  
For example, I haven’t considered the actual mechanisms by which transnational agents 
might be constrained, instead simply outlining the framework within which such constraints could 
be determined. That is, constraining multinational corporations might require the democratisation 
of these agents, the issuing of charters which specify how they might conduct their business, or 
the creation of binding global legislation. It seems likely that preventing such agents from exerting 
domination would require a combination of each of these suggestions but explicating the exact 
mechanisms has been beyond the scope of this thesis. With that said, the multi-level framework 
that I have outlined would enable individuals to co-determine the global response to the 
depredations of corporations, ensuring that they’re able to direct democratic institutions to 
safeguard their freedom. Similarly, I haven’t specified what institutions would need to be created 
at each level of governance in order to secure influence and direction beyond the state, instead 
suggesting that we aim to replicate the mechanisms that Pettit defends within national 
communities. I therefore haven’t considered what form of democracy would be most appropriate 
at a transnational or global level, nor indicated exactly which constitutional and quasi-
constitutional mechanisms would be most appropriate for securing non-domination.  
These and many other institutional questions are beyond the scope of this thesis but they 
offer an interesting and fruitful avenue for further research. Indeed, there would be a need to 
outline whether, for example, states would have representatives sitting in transnational or global 
legislatures, or whether representatives would be selected directly by the respective demos. 
Similarly, it would be interesting to explore how democratically shaped constitutionalism can be 
combined with boundary courts to secure democratic legitimacy beyond the state.  
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The third limitation to this thesis has been the decision to focus on a political response to 
the problem of domination rather than considering the less formal mechanisms that might achieve 
or supplement the same ends. Indeed, it is possible that there may have been additional 
conclusions to be drawn had I focused upon the role of civil society in guarding against 
domination. For example, in discussing the problem of adaptive preferences, I have focused upon 
how this issue might be resolved politically through the creation of a deliberative institution which 
would enable individuals to discard such preferences. Nonetheless, it seems clear that addressing 
the causes of such preferences, including racism, homophobia, and sexism, would require 
significant changes within civil society that would go beyond formal legislation which prohibits 
overt forms of discrimination. Likewise, I have argued that a civic education would be required 
to support the emergence of transnational and global nationalisms, as well as ensuring that 
individuals are empowered to participate in political processes in the requisite way, but it may be 
the case that more far reaching changes would be required. That is, we might have to look beyond 
the education of children and consider less formal ways of educating citizens, including adults, 
and explore the role which might be played by civil society in achieving the desired ends. 
While my conclusions are therefore limited by the decision to focus upon the political 
response to domination, I think that exploring what changes might be required within civil society 
represents a fruitful and necessary avenue for future research. Indeed, it would be important to 
consider, for example, how we might facilitate changes within civil society and individuals’ 
attitudes in order to address some of the sources of adaptive preferences. Likewise, it would be 
necessary to explore whether formal schooling is sufficient to craft civic-minded citizens, or 
whether more significant changes would be required within civil society. Finally, it would also 
be useful to explore what additional changes would need be necessary within civil society to 
support the emergence of a more cosmopolitan attitude amongst citizens. While these suggestions 
are far from exhaustive, they nonetheless do offer an indication of avenues for future research 
which would address some of the limitations in my own research and contribute meaningfully to 
the neo-republican literature.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has provided a coherent and defensible conception of transnational 
domination, and an account of how this problem might be addressed. I have argued that 
transnational domination can come in two distinct forms: when control is exerted over a state and 
when control bypasses the state and interferes in the lives of individuals. Addressing the two 
forms of transnational domination, I have argued, should lead us to pursue a new account of 
international justice, one which is premised upon the strategy of constitutional provision. Securing 
non-domination, I have argued, requires the creation of a cosmopolitan democratic multi-level 
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system of governance within which states would be able to secure internal social and political 
justice; transnational agents, including multinational corporations, would be subject to 
constitutional constraints; and individuals would be able to influence and direct the governance 
that they’re subject to, rendering it democratically legitimate. This thesis therefore shows that it 
is possible to secure social, political, and international justice without giving rise to a global 
Leviathan, and points us in the direction of a neo-republican cosmopolitan future.  
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